This paper aims to endorse physicalism over dualism by means of Smart’s concept of identity theory. Smart’s article Sensations and the Brain provides a strong argument for identity theory and accounts for many of it primary objections. Here I plan to first discuss the main arguments for physicalism over dualism, then more specific arguments for identity theory, and finish with further criticisms of identity theory.
Physicalism is the theory that the universe contains nothing other than the physical. Therefore, the universe can be fully explained in physical terms. In terms of the mind, mental states globally supervene on physical states, meaning that there are no changes in the mental without changes in the physical. Identity theory is a
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Complete physical explanations can account for all experience and once all the physical facts are set/known then nothing can add to or detract from experience. That being said, a scientist can learn all of the physics behind lightning, every detail of cause and effect, even see photographs of lightning bolts, without ever seeing lighting first hand. If this is true he should have a complete physical understanding of lighting. So if identity theory is correct, he should gain no new experience from witnessing lighting. This, however, does not seem true. It may produce no new information but it seems plausible, even logical, that it would have an impact at least …show more content…
Then if they stimulate the brain in a certain way they can control what people are thinking and create experiences. Therefore, if one person had never seen, heard of, tasted, or smelled a cookie, a neurologist should be able to create that exact experience through brain manipulation. Also, there should be no added mental response when the subject eats his “first” cookie.
This, however, seems entirely false. Neuroscience has progressed and shown that rudimentary brain manipulation is possible, but it is counter-intuitive to believe that triggering F-fiber can suddenly result in entirely new tactile and emotional knowledge. It is more plausible to consider that people describe sensations as what its like to experience something of which they already have knowledge. So, when they receive the real product they would likely have an emotional response or attachment to it that cannot be accounted for in identity
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
In regards to identity, Smart believes that sensations and brain processes just so happen to be the same. Referring to sensations and brain processes as identical factors would indicate that one is suggesting that the identity is strict. An example of strict identity is Smart’s use of a metaphor that compares lightning with an electrical discharge, just as sensations equate to brain processes. Smith belief contradicts dualism, which is a concept that refers to the mind and body as two distinct
The Absent Qualia Argument’s counterexample suggests functionalism is susceptible to similar problems behaviorism faces. The additional requirement functionalism holds, namely functionally equivalent internal states, mental states possibly differ. Block argues it is plausible to not only have type identical behavior states, but also functionally equivalent mental states. However, functionally equivalent functional states cannot ensure equivalent mental states. So, functionalist theories of mental states are insufficient theories of the nature of mental
Have you ever been eating something and thinking at the same time that it tastes like heaven. This essay is about a problem that has been around for a lot of years, and although it is not base in taste in general, it is base in the example of what chocolate tastes like extracting from (Nagel, 1987). The problem is the Mind- Body problem. This essay is going to explain the three points of view in Nagel argument: dualism, physicalism or materialism, and dual aspect theory.
Physicalism is the position that nothing can exceed past what is physically present, and what is physical is all that there can be. This idea is reductive in that it suggests there is no more to the universe than physical matters, including brain processes, sensations, and human consciousness. J.J.C. Smart explains sensations as a means of commentary on a brain process. He believes that, essentially, brain processes and what we report as sensations are essentially the same thing in that one is an account of the other. He writes in “Sensations and Brain Processes” that “…in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes,” (145). Though
The identity theory of the mind is a physicalist theory which holds that “every mental state is identical with some state in the brain” (Braddon-Mitchell&Jackson,2006:95), According to the identity theory, desire and beliefs are all just physical states of your brain. Many philosophers agree that the mind is not an entity that can exist independently of its states and is an aggregation of its ‘mental states unified into ‘one’ mind.’(ibid) If one thinks of experiencing pain, the identity theory of mind claims that this experience is a brain process and not merely correlated with brain processes.(Smart,2012) Kripke disagrees with type identity, because one can conceive of the mental state without the brain state (and vice versa), which will be explained later in this essay.
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
There are many theories about the mind and body. Many philosophers argue whether the mind and body are two separate entities or are in fact one thing. There are five main arguments for this accounts they are, dualism, logical behaviorism, methodological behaviorism, identity-theory, and lastly functualism. There are many similarities and differences between these five theories. Dualism is the main focus that I will be recounting, then comparing and contrasting it against identity-theory and logical behaviorism.
Dualism is the view which states that there exists two types of substances. An immaterial entity that is responsible for our mental life, and a material body . It claims that both are able to interact and affect one another. In Difficulties for the Dualist by Smith, P. and Jones, O.R. , many problems are raised against dualism. I will focus on the nature of the mind/body interaction. The argument claims that the mind/body causal interaction is mysterious, and therefore materialism is the more attractive argument. I will disagree with the authors by arguing that body/body interactions are equally mysterious considering that both types of interactions both boil down to a rock-bottom explanation in which we can no longer further explain. I will then conclude that dualism is valid in claiming
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows:
Type identity theory is a subcategory of physicalism. In physicalism it is understood that physical things form the basis for all things that exist. When this approach is taken it is incorrect to distinguish the mind from the body. The mind in a sense is not regarded as a thing. When discussing the mind it would be a better representation to reference mental states and particular processes that the brain performs. These properties, states and processes are physical objects which may be referred to as processes of the brain, opposed to the idea that said properties are linked to the mind. This is the general view taken by physicalists however there is disagreement on what a mental property actually is and furthermore their relation to physical
Fred has an ability to distinguish two variations of the color red. Only Fred could see the difference and decided to call them red 1 and red 2. The reds are actually different colors to him, but he calls both colors red to allow better understanding for those that cannot see the variations. There are individuals that would like to see the two colors that Fred has the ability to view. In order to gain knowledge about Fred’s color vision, the individuals would need to study Fred’s reactions to the colors, the neurological patterns of his brain, and the physiology of the colors differences and stimuli. All of the information the individual obtains is lacking the experience necessary to complete the full comprehension of Fred’s incredible color vision capacity. An individual could possess every piece of physical information about the brain, body, and person’s reaction to the color visual occurrence, but without qualia, the individual does not truly know the colors. The only way to complete the data would be for the individual to have the experience of colors his or herself. The individual could have full comprehension of the visual variation by having a surgery to reconstruct the individual’s brain to connect the way Fred’s brain fires to make the association to the different reds. The individual will then have the capability to decipher red 1 from red 2. The
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
The knowledge objection to identity theory intense deals with what experiences are like and that we cannot know what they our like for others. For example when we experience pain and a creature who is out of this world and not like us go though pain, we can not predict how is for them. The reason for this
In a world of science, religion, ignorance and opinion common perception on whether or not the mind is separate from the brain has switched more times than one can track. A dualistic view on the body/mind relationship continues to be scrutinized day in and day out. As I will explain throughout the argument dualism is facing increasingly more constraints as time goes on. An evaluation of the mind/body argument from a Humean perspective proves dualism to be flawed in key aspects, where in contrast a materialistic approach is not affected.