In “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, Thomas Kelly gives two responses to the question “How should awareness of disagreement, with those that you take to be your epistemic equal, effect the rational confidence you have in your beliefs?”. Kelly discusses two possible responses to the question. The first is Richard Foley's first person perspective argument. Adam Elga calls the second the right reasons view (Elga, 2007 pg. 485). Kelly pursues the latter, and does not go further than agreeing with Foley that we should only view these disputes with a first person perspective. I will show that Kelly's response to the question of epistemic significance of peer disagreement is not compelling. In my explanation of Kelly's argument, I will show that it is contradictory of him to assert the first persons perspective and the right reasons view. I will then examine the third person perspective, and show that this is more compatible with the right reasons view. Nevertheless I will propose an objection in the form of a question. Specifically, why should the difference between first person and third person change my thinking skeptically? Would this view only be attractive from the third person view? The third person perspective, the right reasons view as Kelly explains it, plus what I will call external Validation of a belief makes a more compelling argument. Kelly defines epistemic peers as two people that have an equal familiarity with the evidence and questions surrounding an argument (Kelly, 2005 Pg.10 ). Epistemic peers must also be equals with respect to epistemic virtues like intelligence (Kelly, 2005 Pg. 10). Kelly suggests that there is no significance in someone merely disagreeing with you that would entail that you los... ... middle of paper ... ...istinct asymmetry here because it is not possible for one third party to agree with both mine and Sam's conclusion. Therefore the assertion of the right reasons view, with respect to the third person perspective, and the validation of your belief from that same one third party makes a more compelling argument for keeping confidence in one's beliefs upon a disagreement. References (1) Kelly, Thomas (2005). “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Eds. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pg.1 – 36. (2) Rattan, Gurpreet (2014) “Disagreement and the First-Person Perspective” Analytic Philosophy. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Pg. 1 – 23. (3) Adam, Elga (2007) “Reflection and Disagreement” Princeton University Copyright the Authors Journal compilation, Blackwell Publishing, Inc. Pg. 478 – 502.
It is crucial that every belief must be thoroughly explored and justified to avoid any future repercussions. Clifford provides two examples in which, regardless of the outcome, the party that creates a belief without comprehensive justification ends up at fault. It is possible to apply the situations in The Ethics of Belief to any cases of belief and end up with the conclusion that justification is of utmost importance. Justifying beliefs is so important because even the smallest beliefs affect others in the community, add to the global belief system, and alter the believer moral compass in future decisions.
In order to be considered a non-evidentialist, one must believe that actual evidence is not required for all of our beliefs. Pascal believ...
Inch, Edward, Barbara Warnick. Critical Thinking and Communication: The use of Reason in Argument. 4th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002.
C. Stephen Evans is stating there is a problem with the philosophy of religion having a neutral stance. Evans rejects both fideism as well as neutralism, and believes that by trying to have a, “neutral, disinterested posture,” a person could, “cut themselves off from the possibility of even understanding what religion is all about,” (Evans, 1985 p. 115). Evans notes that the view of faith and reason, by some religious believers think it is an impossibility to have “rational reflection” on religion. After his arguments that disprove many ideas in both fideism and neutralism, he proposes an alternative solution which he has named, “critical dialog”, that he hopes will, “preserve the strengths and eliminate the weaknesses of the initial theories,” (p. 115). “Correct thinking about religion is rather a genuine faith, a personal commitment,” (p. 116).
Notional confrontation cannot be ways of refusing to take part in a conversation. For someone participating in a disagreement, Schafer’s assessor relativism gives two options, either converge upon a belief with your opponent, or refuse to converse with your opponent. Contrarily, Williams’ idea of notional and real confrontation says someone participating in a disagreement can only convert to their opponent’s belief, and they can only do this if and only if conversion is a real option. If there is no real option, then there is no confrontation, or disagreement. Intuitively, there is no other option that one coul...
John Locke's, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), was first criticized by the philosopher and theologian, John Norris of Bemerton, in his "Cursory Reflections upon a Book Call'd, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," and appended to his Christian Blessedness or Discourses upon the Beatitudes (1690). Norris's criticisms of Locke prompted three replies, which were only posthumously published. Locke has been viewed, historically, as the winner of this debate; however, new evidence has emerged which suggests that Norris's argument against the foundation of knowledge in sense-perception that the Essay advocated was a valid and worthy critique, which Locke did, in fact, take rather seriously. Charlotte Johnston's "Locke's Examination of Malebranche and John Norris" (1958), has been widely accepted as conclusively showing that Locke's replies were not philosophical, but rather personal in origin; her essay, however, overlooks critical facts that undermine her subjective analysis of Locke's stance in relation to Norris's criticisms of the Essay. This paper provides those facts, revealing the philosophical—not personal—impetus for Locke's replies.
The epistemological concept questions “how do I know?” The epistemological dimension is how we view the assumptions of knowledge to decide what to believe (Marcia, 2008, p2). The way in which information is delivered affects how it perceived by those who receive the information. Intrapersonal dimension is how we chose and adopt the values and beliefs that we decide to live by (Marcia, 2008, p8). For example, as a student in the first phase of self-authorship, I seek my values and beliefs according to seeking acceptance from those around me, while others who may be further down the process chose their values and beliefs according to who they are. Interpersonal dimensions is the connection between yourself and with others (Marcia, 2008, p9). It is the understanding of others views and developing a mature and respectful way to interact with everyone. “Complex epistemological, intrapersonal, and interpersonal development is necessary for adults to build complex belief systems, to form a coherent sense of identity, and to develop authentic, mature relations with diverse others (Baxter Magolda, 2001).” Within this course, I believe that we have learned a bit of all of three dimensions. Reading the
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.). Philosophical Investigations. 4th edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.
This paper will dispute that scientific beliefs are not the right way to accept a belief and it will question if we should let one accept their rights to their own beliefs. In Williams James article Will to Believe, we accept his perspective on how we set and fix our beliefs. This paper will first outline his overview on the argument that someone does not choose their belief but rather one just has them. Following, it will outline my perspective on how we set our beliefs and agreement with purse. Then it will explain how other methodologies such as science cannot conclude to one’s true beliefs. Science has been seen as a way to perceive life and taken to consideration as the truth. This paper should conclude that humans define ourselves by
Moore, Brooke Noel., and Kenneth Bruder. "Chapter 6- The Rise of Metaphysics and Epistemology; Chapter 9- The Pragmatic and Analytic Traditions; Chapter 7- The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries." Philosophy: the Power of Ideas. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2011. Print.
Chisholm begins the paper by addressing the importance of skepticism by stating “'The problem of the criterion' seems to me to be one of the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy” (Chisholm, 77). He attempts to split viewpoints of the criterion into three parts, methodism, particularism, and skepticism. Chisholm's arguments against skepticism and defense of particularism are faulty because of the breaches in his reasoning.
philosaphy. ED.J.Baird Callicott and robert Fdrodeman usa, 2009, 458-463. opposing view points in context. web.12 feb.2014
The argument that is used in the idea of skepticism has comparable and incompatible views given from Augustine and Al-Ghazali. Both monologues cover and explain the doubts one should have, due to the
In this paper I will talk about 3 main topics and describe what each one means to me as well as compare and contrast. The 3 main points will be metaphysics, epistemology, and political philosophy.
Epistemology helped me investigate the procedure I went through for crafting the essays. I referred to books, online articles, journal and other publications to understand and justify the concepts and information. It helped me distinguish between what is false, what is true across diverse contexts, and to decide the boundaries of knowledge based on how that knowledge is acquired. I also evaluated the truthfulness of my beliefs and personal opinion. I am actuated by understanding the sources of knowledge and also the quality of the resulting knowledge – knowing its dimensions and limitations.