Wait a second!
More handpicked essays just for you.
More handpicked essays just for you.
Thomas Nagel biography and death
What is it like to be a bat thomas nagel main arguments
Don’t take our word for it - see why 10 million students trust us with their essay needs.
Critique on Thomas Nagel's What it is like to be a bat?
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
In ?What is it like to be a bat??, Nagel attempts to distinguish between objective and subjective conscious experience. He begins his paper by explaining how ?consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem intractable? (p. 534) and why reductionists must use this in order to come to a true conclusion about the mind. He uses the ?what is it like to be a bat? example to support this argument because he wants to prove that the mind has a subjective aspect to it. However, this argument already begins with a flaw. This argument presupposes that a bat is a thinking, conscious being. He even states this prior to the bat example when he states ?Conscious experience is a widespread pheno...
... middle of paper ...
...ay need to be included in the answer to the mind-body problem in order for a true solution to be obtained. I do not believe that mental states can be explained with the simple firing of neurons. This explanation would leave out the conscious experience. Consciousness involves experience and an awareness of one?s surroundings. It seems as if this must be included in the answer to the mind-problem because if not, then this aspect would be left out. In order to correct Nader?s argument, one would need to clarify his presuppositions. However, he does seem to make plausible points and hopefully this will be enough to deter other philosophers from sticking straight to physicalism. Otherwise, they must first reject the subjective nature of the mind in order to come to a truly valid conclusion.
Bibliography:
Nagel, Thomas. "What is it like to be a bat?"
Richard Taylor explained why the body and the mind are one, and why they are not two separate substances. In the article “The Mind as a Function of the Body”, Taylor divides his article in a number of sections and explains clearly why dualism, or the theory that the mind and the body are separate is not conceivable. In one of these sections it is explained in detail the origin of why some philosophers and people believe in dualist metaphysics. As stated by Taylor “when we form an idea of a body or a physical object, what is most likely to come to mind is not some person or animal but something much simpler, such as a stone or a marble”(133). The human has the tendency to believe a physical object as simple, and not containing anything complex. A problem with believing this is that unlike a stone or a marble a human (or an animal) has a brain and the body is composed of living cells (excluding dead skin cells, hair, and nails which are dead cells). The f...
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
This paper aims to endorse physicalism over dualism by means of Smart’s concept of identity theory. Smart’s article Sensations and the Brain provides a strong argument for identity theory and accounts for many of it primary objections. Here I plan to first discuss the main arguments for physicalism over dualism, then more specific arguments for identity theory, and finish with further criticisms of identity theory.
In Searle’s first argument against the distinction between the mental and physical, he assumes this mistaken assumption is largely due to one’s common-sense supposition that there indeed is a distinction between the mental and physical at some deep metaphysical level. Searle confronts this assumption with the simple fact that he believes Consciousness it is a systematic biological phenomenon, much like digestion, and as such, concludes, that consciousness is a feature of the brain as such such is part of the physical world. However, I agree with Searle in the sense that the through simple reduction there incidentally will be a metaphysical distinction between mental and physical, however I disagree with the way in which he counters this.
Thomas Nagel begins his collection of essays with a most intriguing discussion about death. Death being one of the most obviously important subjects of contemplation, Nagel takes an interesting approach as he tries to define the truth as to whether death is, or is not, a harm for that individual. Nagel does a brilliant job in attacking this issue from all sides and viewpoints, and it only makes sense that he does it this way in order to make his own observations more credible.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
This very intricate nature of consciousness led reductionist to not adequately addressing the difference between mind and body. For Nagel, what makes consciousness or the mind so difficult to grasp is its subjectivity. In the article “ What is it like to be a bat?”, Nagel argues that although science allows us to understand certain attributes and of their behaviours, one simply understands what it would be like to be a bat from a human perspective. This understanding is thus flawed as it is subjective to individual’s preconceptions. Angel asserts that the subjective nature of the minds acts as a barrier to understanding what it is truly like to be anything, other than one’s self. This subjective theory does not simply apply to animals, Nagel gives the example of a blind individual, although constitutionally similar to an individual with sight, there is no way a blind person could perceive or understand what the experience of seeing colour entails. As one’s perception of colour is described in a subjective point of view. One cannot to any sufficient detail, objectively describe what it is like to experience anything, as all experiences as based on
This argument supports the claim that the body and mind are two in the same. Premise 1 explains the reason we feel pain from stubbing our toe is that the mind and body work together. In a Dualist view minds are non-physical and non-spatial. Based on the assumption that our mind can be spatially divided there is no way to prove this because the only way the mind can be divided is in space and we can’t verify this to be true.
I do not think that the mind and body are the same thing. Both from arguments relating to my own beliefs, and with supporting arguments I hope to have thoroughly explained why I feel this way. I just don?t see how something as unique as the mind, with so much nonphysical substance to it, can be a part of the brain, an object which is so definitively physical. Although I feel the two are separate, this does not mean that I think they have no connections at all. The mind and brain are, without a doubt, a team. They interact together and run the body, however, they just are not the same thing.
In accordance to the argument from analogy, although an individual may experience the same sensations or feelings as I do, this does not mean that we share the same conscious experiences. For example, let’s consider the conscious experiences between a blind man and a man with normal eyesight who partake in the same routines and/or activities throughout their day. In this scenario, both men cannot claim that they know what it is like to be the other person based on their different experiences with their sense of vision. In other words, the man who has normal eyesight is usually able to understand what he is reading, eating, or doing at a certain time throughout his day. However, for the blind man, he does not have the ability to rely on his sense of vision in order to understand what activities he partakes in. Therefore, although both men have the ability to understand how each other’s senses work and/or feel, their experiences with vision, taste, smell, touch, and hearing can only be shared with themselves and no one else. For this reason, Nagel would say that both men could not know what it is like to be the other person because of the lack of prior knowledge, memories, or
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
Since Descartes many philosophers have discussed the problem of interaction between the mind and body. Philosophers have given rise to a variety of different answers to this question all with their own merits and flaws. These answers vary quite a lot. There is the idea of total separation between mind and body, championed by Descartes, which has come to be known as “Cartesian Dualism”. This, of course, gave rise to one of the many major responses to the mind-body problem which is the exact opposite of dualism; monism. Monism is the idea that mind and body one and the same thing and therefore have no need for interaction. Another major response to the problem is that given by Leibniz, more commonly known as pre-ordained harmony or monadology. Pre-ordained harmony simply states that everything that happens, happens because God ordained it to. Given the wide array of responses to the mind-body problem I will only cover those given by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. I will also strive to show how each of these philosophers discuss what mind and body are and how each accounts for God’s influence on the interaction of mind and body, as this is an interesting distinction between them, as well as the important question of the role of substance. This is important, I believe, because it helps to understand the dialogue between the three philosophers.
While the great philosophical distinction between mind and body in western thought can be traced to the Greeks, it is to the influential work of René Descartes, French mathematician, philosopher, and physiologist, that we owe the first systematic account of the mind/body relationship. As the 19th century progressed, the problem of the relationship of mind to brain became ever more pressing.
...ocesses which are distinct from observable behavioral responses. Acts such as thinking, remembering, perceiving, and willing are defined by behavioral actions and by dispositions to perform behavioral actions. However, Ryle criticises Behaviorist theory for being overly simplistic and mechanistic, just as he criticizes Cartesian theory for being overly simplistic and mechanistic. While Cartesian theory asserts that hidden mental processes cause the behavioral responses of the conscious individual, Behaviorism asserts that stimulus-response mechanisms cause the behavioral responses of the conscious individual. Ryle argues that both the Cartesian theory and the Behaviorist theory are too simplistic and mechanistic to enable us to fully understand the Concept of Mind.
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.