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Theories on knowledge
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One of the most remarkable things about human existence is that there is a subject, an “I”, that experiences intellectual cognition of external things and is able to reflect on these experiences as a cognitive act in itself. How do things that exist outside of my mind come to exist inside of my mind so as to enable me to understand them? The goal of any theory of mind should be to answer questions such as this and, in evaluating the Gettier Problem as objectively as possible, we shall attempt to solve it to see whether it can withstand the single most piercing question we can ask of it: is it true that they are inescapable? In this essay I shall examine the paper of Gettier to answer the question of whether or not man can arrive at knowledge and, if so, how? I shall do this by recounting the problems posed by Gettier to the traditional understanding of knowledge as 'justified true belief', and then present critical responses to it to get to the truth of whether Gettier problems are inescapable, most notably by attempting to answer it with the 'Causal Theory', the 'Defeasibility Theory', and finally by considering knowledge as 'true belief with sufficient warrant'.
Gettier undermines the traditional understanding of knowledge by showing that a person can make an apparently proper inference from a belief one is justified in holding, but which is false. He proves that we can arrive at a justified true belief, but the truth of which is unrelated to the premises that it was inferred from. It is “possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false”. In his first example Gettier shows that one can infer a true statement from a false proposition. To briefly outline the case, Smith has strong evidence...
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...feasibility' and 'Causal' theories, and knowledge as 'warranted true belief' require us to take a certain 'leap of faith' when considering the question of knowledge at times. In order to avoid scepticism, I hold that knowledge does not necessarily need to be infallible, but rather probable. This does not mean that a proposition does not need to be true, it means that something we hold as knowledge is not one which is beyond reasonable doubt, but one which it wouldn't make sense to doubt. Yes, we have an obligation to avoid doxastic errors by reflecting on our belief-forming processes and by adjusting them in pursuit of reliability, but we also need to make a reasonable link between reality and truth to the extent that a proposition becomes senseless to doubt. So, although Gettier problems may be inescapable, this does not mean we are starved of knowledge completely.
Now in the case of Schulz, she talks about the famous philosopher Descartes. He brings up the argument that “error does not arise from believing something that isn’t true, but believing in insufficient evidence” (362). Descartes wanted to be an ideal thinker and take in every bit of evidence he possibly could before drawing a conclusion.
In this book, many fallacious quotations were used to support Skousen’s viewpoints. These quotations were blindly accepted due to the attached name without proper insight into the context of the quotation. It seemed as if Skousen frequently misinterpreted his sources purposely to authenticate his argument, often without proper justification or a well-reasoned argument. The audience was ultimately misled to believe flimsy assertions with unproven conclusions; Skousen achieved this by supporting axioms that will be widely accepted and by jumping to conclusions with which we have
This paper will examine the reliability of George Berkeley’s metaphysical theory of Idealism. Berkeley’s Idealism holds that reality is made real by what the mind perceives and that what we perceive to be material is really a collection of immaterial sensations. Idealism is defined as the view “that only mental entities exist, so physical things exist only in the sense that they are perceived” (“Idealism”). Berkeley’s argument of Subjective Idealism is the view that reality consists of one’s mind and its ideas, while Objective Idealism says in addition, a supreme mind produces ideas in the physical world that do not depend on human minds to exist (Velasquez 146). Without Objective Idealism, one can undergo solipsism which is the belief that only one’s self and experiences of the world are real and everything else does not exist (“Solipsism”). Opposing Idealism is the metaphysical view of Materialism which holds that only physical things exist (“Materialism”). This paper will start by examining George Berkeley’s views of Subjective and Objective Idealism and how they apply to reality. Then, the critiques made and supported by Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes against both views of Idealism will be argued. However, these arguments fail to properly examine Berkeley’s Idealism, thus causing the critiques to be based upon misinformation. Although the criticisms pose potential flaws, Berkeley’s Idealism continues to be a major discussion in the metaphysical debate.
How we approach the question of knowledge is pivotal. If the definition of knowledge is a necessary truth, then we should aim for a real definition for theoretical and practical knowledge. Methodology examines the purpose for the definition and how we arrived to it. The reader is now aware of the various ways to dissect what knowledge is. This entails the possibility of knowledge being a set of truths; from which it follows that one cannot possibly give a single definition. The definition given must therefore satisfy certain desiderata , while being strong enough to demonstrate clarity without losing the reader. If we base our definition on every counter-example that disproves our original definition then it becomes ad hoc. This is the case for our current defini...
Two of the most fundamental parts within the Cartesian dualism argument are both the conceivability argument, and also the divisibility argument. Both arguments aim to show that the mind (thinking things) and body (extensions) are separate substances, both of which arguments can be found within Meditation VI. Within this essay, I shall introduce both arguments, and critically assess the credibility of both, discovering whether they can be seen as sound arguments, or flawed due to incorrect premises or logical fallacies.
Final Paper In the following paper I will argue upon whether the Humes’ or Descartes’ philosophical position on the existence of the external world is stronger than the other. I will first present each philosopher’s position, and then I will argue that Hume has a stronger position on the existence of the external world for the reasons in this paper. Descartes argues that we can know the external world because of God, and God is not a deceiver. Descartes’ core foundation for understanding what is important comes from three points: our thoughts about the world and the things in it could be deceptive, our power of reasoning has found ideas that are indubitable, and certainty comes by way of reasoning.
Knowledge, its source and truthfulness have been under question for a long time. People have always wondered what exactly constitutes facts and if there are any defining laws that can be attributed to all knowledge or information available in the world. Many philosophers speculated on how information can be interpreted according to its falsity or truthfulness, but have not come to definite conclusions. Edmund Gettier has provided one of the key pieces in understanding and trying to figure out what knowledge really is.
ABSTRACT: One much discussed issue in contemporary philosophy is the relation between consciousness and intentionality. Philosophers debate whether consciousness and intentionality are somehow ‘connected’; whether we have reason to be more optimistic about an ‘objective,’ ‘scientific’ or ‘third person’ ‘account’ of intentionality than about an analogous account of consciousness. This paper is intended as a limited contribution to that debate. I shall be concerned only with the intentionality of action. Not everything which is true of intentionality of action is true of intentionality of other phenomena, such as beliefs. I shall discuss the question, ‘What is the intentionality of action?’ More specifically, I shall discuss one partial answer to this question: that a necessary condition of an agent performing a certain intentional action is that the agent is conscious of performing that action. This answer is fairly unpopular in contemporary philosophy. In this paper, I shall try to say something about the ground for the rather wide-spread philosophical resistance to the answer, and I shall also outline the kind of considerations that I think are required to judge whether a wedge can or cannot be driven between consciousness and intentionality of action.
Rene Descartes’ natural light is his saving grace, and not Achilles’ heel. Descartes incorporates the concept of natural light within his epistemology in order to establish the possibility of knowing things completely without doubt. In fact whatever is revealed to the meditator via the natural light is considered to be indefeasible. The warrant for the truth of these ideas does not rely on experience or the senses. Rather the truth of the idea depends on viewing the concept through clear and distinct perception. Descartes’ “I am, I exist”, (Med. 2, AT 7:25) or the ‘cogito’ is meant to serve as the basis for knowing things through clear and distinct perception. Descartes’ cogito is the first item of knowledge, although one may doubt such things as the existence of the body, one cannot doubt their ability to think. This is demonstrated in that by attempting to doubt one’s ability to think, one is engaging in the action of thought, thus proving that thinking is immune to doubt. With this first item of knowledge Descartes can proceed with his discussion of the possibility of unshakeable knowledge. However, Descartes runs into some difficulty when natural light collides with the possibility of an evil genie bent on deceiving the meditator thus putting once thought concrete truths into doubt. Through an analysis of the concept of natural light I
Almost all epistemologists, since Edmund Gettier’s 1963 article, have agreed that he disproved the justified-true-belief conception of knowledge. He proposed two examples
Hume distinguishes two categories into which “all the objects of human reason or enquiry” may be placed into: Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact (15). In regards to matters of fact, cause and effect seems to be the main principle involved. It is clear that when we have a fact, it must have been inferred...
The Transcendental Deductions of the pure concept of the understanding in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, in its most general sense, explains how concepts relate a priori to objects in virtue of the fact that the power of knowing an object through representations is known as understanding. According to Kant, the foundation of all knowledge is the self, our own consciousness because without the self, experience is not possible. The purpose of this essay is to lay out Kant’s deduction of the pure concept of understanding and show how our concepts are not just empirical, but concepts a priori. We will walk through Kant’s argument and reasoning as he uncovers each layer of understanding, eventually leading up to the conclusion mentioned above.
Some of the objections, such as the ones made by Edmund Gettier, claim that three conditions are not nearly enough to justify a true belief, and that at the very least a fourth must be added. Gettier presents a very valid criticism of the JTB theory of knowledge, and his counter examples highlight flaws in the JTB theory that make it an inadequate theory of knowledge. Gettier claims takes an issue with the third part of the JTB theory, which states that proposition P must be true. Gettier makes the interesting observation that person S may very well be justified in believing in proposition P even if P is false
In many aspects of our lives, the use of faith as a basis for knowledge can be found. Whether it is faith in the advice of your teacher, faith in a God or faith in a scientific theory, it is present. But what is faith? A definition of faith in a theory of knowledge context is the confident belief or trust in a knowledge claim by a knower, without the knower having conclusive evidence. This is because if a knowledge claim is backed up by evidence, then we would use reason rather than faith as a basis for knowledge . If we define knowledge as ‘justified true belief’, it can be seen that faith, being without justification, can never fulfill this definition, and so cannot be used as a reliable basis for knowledge. However, the question arises, what if a certain knowledge claim lies outside of the realm of reason? What if a knowledge claim cannot be justified by empirical evidence and reasoning alone, such as a religious knowledge claim? It is then that faith allows the knower to decide what is knowledge and what is not, when something cannot be definitively proved through the use of evidence. When assessing faith as a basis for knowledge in the natural sciences, the fact arises that without faith in the research done before us, it is impossible to develop further knowledge on top of it. Yet at the same time, if we have unwavering faith in existing theories, they would never be challenged, and so our progress of knowledge in the natural sciences would come to a standstill. Although I intend to approach this essay in a balanced manner, this essay may be subject to a small degree of bias, due to my own non-religious viewpoint.
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, and that Materialism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality.