Descartes Conceivability Argument Analysis

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Outline and assess Descartes' arguments for the conclusion that mind and body are distinct substances. Word Count: 1488 Two of the most fundamental parts within the Cartesian dualism argument are both the conceivability argument, and also the divisibility argument. Both arguments aim to show that the mind (thinking things) and body (extensions) are separate substances, both of which arguments can be found within Meditation VI. Within this essay, I shall introduce both arguments, and critically assess the credibility of both, discovering whether they can be seen as sound arguments, or flawed due to incorrect premises or logical fallacies. The first argument to be discussed is that of conceivability, which aims to disprove that the mind and …show more content…

An important idea is that since the mind can differentiate itself from the body, and the body is unable to think, which leads to the conclusion that the two substances cannot be the same, as they have different properties [Descartes 1641: 32]. This is a valid argument as each premise leads to the conclusion, regardless of whether the premises lead to a sound argument. While this is a valid argument, I would say that premise i. could be seen as a supposition, as there is no empirical proof of Descartes being able to visually or physically separate the substances. As I have presented Descartes argument and supplied additional, suppressed premises, I will now assess the soundness of this …show more content…

One, is the lack of distinction between the meaning of ‘possibility’, and ‘conceivability’. Conceivability is the ability to imagine something within the mind [Oxford English Dictionary, 2001], while possibility is something that is doable [Oxford English Dictionary, 1999]. In the context of the argument, Descartes assumes that anything that is conceivable within the mind [Descartes: 1641: 32], and I would argue this point on the basis that, while it has been backed up by philosophers such as Richard Swinburne in Evolution of the Soul , I would argue the premise that anything is conceivable is possible. I would do this by stating, initially, that while something may be logically possible, it must also be physically possible in order to be entirely possible (Swinburne 1986: 147). In order to back this up, I would propose the following

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