In this paper, I will argue that it is more likely that the qualia of colour could be explained by physicalism rather than by property dualism. Qualia are subjective experiences, such as our senses (pg. 3). Physicalism views every property as physical, and can be explained by science (pg. 29). Property dualism refers to the philosophical view that minds are made out of one substance, but contain physical properties, and a non-physical mind (qualia) that are not related to each other (pg. 29). I am going to start off by explaining a thought experiment that was originally created by Frank Jackson, for the knowledge argument in favour of property dualism. I am going to revise both the thought experiment and the knowledge argument in order to argue The original thought experiment did not mention that science has advanced far enough to be able to explain the qualia of colour. Nor did it mention that Mary is able to imagine what it is like to experience colour vision. So, the knowledge argument argues that even though Mary does know all of the facts of colour vision; because, Mary does not know the experience of colour, physicalism must be false (pg. 35). However, this argument is flawed because it seems to be based off of ignorance (pg. 36). It is possible for Mary to have never seen red, but still know what it would look like (pg. 36). My argument is that if physicalism is more likely to be able to explain the qualia of colour than property dualism, then physicalism must be possible and more plausible than property dualism. If physicalism is possible, then someone like Mary could possibly exist in the future and know everything about colour vision, including the qualia of colour, without directly experiencing it (pg. 35). Someone like Mary in the future could possibly know everything about colour vision (pg. 36). Therefore, physicalism could possibly be true. If the
In Beau Lotto’s Ted Talk “Optical Illusions Show How We See” we could appreciate how our perception can vary based on the context. He explained the importance that color has in our lives and all of the factors that can alter how we perceive a color, such as illumination. Lotto showed how the light that comes through our eyes could mean anything, however it is our brain’s job to give meaning to that information by using patterns, associations, knowledge from past experiences, etc.
Assessment of the Statement that Property is a Power Relationship Between People Property is the right to possess, enjoy or use a determinant thing, and includes the right of excluding others from doing the same. The concept of ownership or property has no single or widely accepted definition. Like any other concept it has great weight in public discourse and the popular usage varies broadly. Property is frequently conceived as a 'bundle of rights and obligations.' Property is stressed as not a relationship between people and things, but a relationship between people with regard to things.
The Absent Qualia Argument’s counterexample suggests functionalism is susceptible to similar problems behaviorism faces. The additional requirement functionalism holds, namely functionally equivalent internal states, mental states possibly differ. Block argues it is plausible to not only have type identical behavior states, but also functionally equivalent mental states. However, functionally equivalent functional states cannot ensure equivalent mental states. So, functionalist theories of mental states are insufficient theories of the nature of mental
Jackson contends that if physicalism were true, Mary would know what a color looks like before she would ever see that color. This, however, is false since Mary could not possibly know what the color looks like before exposure to it. It is impossible for any person to imagine what a color looks like before they see any color at all. Jackson writes, "imagination is a faculty that those who lack knowledge need to fall back on."
As we progress into the future, it is certain that with scientific progress will keep on progressing and allow us to gain a better understanding of how our body and mind interacts. We are not simply trying to argue for science without reason instead of theories like Dualism, but the reasoning behind it is that Dualism and other related theories often lack hard, physical evidence to back up such claims or main points in the theory. They are simply outdated in terms of scientific explanations, and whereas many supporters still exist today, in certain cases they are forced to rely on faith resulting from a lack of hard physical evidence. Even though there are many aspects where science have not been able to explain, we hope to one day obtain knowledge from science and in time, explain complexities and universal truth that still exists today.
He suggests that when analyzing colors and their role in brain processes, we are misinterpreting the way it should be understood. When we speak about these sensations that are synonymous with the brain processes, it should be said as “There is something going on which is like what is going on when ____,” (149). In the case of seeing red as mentioned before, the statement would appear as “There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an emission of red cast from an object, that is, when I really see red." Ultimately, I do not believe this response is an adequate answer to the objection. It appears that Smart is merely altering the linguistic nature of the question rather than providing a solution to the problem. This “something” neutralizes the difference between a brain process and a sensation without giving a sound reason as to why or how they would be considered identical rather than
This paper aims to endorse physicalism over dualism by means of Smart’s concept of identity theory. Smart’s article Sensations and the Brain provides a strong argument for identity theory and accounts for many of it primary objections. Here I plan to first discuss the main arguments for physicalism over dualism, then more specific arguments for identity theory, and finish with further criticisms of identity theory.
Webster dictionary defines synaesthesia as “a subjective sensation or image of a sense other than the one being stimulated” (Wyld,1963). Synaesthesia is a condition that causes someone to have associations of usually color with certain everyday things, such as numbers or letters. There are several different types of synaesthesia that will be discussed in this paper digit-color synaesthesia, odor-color synaesthesia, and person- and music-color synaesthesia. A common effect that is discussed when talking about synaesthesia is the McCollough effect. This effect is a wonder of humans and their visual perception where colorless gratings appear to have a color.
Further research of the Paulesu study reveals activity observed in the synaesthetes resembles what was found in studies of color imagery of that in non-synaesthetes. They asked their synaesthetes, but not the controls, to let the color perception occur automatically. This would let them observe the neural correlates of color imagery instead of the synaesthesia. On the other hand, they might suggest that synaesthesia itself is similar to color imagery.
In my mind, dualism is a more attractive view to take when considering the mind-brain issue. The idea that the mind is a separate entity and that it is independent of the physical body is the central point of dualism. One reason it appeals to me is because of my religion, my Catholic upbringing. Introspection is another good reason why dualism is a little more logical to me than materialism.. It logically explains why the mind and brain are separate. Also, the divisibility argument raises good points to allow dualism to appear to be the more attractive idea in my eyes.
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
8 This paragraph and the next are a paraphrase of Terence Horgan, "Jackson On Physical Information And Qualia" Philosophical Quarterly, 34: (1984) 147-52.
As regards materialism, the downside of this doctrine is that when materialists attempt to reduce the mental realm to the physical by saying that mental experiences are brain processes, they deny the existence of consciousness, sometimes called ‘qualia’, which is nevertheless a subjective aspect of mental experiences. According to Dualism, having different properties is not the only difference between Mental and Physical realms, a third difference between the two as mentioned earlier is qualitative. Mental happenings have subjective qualities such as what it feels like, looks like or sounds like. Descartes' view claims that material properties could never produce something as perplexing as consciousness or awareness, because such qualities
...e to claim that objects that were created by humans, including robots, wire and metal structures and series of computer networks could and do possess qualia. Once people have reached the highest nirvana in the limits of consciousness and can create a consciousness device to measure its depths among classes of humans and non-humans, then functionalism can be shelved and rejected if it is the case that a robot does not contain qualia. Until then, however, functionalism needs to be carefully considered and not disregarded for its merits in the problem of mental states. Though for many, psychofunctionalism may be the more favorable choice because it is easier for people to consider themselves as the most intelligent beings and rulers of the universe rather than every collection of objects that satisfy the functional role to have consciousness on the same level as them.
With each of our senses (sight, smell, touch, taste, and hear), information is transmitted to the brain. Psychologists find it problematic to explain the processes in which the physical energy that is received by the sense organs can form the foundation of perceptual experience. Perception is not a direct mirroring of stimulus, but a compound messy pattern dependent on the simultaneous activity of neurons. Sensory inputs are somehow converted into perceptions of laptops, music, flowers, food, and cars; into sights, sounds, smells, taste ...