Kripke Vs Quine

Saul Kripke and W.V. Quine argue that there are no facts about meaning. Perhaps their strongest argument for their rejection of this claim is through their accounts that facts are determinate by rules and that meaning is lost within translation. Kripke depends on facts about rules for his skeptical solution for Wittgenstein’s account that every course of action is made in accord with a rule. Quine basis his argument on the use of translation; he claims that there are no facts about meaning because there is no correct translation of one sentence into another. In this paper, I will argue that in the accounts of both Kripke and Quine, Kripke provides us with a substitution which makes us a little less worrisome about falling completely into skepticism than that of Quine’s account, I will then provide a possible resolution that can assist in dissolving Quine’s perturbing skepticism.

In “On Rules and Private Language,” Saul Kripke argues that the meaning of a certain thing is determined by facts about the rules for the use of that certain thing in the linguistic community that he belongs. He begins with Wittgenstein’s paradox, “no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made in accord with the rule” (Kripke, 627). The distinction between abiding a rule and acting in accord with a rule is that the latter construes no violation of the rule. To find a solution for Wittgenstein’s paradox, Kripke provides a skeptical solution that compels him to consider a computation. He uses “68+57” as an example. He says the meaning of “plus” consists the rules of addition; it is acceptable to utter ‘68+57=125’ but it is unacceptable to utter ‘68+57=5’ because with the latter you are not acting in ac...

... middle of paper ...

...lating a phrase or sentence. My response is that even if you are unable to interpret the speaker’s intention, by stating that there is no fact about meaning is fallible. Regardless of one being able to interpret the speaker’s intention does not necessarily mean that there is no meaning behind the utterance of, say for example “gavagai.” Whatever the meaning of “gavagai” may be is solely dependent upon the speaker’s use and intention. Hence, the argument of the skeptic will not go through, and so this line of response to my argument fails.

In conclusion, I have argued that the skeptical claim of there being no fact about meaning is fallible In the accounts of both Kripke and Quine, Quine’s skeptical claim falls as a slightly more worrisome than that of Kripke’s and to dissolve his claim, I provided a possible suggestion that can assist him out of his own ditch.