Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
In this paper, I will be discussing Frank Jackson and his knowledge argument. The knowledge argument is presented to support property dualism. Property dualism is the view of only physical substances with two different properties: mental property and physical property. Property dualism is a form of dualism, which is the theory of two kinds of phenomena in the universe: physical and mental. The connection between the mind and body has been debated by many philosophers. The mind has different mental states that can be understood through different forms. The consciousness state forms qualia from different events. Qualia is the true feelings of an experience by an individual, such as the touch of sunlight
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or smell of lily. Another mental state is intentionality which is the aboutness of a person’s state. I believe Jackson presents two successful thought experiments for the knowledge argument, despite the counterexamples of physicalist. Frank Jackson was a philosopher with the property dualism view.
He presented the knowledge argument to disprove physicalism and support the knowledge of property dualism. Physicalism is the view that everything is a physical substance and has physical properties in the universe. Jackson believed that qualia are a mental property of a physical state. Jackson’s knowledge argument was about a girl named Mary, who was locked in a room of only black and white. Mary had obtained all the information about the physical aspects that happen during a color visual experience. She had knowledge about the neurophysiology of color vision and the brain activity that occurred with every color episode. Mary had every possible piece of information about the physical circumstances with any color vision. However, she had not ever experienced the seeing color with her own eyes. The lack of the visual experience made her knowledge incomplete. Mary did not know the qualia of visualizing colors. When Mary is released, she experiences viewing color with her own eyes. The new experience allows Mary to learn something new to her about the process of color vision. This argument shows that with all the physical knowledge available about color vision, the experience aspect of the data is omitted. I consider this argument successful in the act of working to prove that qualia are not a physical property. Physical property can be understood without experience, but non-physical properties are not able to …show more content…
be presented to an individual in the form of information and allow for full comprehension of the situation. Property dualism is strongly supported by another knowledge argument thought experiment presented by Jackson.
Fred has an ability to distinguish two variations of the color red. Only Fred could see the difference and decided to call them red 1 and red 2. The reds are actually different colors to him, but he calls both colors red to allow better understanding for those that cannot see the variations. There are individuals that would like to see the two colors that Fred has the ability to view. In order to gain knowledge about Fred’s color vision, the individuals would need to study Fred’s reactions to the colors, the neurological patterns of his brain, and the physiology of the colors differences and stimuli. All of the information the individual obtains is lacking the experience necessary to complete the full comprehension of Fred’s incredible color vision capacity. An individual could possess every piece of physical information about the brain, body, and person’s reaction to the color visual occurrence, but without qualia, the individual does not truly know the colors. The only way to complete the data would be for the individual to have the experience of colors his or herself. The individual could have full comprehension of the visual variation by having a surgery to reconstruct the individual’s brain to connect the way Fred’s brain fires to make the association to the different reds. The individual will then have the capability to decipher red 1 from red 2. The
individual will then have full knowledge of the colors because the information and qualia are known by the individual. I understand this thought experiment to be sound for displaying property dualism having a mental property, the qualia, and the physical property, the reaction of the brain and body. The physicalism supporters developed an objection to Jackson’s knowledge arguments. The objection to Jackson’s argument stated the nature of the experience when visualizing color is equal to certain reactions in the brain. Jackson counters with the reasoning that the brain reaction is known as physical evidence. The experience of visualizing color is omitted from the physical data. The response by Jackson in defense of the knowledge argument can be explained through the morning star and Venus star argument. Mary knows the morning star is visible in the sky in the morning. Mary does not know Venus is visible in the sky in the morning. Therefore, the morning star and Venus are distinct from each other. However, the morning star and Venus are in fact one in the same star. This counterexample, presented by the physicalist in response to Jackson’s counter, works to show that since Mary knows all the physical information about the brain she must know about the visualization experience. The physicalist view of there being only physical substances and properties is supported by the counterexample. Nevertheless, qualia are a mental property that cannot be explained by physical information. Although Jackson used the physical information and experience to use in the comparison of the morning star and Venus, the physical information is not the same as the qualia. Qualia is a mental property only attained by a person’s experience, the qualia cannot be read about or explained completely. Just as the physical data is not the sa
I am going to start off by explaining a thought experiment that was originally created by Frank Jackson, for the knowledge argument in favour of property dualism. I am going to revise both the thought experiment and the knowledge argument in order to argue
The philosophical theory of dualism holds that mind and body are two separate entities. While dualism presupposes that the two ‘substances’ may interact, it contrasts physicalism by refusing to denote correlation between body and mind as proof of identity. Comparing the two theories, dualism’s invulnerable proof of the existence of qualia manages to evade arguments from physicalism. While a common argument against qualia—non-physical properties defined in Jackson’s Knowledge Argument—targets the unsound nature of epiphenomenalism, this claim is not fatal to the theory of dualism as it contains claims of causation and fails to stand resolute to the conceivability of philosophical zombies. This essay argues that epiphenomenalism, while often designated as a weakness when present in an argument, can remain in valid arguments from qualia.
Two of the most fundamental parts within the Cartesian dualism argument are both the conceivability argument, and also the divisibility argument. Both arguments aim to show that the mind (thinking things) and body (extensions) are separate substances, both of which arguments can be found within Meditation VI. Within this essay, I shall introduce both arguments, and critically assess the credibility of both, discovering whether they can be seen as sound arguments, or flawed due to incorrect premises or logical fallacies.
Richard Taylor explained why the body and the mind are one, and why they are not two separate substances. In the article “The Mind as a Function of the Body”, Taylor divides his article in a number of sections and explains clearly why dualism, or the theory that the mind and the body are separate is not conceivable. In one of these sections it is explained in detail the origin of why some philosophers and people believe in dualist metaphysics. As stated by Taylor “when we form an idea of a body or a physical object, what is most likely to come to mind is not some person or animal but something much simpler, such as a stone or a marble”(133). The human has the tendency to believe a physical object as simple, and not containing anything complex. A problem with believing this is that unlike a stone or a marble a human (or an animal) has a brain and the body is composed of living cells (excluding dead skin cells, hair, and nails which are dead cells). The f...
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
Princess Elizabeth 's objection to Substance Dualism rests on her belief that because the mind does not have surfaces, the mind can not transfer energy to the body and therefore can not make the body react. I will challenge this idea by offering another form of causation.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
1. In the Jackson’s case the District Court’s judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on the ground that termination of electric services did not constitute state action. The Metropolitan Edison Co. was a private entity and was not subject to the due process requirements of the 14th Amendment based on the State Action Doctrine. Moreoever, in the Jackson case, Metropolitan Edison Co. was a private entity that did not receive any federal funding. In the Simkin’s Case both the hospitals, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and Wesley Long had received millions of funds through the Hill Burton Act and hence they were subject to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Therefore, subject to the protections from racial
Fodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist theory, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of saying "Dr. Lux is hungry," one would say "If there was a quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it." The central-state identity theory states that a certain mental state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a way similar to Berkeley’s representation of objects. Both mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.
This paper will discuss the dualism’s Divisibility Argument. This argument relies on Leibniz’s Law and uses a different property to prove the distinctness of brain states of mental states. Mary, who is a materialist, presents several objections to that argument. Her main objection corresponds to the first/third-person approach. She believes that Dave presents that argument only from the first-person approach, which is introspection, and totally disregards the third-person approach, which is observation of another mind. Mary’s objections will follow by the Dave’s response on them from the dualist’s point of view.
Churchland states that Mary could have “received a special series of lectures over her black-and-white television from a full-blown dualist, explaining the “laws” governing the behavior of “ectoplasm” telling her about qualia.” He uses this to show that this would not affect the plausibility of the claim that upon her release Mary still learns something. Churchland is saying that this argument would work for dualism as well. Jackson replies by stating this cannot be true because the lectures could not tell Mary everything about qualia. On the other hand, he deduces that to build a good argument against dualism, all that must be done is to replace the premise that she knows everything, and make it so that she is all knowing, according to dualism. This is impossible and does not even make sense and therefore there is no “parity of reasons” as Jackson states. Churchland’s last objection is that Jackson’s argument claims that Mary could not even imagine what the relevant experience would be like and he goes on to argue against this claim. However, this claim was already addressed earlier in Jackson’s article in the first clarification. The knowledge argument claims that Mary wouldn’t know what the relevant experience is like and her imagination is
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
Descartes is a very well-known philosopher and has influenced much of modern philosophy. He is also commonly held as the father of the mind-body problem, thus any paper covering the major answers of the problem would not be complete without covering his argument. It is in Descartes’ most famous work, Meditations, that he gives his view for dualism. Descartes holds that mind and body are com...
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.