Searle Consciousness

In Searle’s first argument against the distinction between the mental and physical, he assumes this mistaken assumption is largely due to one’s common-sense supposition that there indeed is a distinction between the mental and physical at some deep metaphysical level. Searle confronts this assumption with the simple fact that he believes Consciousness it is a systematic biological phenomenon, much like digestion, and as such, concludes, that consciousness is a feature of the brain as such such is part of the physical world. However, I agree with Searle in the sense that the through simple reduction there incidentally will be a metaphysical distinction between mental and physical, however I disagree with the way in which he counters this.

Searle claims the assumption is assuming the stance that if something is intrinsically mental, then it cannot be in any sense physical. His response to this is the claim that because “they are intrinsically mental, they are therefore a fortiori they are physical”(P115).He even goes further to say that terms are constrained in design, and as such are assumed to be a complete opposition. Due to this, we can conclude that consciousness is just a simple reductive biological feature of the brain. This assumption constrains his argument and assumes that reduction to a metaphysical level is not necessary in understanding Consciousness. Searle assumes this reduction is fully casual, and that if ontologically reduced, we lose the whole concept. However, what if we consider mental events as individual and subjective. We cannot assume a identical intrinsically mental event will have the identical physical impact on someone. Although the mental event may be the same, the reduction of this mental causation ...

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...the fact that Qualia are quantifiably mental. To me, contrary to Searle, he believes therefore, that there is no reason why mental would be incapable of acting on the physical, and in addition to this, that there is no reason for the mental to be non-extended in space. These to him, are the main two mistaken assumptions.

I see these however, as not mistakes, but rather arguments that need to be expanded upon. If the mental is extended beyond space, Searle is arguing that the mental occurs outside of the brain. Although he recognizes that the mental has a single source, the Brain. This contradicts his argument about the sensory dominance within the Mental. This is however, a turn towards dualism, which I believe to hold a strong argument against Searle’s claims. This is because, although they once again claim that the mind and body are separate entities, however,