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Non-materialist theory vs materialistic
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In regards to ontology and Metaphysics, there has always been the question of whether or not the nature of reality is fundamentally material or phenomenal, or whether or not mental states emerge from material causes thereby making them causally inert in themselves or whether or not material things are subsets of an underlying phenomenal realm where this has given rise to two branches of philosophy – materialism and non-materialism. Materialism was adopted as philosophy ontologically privileged to exhaustively describe everything that is by Western philosophy starting with an axiom put forth by the Stoics; everything that exists is material where there is nothing that exists that is immaterial. Western Science takes that axiom, along with its implied postulates, for granted, though, now the idea is that there exists nothing that is not physical. This subtle is called physicalism; however, the underlying premise is an inductive argument meaning that it can be disproved via counter-examples to axioms that define what it means for something to be material, so in order to prove non-materialism, one needs to come up with empirical counter-examples where Parapsychology provides empirical counter-examples that support anti-materialism.
Physicalism starts off with the premise that there exists nothing that is not physical where everything that exists is physical; however, how does one define what it means for something to be physical? Intuitively, when one thinks of the word physical, one thinks of things that are material and concrete, but there are things that are immaterial yet physical such as vacuums and fields. The things that are physical that predicate both material objects, such as matter and energy, and immaterial objects, such...
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... in parapsychology where this provides an empirical case for non-materialism and a counter-example to physicalism.
Similarly to how physicalism says that everything that exists is a subset of a physical domain, the non-spatialtemporal nature of precognition, and other psychic phenomena, would imply that the physical world is actually a subset of a non-physical domain where entities in that domain have causal properties where things.
While physicalism is taken for granted within Western science and philosophy where non-materialism is often times looked at as not being true and something that people not educated in science agree with, it is an inductive case where inductive cases can be argued against by showing counter-examples. Parapsychology provides a significant amount of empirical counter-examples to physicalism.
In this paper, I will argue that it is more likely that the qualia of colour could be explained by physicalism rather than by property dualism. Qualia are subjective experiences, such as our senses (pg. 3). Physicalism views every property as physical, and can be explained by science (pg. 29). Property dualism refers to the philosophical view that minds are made out of one substance, but contain physical properties, and a non-physical mind (qualia) that are not related to each other (pg. 29).
Frank Jackson begins his article by writing about what he feels to be a fatal flaw in physicalism. He writes a story about a girl named Mary who is raised in a black-and-white room. In this room Mary was taught everything there is to know about the physical world. The only catch is she learned only from media, which was black-and-white, so she knows nothing of the colors outside this room. After learning everything about the physical world, she is then given the chance to see color. She will then "learn" what color is in the world. For this reason Jackson believes physicalism to be false.
Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, while relying on the validity of epiphenomenalism, manages to stand to arguments of physicalism. The ability of conceivable ‘zombies’ to register qualia without experiencing it responds to the claims of acquaintance arguments. Furthermore, beliefs that qualia would provoke physical changes and reactions are accompanied by flawed assertions of attempting to capture the nature of causation. Qualia and the necessity of non-physical knowledge to their existence provide valid arguments to upholding dualist beliefs.
The first argument to be discussed is that of conceivability, which aims to disprove that the mind and
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
Princess Elizabeth 's objection to Substance Dualism rests on her belief that because the mind does not have surfaces, the mind can not transfer energy to the body and therefore can not make the body react. I will challenge this idea by offering another form of causation.
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
Physicalism is the theory that the universe contains nothing other than the physical. Therefore, the universe can be fully explained in physical terms. In terms of the mind, mental states globally supervene on physical states, meaning that there are no changes in the mental without changes in the physical. Identity theory is a type of physicalism, which posits that brain states are identical to mental states. They may not have exactly the same meanings, but the refer to the same thing. This is opposed to Dualism, which contends that mental states are non-physical and therefore different than brain states.
Physicalism, to further specify, states that everything is dependent upon the physical world, and that there is nothing over and above the physical world. It states that everything can be defined in purely physical terms. This view has many implications, especially within the philosophy of mind, where it stands in stark contrast to dualism which puts the mind above the physical world. This focus on the philosophy of mind is, in part, due to it producing most of the objections that appear against physicalism. Within the philosophy of mind, physicalism states that all mental states can be equated to some physical state. Note that this does not necessarily imply the identity hypothesis, or the idea that a specific mental state is associated with a spe...
Fodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist theory, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of saying "Dr. Lux is hungry," one would say "If there was a quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it." The central-state identity theory states that a certain mental state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a way similar to Berkeley’s representation of objects. Both mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
As regards materialism, the downside of this doctrine is that when materialists attempt to reduce the mental realm to the physical by saying that mental experiences are brain processes, they deny the existence of consciousness, sometimes called ‘qualia’, which is nevertheless a subjective aspect of mental experiences. According to Dualism, having different properties is not the only difference between Mental and Physical realms, a third difference between the two as mentioned earlier is qualitative. Mental happenings have subjective qualities such as what it feels like, looks like or sounds like. Descartes' view claims that material properties could never produce something as perplexing as consciousness or awareness, because such qualities
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
In the reading Philosophy Before Socrates by Robert Mckirahan I was impressed by the elements discussed in the story on Democritus. The idea of the element of wind prompted the questions of physical and non- physical entities in my mind. When I consider the tree and the process of photosynthesis that requires chlorophyll, and the chemist approach to distilling that very chlorophyll the relations comes to mine. Would that relationship be the same if we was to ask the chemist to distill the photosynthesis? Would this relationship be different due to the non-physical abilities of the photosynthesis? Both philosophers and scientists believe the brain creates a physical process that creates thoughts. It is in this thought that relationship between the mental and physical realm can become causal. It’s important to highlight that the brain (like photosynthesis) can’t be isolated from the physical body. In the case of another physical element the wind comes to mind. The wind is composed of material entities, such as molecules of oxygen and nitrogen, all of which creates a rapid movement that
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.