The Importance Of Groupthink In Iraq

Every individual has faced a situation in which an opinion was required, yet no one was brave enough to speak about what is really on their mind. Due to the fear of going against what the rest of the group says they think, as well as the fear of feeling outcasted afterwards. This type of situation is called “groupthink,” theorized by Irving Janis, in which a person’s behavior is affected based off of those around him/her. One of the most controversial real world example of groupthink, would be the United States invasion into Iraq in 2003. The United States Government believed that Iraq withheld weapons that could cause major mass destruction, therefore the result to attack was decided upon, except the plan backfired in many ways. According

to Alison McQueen’s article; the specific causes, symptoms, and consequences of groupthink is well applied to the Bush administration’s decisions and downfalls.
The first part in Janis’s theory is the antecedents, or causes; specifically one of the most important is group cohesiveness. According to Janis’s model, group cohesiveness is when one is “in a highly knit group and feels bad to disagree because of unity” (Wagner, 2015). McQueen goes on to mention how cohesive the Bush Administration was, despite Powell seeking for an alternative other than war. “The President’s election campaign was focused on the idea that voters would be choosing a team … the core group surrounding Bush was more tightly-knit than that in any administration” (McQueen, 2005, p. 62). From the start Bush and his administration not only presented to the public how clearly close-knit they were, but it was further showed when Powell wanted them to just consider an alternative. Powell was referred to as the “B-team” because Bush and his “A-team” felt it was already clear on what needed to be done in Iraq (McQueen, 2005). The second antecedent is provocative situational context, or high stress situation. Highly stressful situations will increase the chance of groupthink “particularly if physical danger and time pressure are present” (Wagner, 2015). Although Bush and his administration did not have a time restraint nor a guaranteed physical danger if nothing was done, but recent terroristic attacks such as September 11, 2001; heightened feelings of danger (McQueen, 2005). As well as increasing the feeling of time pressure and vulnerability because of the worry that it has been done once, and must not happen again.
The next part in groupthink is the symptoms; such as illusion of invulnerability, in which the members in the group feel that nothing bad can happen to them because they will not face any negative consequences, making them optimistic (Wagner, 2015).

Since Bush and his administration has such confidence and optimism that this plan to invade Iraq would work, they exhibited the illusion of invulnerability. After coming off of a victory in Afghanistan, and the still existent confidence that these weapons of mass destruction are in Iraq; left them high up in the clouds feeling that it was no longer of why, but rather of how they will invade (McQueen, 2005). The second symptom exhibited by Bush and his administration was the illusion of unanimity, which is when the “group appears to be unanimous” (Wagner, 2015). This was shown mainly through how the cabinet meetings went, along with who was invited. The meetings were very scripted in which it was stated that before meetings “The note instructed the cabinet secretary when he was supposed to speak, about what, and how long” (McQueen, 2005, p. 70). This scripting of the meetings is very odd because the people attending the meetings should have been allowed to speak freely about their honest opinion. Not only is the scripting wrong and strange, but also Colin Powell was excluded from these meetings since he advocated other ideas or alternatives; which many of the members disliked him for (McQueen,

2005).
The final part in groupthink is the defects or negative consequences of the actions completed.

The two major negative consequences the Bush and his administration made; was the failure to look into risks with the alternative they chose, and leading bad decisions to be made. After the damage has been done, Kenneth Pollack states, “the U.S. government must admit to the world that it was wrong about Iraq’s WMD” (McQueen, 2005, p. 72-73). This now makes the U.S government look bad, as well as creating many angry, or upset, people since so many casualties resulted. This political event of actions have shown how bad and dangerous it can be to go against disagreement (McQueen, 2005). Although what has already happened cannot be changed, but it could have been avoided. The leader, Bush, could have encouraged any and all members to voice their true opinions and doubts about the plan at hand. This could have been done by assigning at least one person to play the devil’s advocate so all alternatives could be considered (McQueen, 2005). Secondly, to consider all possible threats with each alternative plan created. If they based plans on “worst-case scenarios” it would've set up necessary road blocks that will help to really dig in deeper with the alternative they want to choose, then decide upon if that is best for the nation (McQueen,

2005).
Overall, what has been done cannot be changed based off of what we now know, but it could have been avoided, and now can be avoid it in the future. When groups, such as Bush and his administration, appear too close-knit with a highly stressful situation at hand, or seem too unanimous, bad decisions are sure to follow. It must be kept in mind that it will always be best to take the proper time allotted to playing with other alternatives. As well as playing the devil’s advocate, and staging road blocks so that groupthink does not occur.