Compare And Contrast Mind And Body Dualism

In a world of science, religion, ignorance and opinion common perception on whether or not the mind is separate from the brain has switched more times than one can track. A dualistic view on the body/mind relationship continues to be scrutinized day in and day out. As I will explain throughout the argument dualism is facing increasingly more constraints as time goes on. An evaluation of the mind/body argument from a Humean perspective proves dualism to be flawed in key aspects, where in contrast a materialistic approach is not affected.

The argument the mind/body dualism interaction has been evolving for thousands of years. Earlier on in history during the era of Socrates and the theory of the Forms the first sign of the demise regarding

a typical dualist belief began to emerge. As philosophies grew less ignorant to science perception on this debate started to slowly shift from the tradition religious dualist believes towards the concept of materialism. Common day philosophy tends to be leaning increasingly towards a materialistic view on the mind/body debate, as scientific proof lessens the ignorance of the realities of human cognition. When evaluating dualism it is crucial that the existence of the mind be it’s own separate non-physical entity. Since materialism does not have a reliance on a non-physical or defined force it becomes increasingly easy to scrutinize restraints that a dualistic philosophy maintains. Hume, a great philosopher, was the first major philosopher to strike down the notion of the self as he calls it. The self in terms of this argument will be known as the mind, not to be confused with the physical body/brain this mind inhabits. Hume’s philosophy resembles vaguely that of Socrates and his belief in the theory of the forms. In Hume’s opinion, anything real is an impression meaning it’s concept has never deceived him, and has always been proven to be true. An impression is something that is pure, and cannot be understood as anything other than itself. An impression is neither real in any other sense than itself, nor physical in the sense that it is at specific place at a given time. Like Socrates, Hume believes that impressions (forms) are the foundation of everything we know to be true. An example of an impression is that of the colour green. It can neither be broken down further, nor understood in any other sense than itself. Hume also believes in another less reliable class of knowledge and understanding as what he calls ideas. To Hume, ideas are a collection of impressions for example a green sphere. The green sphere can be separated both the impression for green, and the impression of a sphere. This example illustrates the difference between an idea (green sphere) to that of a pure impression. Hume critic’s the belief in the self (mind) as something that is not an impression, but rather a vague summation of individual impressions. In layman’s terms, Hume criticizes the fact that it is hard to put a finger on what makes you more than just a physical object. He does not believe that you could ever describe concretely what makes you, you. With a Humean approach to philosophy the impression of the mind does not exist (there is nothing that makes you, you). Likewise this ambiguity proves problematic when considering further factors of the mind/body interaction.

One struggles to apply Hume’s theory of impressions when evaluating a dualistic perspective on the issue of the body/mind debate. For example, if dualism is true then you must accept the notion that the mind is separate and independent of the brain. If the previous statement is true one could logically make sense of the fact that the mind should have an impression or one pure representation that can be identified. This however is not the case as society has spent thousands of years trying to define the mind to no avail. When Hume’s theory about impressions and ideas is applied to the argument against dualism, an irrefutable flaw presents itself. Using Humean perspective the lack of a distinct impression for the mind becomes problematic, as you are unable to find a common impression of the mind.. As Hume states the mind “must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression.”(Skepticism.doc. Page 4) which in Hume’s eyes dismisses the reality of the impression of the mind. This presents an interesting scenario where the mind cannot be described as a pure being. Since humans cannot come to a conclusion on the impression of the mind it proves that the mind is no more than just ideas and accordingly does not exist as an impression. A common counter argument to this flaw is the notion of an omniscient god and the belief that surely only this being could comprehend the complexity of the mind. By that logic, it still acknowledges the existence of an impression for the mind in which the omniscient god could not see once it leaves the physical realm. Upon evaluation of this scenario the omniscient being would not allow this to happen, as it would now put them in a scenario where they no longer know everything. With the dismissal of the omniscient being this now proves that the mind is no more than collection of ideas which forces a dualist to accept the fact that a mindless being is possible as ideas are simply a group of impression functioning in unison. As a consequence of this result the mind fails to be one impression, which proves that the mind truly does not exist. The ambiguity of an impression for the mind is further scrutinized when considering the interaction (or lack there of) between the brain and the mind.

In addition to the lack of a definitive impression for the mind dualism fails to explain the reliance of the brain for mind to function.

As previously stated if dualism is true then you must accept the notion that the mind is separate and independent of the brain. However this restriction causes an awkward reliance between a material object (the brain), and an immaterial being (the mind). Since the brain is necessary for observation, the senses, and perception the mind is now dependent on the brain, and cannot perceive nor react to anything that happens in the physical world without the brains capabilities. I would argue that this reliance on the brain proves that there is no impression of the mind, as the mind would then be required to operate without a pivotal part of it’s functionally. As a consequence the dualist would have to accept one of the two following statements; 1) “There is no impression of the mind that operates independently of the idea of the brain” or 2) “The mind does not exist separate from the brain, therefore the material brain participates in the impression of the mind.” Using Hume’s criticism of the mind you easily see the problem with having the brain (a collection of ideas and physical objects) be part of the impression of the mind that is suppose to be pure and independent of other ideas. On the contrary materialistic view of this scenario present no such problem, as materialists believe that the impression of the mind does not exist, and that the mind is simply the brain. With the argument against a defined impression of the mind, and the confusing nature of the interaction between the brain and the mind, it begs the question; can the mind (the self) exist as a pure impression in multiple places at once, much like the example of the impression of

green?

Consider now the notion that the mind is supposed to be it’s own impression; it follows that the mind should be pure and indivisible. Using Hume’s perspective it should be true that only one pure impression of the mind can exist. Keeping in mind the definition of an impression consider the following scenario. Imagine a case such that a perfect duplication of a brain (that shares all the same knowledge and memories to which the original brain contains) is made. The scenario presents itself as follows. There are 3 people standing in a field. To further understand the scenario imagine that you are playing the part of the 2 participants that are identical. In this field there is a third party materialist observer, the original participant (You(1) a dualist) and the duplicated entity (You(2)) and let us call this Scenario (A). The materialist would observe the two identical entities and say the following “I see two beings in front of me. I see you(1) and I see a duplication of you(1).” Using a Humean angle a dualist would now have to retort in the following manner “Both represent the impression of you(1)”.

In Scenario (A), the materialist is able to ignore the notion that there needs to be one impression of the mind, as they believe solely that the mind is nothing more than just a physical brain. Since their belief that there does not exist an impression for the mind still holds materialists would simply respond by stating that “you(2) is just an exact copy of you(1)”and that it is possible to perfectly duplicate anything given the correct tools. A Humean argument can now be formed against dualism, as the dualist in the scenario would need to describe the relationship between whether or not you(2) represents the impression of you(1)’s mind, or if it merely participates in the idea of the original. In this case the dualist is now forced into accepting that you(2) is just as significant as you(1). This equal participation of the impression of the mind now begs the question, which version of you does the impression of your mind represent? It would be easy to assume the original you(1) would be the impression your mind is based off, however, an impression is pure and non-divisible. Since there now exist two identical copies both participating equally in the impression of you(1) it forces a dualist to accept one of the following two statements; One(1) “There exists some impression of you(1) that is now more pure than the original impression of you(1)” or Two(2) “The mind does not have a sense impression and therefor cannot be known (real)”. Statement One(1) is impossible, as once you(1) is copied it necessitates a new impression of you(1) that is more pure than the original impression itself, and that of you(2) who equally participates in this impression. Therefor, if a dualist does not accept the first statement, they must except that there exists no concrete impression of the mind. Another rather perplexing flaw is that of the definition of the mind. The mind is supposed to represent a sole individual’s impression. This definition in mind, how can it be one pure impression if both you(1), and you(2) share the same mind which is now physically restrained by the brain in both beings. In addition further consider the implication this interaction created, as there now exists two minds exactly alike, in two different vessels bounded by the same parameters. Since this proves to be true in this case it also follows that an individual’s mind would be two multiple minds (You(1) and you(2)), which as previously stated is not possible. As proven it is now only possible to view this scenario from a materialistic perspective, as it is not bound by the perplexing dualistic properties described above.

Using Humean scrutiny of the arguments above the following points in regards to the mind/body debate present themselves. Firstly materialism provides a clear viewpoint where the mind is no more than just the physical matter that makes up the brain. On the contrary under the same Humean scrutiny it becomes evident that a dualistic view on the mind/body is flawed as it lacks a concise impression setting it apart from other ideas. This vague impression (if such a thing could exist) is further construed when consider the physical necessity the mind has to the brain. Again dualism was proven to be problematic it is necessary to explain the physical interaction between a physical object, and an inanimate impression. Finally in scenario (A) the materialist is able to immediately identify between the two copies, as the materialist is not bound by the notion of an impression for the mind. It is evident the mind/body debate is simply answered by a materialist and nearly impossible by a dualist.