Venezia Zandrelli
A11186709
Claudi Brink (A01)
In this paper, I will first define knowledge and explain how we reach epistemic justification for our beliefs. I will then briefly explain the Gettier Cases and use his argument to introduce the Agrippa Trilemma and discuss two epistemological theories. After, I will define and explain Coherentism and Foundationalism and finally offer my own argument on why Coherentism is the better account for epistemic justification.
“If we are to have knowledge then we must be justified in what we believe (Pritchard, 39).” Knowledge consists of three necessary and sufficient conditions: Knowledge is a justified, true, belief. Anything that has all three qualities holds knowledge and anything lacking justification, truth or belief cannot hold knowledge. Knowledge is a state of mind that asserts that x and y is the case. “For example, when we believe that P, we are in a mental state that takes P to be true. We cannot believe that P, and also believe P to be false (FULKERSON, PHIL 15: WEEK 4).” I will now explain what reason we hold for our beliefs.
The notions of justification are the beliefs you hold; these notions are propositions you have justification for believing in thus, “justification is necessary for knowledge (Pritchard, 31).” Justification can be based on evidence but some beliefs might be automatically justified. For example, the belief that the earth orbits the sun “does not need further support to be rightly held (Pritchard 32).” For any X, if Y is justified in believing X, and X entails Z, and Y deduces Z from X, and accepts Z as a result, then Y is justified in believing Z. “When you have a belief that is true and justified, then you have knowledge (FULKERSON, PHIL 15: WEEK 4).”
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...ning it is not very plausible; “justification is necessary for knowledge (Pritchard, 23).”
The subject of which Foundationalism and Coherentism are offering competing accounts is the fundamental structure of the epistemic justification of our beliefs. This epistemic justification is what is supposed to give us a compelling reason for thinking that the belief in question is justified. Although there are flaws within both theories, I would argue that Coherentism obtains a belief closer to the truth than foundationalism; there is more evidence to justify the truthfulness of a belief. So if you have a coherent set of beliefs, that's enough to make the beliefs justified. I have argued why Coherentism is the better account for epistemic justification and shown how Foundationalism fails to provide a logical or adequate reason to be accepted as a structure of knowledge.
It is crucial that every belief must be thoroughly explored and justified to avoid any future repercussions. Clifford provides two examples in which, regardless of the outcome, the party that creates a belief without comprehensive justification ends up at fault. It is possible to apply the situations in The Ethics of Belief to any cases of belief and end up with the conclusion that justification is of utmost importance. Justifying beliefs is so important because even the smallest beliefs affect others in the community, add to the global belief system, and alter the believer moral compass in future decisions.
As we delve deeper into the Philosophical understanding of William Clifford and Blaise Pascal we gain a new understanding of evidentialism and non-evidentialism. Having studied both Pascal and Clifford I lean more with Pascal and his thoughts and teachings that you do not need to have evidence to believe in a higher power. This paper will continue to give more examples of Pascals teachings of non-evidentialism and why I agree with them.
Rationalists would claim that knowledge comes from reason or ideas, while empiricists would answer that knowledge is derived from the senses or impressions. The difference between these two philosophical schools of thought, with respect to the distinction between ideas and impressions, can be examined in order to determine how these schools determine the source of knowledge. The distinguishing factor that determines the perspective on the foundation of knowledge is the concept of the divine.
Why is it important to know what you believe and why you believe it? While reflecting upon this question I found myself turning to the scripture in 1 Peter 3:15 “But in your hearts revere Christ as Lord. Always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have. But do this with gentleness and respect,” (NIV) Can other’s see your hope in Christ? Are you prepared to tell them what Christ has done in your life? Christians should always be prepared to give an answer when asked about our faith (what we believe and why). 2 Timothy 2:25 states “in humility correcting those who are in opposition, if God, perhaps will grant them repentance, so that they may know the truth, “(NKJV) By knowing what we believe and why we believe it, we, as Christians, are able to listen to question and respond respectfully, while avoiding debate, and those who oppose our belief will be more willing to
Zagzebski defines knowledge by expressing the relationship between the subject and the truth proposition. A truth claim becomes knowledge when your state of belief makes cognitive contact with reality. What it is to know that you understand something is different from having a relationship with something. Propositional knowledge, that can be known or believed, is her focus due to simplicity. The criteria required for belief is to have a thought, followed by augmentation with experience. The minimal criteria for a definition of knowledge must incorporate two types of “good”; a moral and an ethical. These truths are implemented to develop the foundation on which Zagzebski later builds her definition.
Knowledge, its source and truthfulness have been under question for a long time. People have always wondered what exactly constitutes facts and if there are any defining laws that can be attributed to all knowledge or information available in the world. Many philosophers speculated on how information can be interpreted according to its falsity or truthfulness, but have not come to definite conclusions. Edmund Gettier has provided one of the key pieces in understanding and trying to figure out what knowledge really is.
Hume distinguishes two categories into which “all the objects of human reason or enquiry” may be placed into: Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact (15). In regards to matters of fact, cause and effect seems to be the main principle involved. It is clear that when we have a fact, it must have been inferred...
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies knowledge. It is mainly concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge. It attempts to answer the basic question of what distinguishes true or adequate knowledge from otherwise false or inadequate knowledge (Heylighen). The major branches of epistemological theory are rationalism, empiricism and mysticism. Rationalism implies that knowledge is obtained through reason and introspection. Ones ideas are justified by sense experience, but if the senses and intuition are in conflict, the sensory evidence must be discarded. In empiricism, knowledge is obtained through observation and experiment. Models and theories may be used to organize this sensory experience, but if theories contradict experience they are wrong. In mysticism, knowledge is obtained through faith, emotions or revelation but if observation or intuition contradict, the knowledge is thus deemed wrong (“Rationalism”). Doubt, as a Persian Proverb once said, is the key to knowledge. It is one of the influencing factors in the expansion of knowledge. A fact that is conside...
This essay attempts to capitalize on Goldman 's “What is justified belief?” to form an opinion about his ideas. Goldman makes a break from traditional views of knowledge to form a theory of externalism. He gives the reader a new point of view for observing the relationship between knowledge and justification. The following passage will weed out some important aspects of his theory and how they relate to his theory as a whole.
The Transcendental Deductions of the pure concept of the understanding in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, in its most general sense, explains how concepts relate a priori to objects in virtue of the fact that the power of knowing an object through representations is known as understanding. According to Kant, the foundation of all knowledge is the self, our own consciousness because without the self, experience is not possible. The purpose of this essay is to lay out Kant’s deduction of the pure concept of understanding and show how our concepts are not just empirical, but concepts a priori. We will walk through Kant’s argument and reasoning as he uncovers each layer of understanding, eventually leading up to the conclusion mentioned above.
Empiricists and rationalists have proposed opposing theories of the acquisition of knowledge, which appear unable to coexist. Each theory holds its own strengths but does not demonstrate a strong argument in itself to the questions, “Is knowledge truly possible?” and “How is true knowledge obtained?”. Immanual Kant successfully merged the two philosophies and provided a convincing argument with his theory of empirical relativism, or what some may call constructivism. His theory bridges the gap between rationalism and empiricism and proves that empiricists and rationalists each present a piece of the full puzzle. In order to truly understand Kant’s epistemology, one must first review and understand both empiricism and rationalism on an impartial basis.
...ll true knowledge is solely knowledge of the self, its existence, and relation to reality. René Descartes' approach to the theory of knowledge plays a prominent role in shaping the agenda of early modern philosophy. It continues to affect (some would say "infect") the way problems in epistemology are conceived today. Students of philosophy (in his own day, and in the history since) have found the distinctive features of his epistemology to be at once attractive and troubling; features such as the emphasis on method, the role of epistemic foundations, the conception of the doubtful as contrasting with the warranted, the skeptical arguments of the First Meditation, and the cogito ergo sum--to mention just a few that we shall consider. Depending on context, Descartes thinks that different standards of warrant are appropriate. The context for which he is most famous, and on which the present treatment will focus, is that of investigating First Philosophy. The first-ness of First Philosophy is (as Descartes conceives it) one of epistemic priority, referring to the matters one must "first" confront if one is to succeed in acquiring systematic and expansive knowledge.
Some of the objections, such as the ones made by Edmund Gettier, claim that three conditions are not nearly enough to justify a true belief, and that at the very least a fourth must be added. Gettier presents a very valid criticism of the JTB theory of knowledge, and his counter examples highlight flaws in the JTB theory that make it an inadequate theory of knowledge. Gettier claims takes an issue with the third part of the JTB theory, which states that proposition P must be true. Gettier makes the interesting observation that person S may very well be justified in believing in proposition P even if P is false
In this paper, I offer a solution to the Gettier problem by adding a fourth condition to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. First though, a brief review. Traditionally, knowledge had been accounted for with the justified true belief analysis. To know something, three conditions had to be met: first, you had to have a belief; second, the belief had to be justified; third, this justified belief had to be true. So a justified true belief counts as knowledge. Gettier however showed this analysis to be inadequate as one can have a justified true belief that no one would want to count as knowledge.
...when any and every contribution towards his salvation on the part of the believer or on the part of the Church is absolutely and unequivocally shut out. Justification must be seen and received as a blessing dependent wholly and exclusively on Christ alone, on what he is and what he has done—a blessing enjoyed simply through being joined directly to him, through finding one's all in him, through drawing one's all from him.” "Justification by Faith: the Reinstatement of the Doctrine Today," Evangelical Quarterly, July, 1952, p. 166.