Physicalism is either false, or it lacks content. Physicalism claims that everything can be exhaustively described and explained by physics, implying that persons are merely collections of fundamental physical particles and as such, their behavior can thoroughly be described and explained using physics. This, however, begs the question of which physics accounts for the descriptions and explanations of the world, and in turn, persons and their behaviors; the progressive nature of science renders the term ‘physics’ ambiguous. This problem is called the Hempel’s dilemma and is argued thusly:
1) Physicalists must define physics relative to a preliminary stage of its development or the final, ideal stage of its development.
2) 2. If physicalists
As premise (1) states, physicalism must be based upon either the preliminary stages of physics or the final, ideal stage of physics. This is because the nature of physics is as such that in its preliminary stages, physical theories are hypothesised and disproved, and replaced by theories that hold true. Once all false theories are disproved and replaced by accurate, irrevisable theories, physics will have said to be in its final, ideal stage. As these are the two stages of physics, physicalists must define physics relative to either one of these stages. Premise 2 claims that if physicalists define physics to its preliminary stage, then physicalism must be false. Physicalism claims that everything, including persons, can be described and explained exhaustively using physics. However, in its preliminary stage, which is physics of the past and that of today, it does not, in fact, exhaustively describe and explain everything. For example, physical theories that were known to be true in the 18th century have been falsified and replaced with newer, seemingly truer theories. Even if physicalists define physics relative to the physics we currently have in the 21st century, there would still be no way of knowing if this physics is completely true, infallible, and not subject to change, as history has shown us. Therefore, if physicalists define physics relative to its preliminary stage, physics cannot be used to exhaustively describe and explain everything in the world, including persons and their behaviors, and physicalism is
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
Frank Jackson begins his article by writing about what he feels to be a fatal flaw in physicalism. He writes a story about a girl named Mary who is raised in a black-and-white room. In this room Mary was taught everything there is to know about the physical world. The only catch is she learned only from media, which was black-and-white, so she knows nothing of the colors outside this room. After learning everything about the physical world, she is then given the chance to see color. She will then "learn" what color is in the world. For this reason Jackson believes physicalism to be false.
The philosophical theory of dualism holds that mind and body are two separate entities. While dualism presupposes that the two ‘substances’ may interact, it contrasts physicalism by refusing to denote correlation between body and mind as proof of identity. Comparing the two theories, dualism’s invulnerable proof of the existence of qualia manages to evade arguments from physicalism. While a common argument against qualia—non-physical properties defined in Jackson’s Knowledge Argument—targets the unsound nature of epiphenomenalism, this claim is not fatal to the theory of dualism as it contains claims of causation and fails to stand resolute to the conceivability of philosophical zombies. This essay argues that epiphenomenalism, while often designated as a weakness when present in an argument, can remain in valid arguments from qualia.
First, Descartes contends that God’s perfection implies his immutability because a modification of his action would deny the perfection of the creation. Accordingly, Descartes says: ‘Thus, God imparted various motions to the parts of matter when he first created them, and he now preserves all this matter in the same way, and by the same process by which he originally created it’ (AT IXB, 62). The conservation of the initial conditions of the universe is possible because of God’s continual action on the universe. Finally, Descartes concludes this argument explaining that it is reasonable to think that God preserves the same quantity of motion in matter. Under these considerations, we can say that Descartes founds his physics on his metaphysical conception of God’s immutability, and it makes possible to universalize the laws of
...e theory already allows for knowledge. This does not follow as we are not justified in holding step one without a proper method. Step one is needed to justify three and four, you are not justified in holding either three or four as they both require that we have a justified step one. Thus the steps do not allow for complete justification.
That the world is, is apparent, but what the world is, is neither evident, nor easy to comprehend. The theoretical analysis of the universe has still been the hardest problem for metaphysics the object of which is to determine the nature of things and relations and to discover the ultimate principle ordering all things and changes into one world.
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
This paper aims to endorse physicalism over dualism by means of Smart’s concept of identity theory. Smart’s article Sensations and the Brain provides a strong argument for identity theory and accounts for many of it primary objections. Here I plan to first discuss the main arguments for physicalism over dualism, then more specific arguments for identity theory, and finish with further criticisms of identity theory.
Physicalism, to further specify, states that everything is dependent upon the physical world, and that there is nothing over and above the physical world. It states that everything can be defined in purely physical terms. This view has many implications, especially within the philosophy of mind, where it stands in stark contrast to dualism which puts the mind above the physical world. This focus on the philosophy of mind is, in part, due to it producing most of the objections that appear against physicalism. Within the philosophy of mind, physicalism states that all mental states can be equated to some physical state. Note that this does not necessarily imply the identity hypothesis, or the idea that a specific mental state is associated with a spe...
2.Physics A World View. Larry D. Kirkpatrick, Gerald F. Wheeler. Harcourt College Publishers. 2001. P174.
Fodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist theory, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of saying "Dr. Lux is hungry," one would say "If there was a quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it." The central-state identity theory states that a certain mental state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a way similar to Berkeley’s representation of objects. Both mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.
The mind-body problem has kept philosophers busy ever since Descartes proposed it in the sixteenth century. The central question posed by the mind-body problem is the relationship between what we call the body and what we call the mind—one private, abstract, and the origin of all thoughts; the other public, concrete, and the executor of the mind’s commands. Paul Churchland, a proponent of the eliminative materialist view, believes that the solution to the mind-body problem lies in eliminating the single concept that allows this problem to perpetuate—the folk psychological concept of mental states. Churchland argues that the best theory of mind is a materialistic one, not a folk psychological one. Unlike other materialist views such as identity theory, Churchland wants to remove the idea of mental states from our ontology because mental states cannot be matched 1:1 with corresponding physical states. This is why Churchland’s view is called eliminative materialism—it is a materialistic account of the mind that eliminates the necessity for us to concern ourselves with mental events. At first this eliminative materialism appears to be a good solution to the mind-body problem because we need not concern ourselves with that problem if we adopt Churchland’s view. However, there is a basic flaw in his argument that raises the question of whether we should actually give up folk psychology. In this paper, we will first walk through the premises of Churchland’s argument, and then we will explore whether Churchland does a suitable job of justifying our adoption of eliminative materialism.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
In the laws of Newtonian mechanics, an object traveling in a straight line at the same speed is identical to being at rest. Therefore, Newton’s theory of universe at motion would make the same predictions as his theory of the universe at rest. Though we now know this theory to be incorrect, it is a good example to explain how theories can be empirically equivalent while possessing different claims. This is an argument against realism because it shows how any accepted theory could have competing theories that are empirically equivalent yet different. If theories are empirically equivalent, then they are identical in the strength supported by the evidence. So the choice between the accepted theory and the rival theory is arbitrary. This is a strong argument by the antirealists as they bring up a powerful point of not believing in the truth of accepted theories because there are other theories which are equally well-supported in evidence. Going back to the electrons theory, a realist scientist may have accepted the theory of electrons to be real because it may have developed
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.