Finnis Counter-Argument Analysis

As it has been said previously, knowledge is one of Finnis’ seven basic goods that are intrinsically valuable, and is acquired by means of whatever process one must endure in order to obtain the truth about something. Though the value of knowledge varies subjectively, the objectivity of knowledge is relative and only adds to knowledge being self-evident. The core of what makes knowledge an underived principle encompasses not only the fact that it cannot be further deduced nor attributed to another principle in order to add to its validity, but also that its goodness is an antecedent to all skeptics’ counter-arguments, therefore invalidating any and all skeptical arguments.

Finnis considers knowledge to be a underived principle because it

is completely independent of any other basic good; nothing can be derived from it, nor can there be any further inference to it, therefore making it as bare-bone basic as it can be. Because it is removed from any other basic good, it only adds to its self-evidence, and therefore makes it even more of a universal good to have. It is also self-evident that those who have knowledge “simply are better off…than someone who is muddled, deluded and ignorant…whether I like it or not” (Finnis 72). Being that this is not a subjective fact based on emotions or personal beliefs, but a universally objective statement, by saying that “knowledge is better than ignorance,” one is not using a personal statement based upon an individual’s inclination, bias, emotion, etc., but simply stating that having knowledge is better than not having it in a way that goes beyond human desires and inclinations, ultimately subconsciously urging one to seek knowledge for its intrinsic value (Finnis 72). According to Finnis, such a statement is simply “a rational judgment about a general form of human well-being, about the fulfillment of human potentiality” (72). With this statement being so detached from any kind of human predilection, the skeptic’s argument of objectivity in values leading to beliefs with the use of oddball statements are invalid. Because the statement “knowledge is better than ignorance,” does not include anything that would add any moral or ethical meaning to the value of the statement itself, and is therefore not even a moral statement. With this, Finnis thoroughly explains the problems with any objections skeptics may pose while clearly defining why knowledge is an underived principle.
Finnis also goes on to show that any counter-argument raised by a skeptic is self-refuting and invalid, consequently proving that the goodness of knowledge is “presupposed” in all “demonstrations.” Three types of skeptical counter-arguments are pointed-out by Finnis: 1.

they are either directly self-contradictory or entail their contradictory, 2. are performative consisstancies, where statements and the facts are not consistent, and 3. a statement that is falsified by its assertion (Finnis 74). All of these arguments are forms counter-arguments that can be conjured up by skeptics in attempts to invalidate the argument that knowledge is not a good worth pursuing. However, knowledge as a good to be pursued defeats all of the mentioned forms of rebuttals. “ ‘…Knowledge is not a good’ is operationally self-refuting” (Finnis 74). By asserting that knowledge is not a good worth pursuing, one is also asserting that truth is not a good worth pursing, which contradicts one’s belief in the truth of the statement. With this, Finnis proves that knowledge as a good to be actively pursued is presupposed, or assumed prior, in all of the previously mentioned rebuttals. Knowledge cannot be falsified by means of contradictory, inconsistent, or operationally self-refuting because of its presupposition of the pursuit of truth being good. Therefore, all skepticism about the basic value of knowledge is

indefensible.
Knowledge as a good is an objective underived principle, immune to many skeptics’ arguments due to its detachment from moral and ethical conditions. The undeniable assumption that knowledge itself exists makes the validity of skeptic arguments collapse before they are even uttered. For to utter words that do not correspond with the rational goodness of the pursuit of truth and knowledge are contradictory, and therefore logically incoherent.