Smart's Essay 'Sensations And Brain Processes'

In J.J.C. Smart’s essay, Sensations and Brain Processes, he disagrees with dualism as he believes that states of consciousness and brain processes are similar. He presents a case where he reports that he sees a round and yellowish-orange after-image. He describes various perspectives about what he is actually reporting. He claims that he could not be reporting anything, and that this after-image is only the result of him having a temptation to say that he sees it. Another example involves an individual reporting pain, and, like the after-image example, he or she could not be reporting anything as well. In regards to both the reporting of the after-image and pain, Smart disagrees with the claim that these reports are “irreducibly psychical,” (Rosen 372) which means they cannot be reduced to mental properties.

Smart supports his opposition of reports being irreducibly psychical through Occam’s razor, which is a philosophical principle stating that simpler explanations lead to better interpretations.

He claims that science has been used extensively to describe almost every property of the world. Science has led to the description of the world as a compilation of “increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents” (Rosen 372). However, an aspect that is not included in science’s complex explanation of the world is states of consciousness, like sensations and pains.
In regards to identity, Smart believes that sensations and brain processes just so happen to be the same. Referring to sensations and brain processes as identical factors would indicate that one is suggesting that the identity is strict. An example of strict identity is Smart’s use of a metaphor that compares lightning with an electrical discharge, just as sensations equate to brain processes. Smith belief contradicts dualism, which is a concept that refers to the mind and body as two distinct

things.
Smart describes several objections to his theory. The first objection states that individuals can talk about sensations without actually understanding the processes in the brain. An opponent to Smart’s theory would argue that sensations are not body processes. Smart replies by claiming that factors can be identical regardless if a person knows one factor but does not know the other. For example, lightning and electrical discharge are the same despite some individuals’ lack of understanding for the science behind lightning. The second objection states that reports of a sensation do not compare to reports of brain processes. Smart replies by claiming that although reporting a sensation may not report a brain process, the sensation is still a brain process. The third objection reveals that the qualities of sensations differ from the qualities of brain processes. Smart argues that when someone sees a color, he or she sees the color because of what he or she is looking at. Brain processes allow the individual to express this sensation.
The fourth objection states that “the after-image is not in physical space,” (Rosen 376) but the brain process is in physical space. Smart argues that he does not refer to after-images and brain processes as the exact same thing. He suggests that just the experience of an after-image constitutes as a brain process. The fifth objection differs brain processes from sensations by explaining that brain processes can be “swift or slow,” (Rosen 377) but experiences cannot. Smart states that his theory does not indicate that experiences and brain processes “have the same logic,” (Rosen 377) but the two factors signify the same thing. The last objection refers to the imagination of a brainless individual that has sensations. Smart states that anyone can imagine fake information regarding two things, suggesting that imagination just reveals that the two things are only different in meaning.
I am intrigued by Smart’s criticism of science because he strongly believes that the discipline is unable to explain consciousness. I enjoyed Smart’s recurrent example involving the lightning and electrical discharge because it explained the opposition of dualism in a simple way. Despite many objections, Smart was able to defend his view in a convincing manner. Based on various examples, Smart deduces that states of consciousness and brain processes are quite the same, yet he does not claim that they are strictly identical.