Examples Of Mission Command Failure

Mission Command as defined by the United States Army consists six distinct and critical principles. During World War II there were many examples of exemplary mission command that led to stunning victories for the Allies but also many examples of failure. The Battle for Arnhem or Operation Market-Garden was such a failure. Major General Robert Elliot Urquhart, the Commander of the 1st Airborne Division failed in not only in tactics but the ability to lead his division to victory. He did not completely misunderstand the principles of mission command, but four main areas in which he made critical mistakes were; Build a Cohesive Team Through Mutual Trust, Create a Shared Understanding, Accept Prudent Risk, and Exercise Disciplined Initiative.

The plan for Operation Market-Garden was to secure bridges crossing the Rhine river into the German industrial heartland to have a timely end to the war in 1944. Field Marshall Sir Bernard Montgomery, commander of the 21st Army Group, issued the orders on 12 September, the plan intended for airborne troops to capture key bridges at three towns; Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem. Codename “Market” was to be the airborne seizure of the bridges, and “Garden” was to be the simultaneous ground plan. The airborne operations were to take three days to complete, and 1st Airborne Division’s mission was to be a road, rail, and pontoon bridge crossing the Lower Rhine in and around the town of Arnhem.
Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
The first tenant of mission command that MG Urquhart exemplified was to “build cohesive teams through mutual trust” . Building trust takes time, and Major General Urquhart became the commander of 1st Airborne in a rather unconventional manner. Traditionally British airborne units promoted from within, MG Urquhart had served and commanded previously in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, but in light infantry units. Urquhart was aware of his situation and did his utmost to win the respect and admiration of his troopers.
During the battle, Major General Urquhart exemplified true leadership and trust with his subordinates. His soldiers thought of him as “a bloody general who didn’t mind doing the job of a Sergeant” . During the battle, he visited his soldiers constantly, and in one instance was helping move radio batteries from out of storage and into his command trench, where in which his subordinate did not realize who was assisting him and continued on his tasks. He absolutely won the admiration and respect of his men and encouraged the soldiers of 1st Airborne Division.
Create a Shared Understanding
Creating a clear understanding especially during the midst of a battle is vital to the success of the mission, and for Major General Urquhart this was absolutely an utter failure.

1st Airborne from the outset was having communication issues, and on many occasions, MG Urquhart left his headquarters to gain understanding from his subordinate commanders. At one point in the battle Major General Urquhart and Brigadier Lathbury, his second in command were both hiding in an attic to avoid German forces, greatly diminishing the command and control node of 1st Airborne Division. Communications issued plagued the operation but the Dutch telephone service was still operable during the battle and could have alleviated many problems faced by Major General

Urquhart.
Major General Urquhart did not create a shared understanding of Operation Market during the preparation phase of the operation. While he and his deputy commander were cut off from the rest of the division, Brigadier Hicks took command of 1st Airborne. Brigadier Hicks was securing Landing/Drop Zone’s in the early actions of the battle. His lack of understanding of the operation led him to believe that Lieutenant Colonel’s Frost’s 2nd Parachute Battalion was the decisive operation. Brigadier Hicks lack of understanding of the terrain and the enemy gave him a false understanding of the emerging situation. He ordered three battalions into an area called the Den Brink Area, a 200-meter corridor, on which the Rhine was on one side and high ground on the other. Along this route, the Germans were able to place on the high ground a Ant-aircraft battalion and a engineer battalion. Across the Rhine the Germans had also emplaced a reconnaissance battalion. These three battalions had a devastating effect on the reinforcements for the 2nd Parachute Battalion.
Unfortunately for Major General Urquhart, the German forces had a very clear understanding of Operation Market-Garden. The Germans were swift to react to the noticeable airborne operation in broad daylight but were also in possession of the Allied orders that were found on a dead officer. This allowed the Germans commanders to understand just as well as the Allied commanders the concept of the mission and the goals the Allies had hoped to achieve.
Accepting Prudent Risk
Accepting prudent risk is key to being a commander, MG Urquhart did not adequately understand the risks involved at Arnhem. It was reported that on 15th September before the Friday before the operation was to begin, MG Urquhart was playing golf, rather than providing guidance and leadership to his staff and soldiers. This was/is completely unacceptable before the largest airborne operation was about to commence. General Browning was quoted saying to Major General Urquhart “I shouldn’t worry about learning how to parachute. Your job is to prepare this division for the invasion of Europe. Not only are you too big for parachuting but you are also getting on.” Meaning that Major General Urquhart was not even going to be parachuting into Arnhem, but rather flying in on a glider. MG Urquhart’s lack of understanding of the situation and his responsibility in coordinating and planning the operation were paramount, possibly if he was trained from within the airborne community he would have had a better understanding of what his mission and the flawed intent of his higher headquarters.
Due to MG Urquhart’s lack of experience in airborne operations, it can be inferred that many of the faults in the operation were due to his lack of understanding and knowing the risks that were posed by the operation.

Unfortunately for the entire army group, Operation Market Garden was to be planned in 7 days. Major General Urquhart’s report on Operation Market states that there was adequate time for the planning of the mission but that due to the necessary risk of multiple airlifts over three days led to the divisions fighting strength to be that of a brigade. In his planning of this Operation, Major General Urquhart had requested more Allied gliders and planes, but seemed content enough to go ahead with the

plan.
The entire 1st Airborne Division was to be dropped 8 miles away from the road bridge that was to be secured at Arnhem instead of coordinating landing zones closer to their vital objective. For a typical airborne operation, the objective should not be further than 5 miles away from the drop/landing zones. Major General Urquhart acknowledged the risks in his report of Operation Market, but did not fight General Browning before the Operation commenced in changing the plan so 1st Airborne Division had a better chance of succeeded at their mission. This allowed for the Germans to have adequate reaction time to set up blocking positions
1st Airborne Division’s mission statement “was to capture the bridges at ARNHEM and to establish a bridgehead round them, so that formations of 30 Corps and SECOND Army could pass through without delay on their advance northwards”. In creating a shared understanding with his subordinates before the operation took off he was successful.
Exercise Disciplined Initiative
During the battle 1st Airborne Division lacked the ability to take the initiative. Subordinate commanders were not audacious enough to seize opportunities that could have shifted the course of the operation. On 17 September, while Major General Urquhart was not in his command post, Major Gough, the commander of 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, had found a ferry at Heveadorp to aide crossing the Rhine. With the leadership elsewhere in the battle, this ferry went unsecured. This was a critical failure of the 1st Airborne Division. If Brigadier Hicks took the initiative to secure this ferry and dug in and waited for the ground forces from XXX Corps he could have contributed to the success of the operation. Instead of still focusing on securing the bridge at Arnhem, Brigadier Hicks did not undertake the initiative and understand the purpose of 1st Airborne Division.
Conclusion
Overall Operation Market Garden did not achieve its intended purpose. The Allies were not able to seize the bridges crossing into the German industrial heartland and bring a swift end to hostilities. Major General Urquhart and the 1st Airborne Division (UK) had mixed results which ultimately led to the failure of their assigned mission. At the end of the Operation the division suffered 80% casualties and would not see combat again for the rest of the war. If Major General Urquhart and his staff had a better understanding of their mission, they could have taken more acceptable and prudent risks and took the initiative to secure their objectives by other means.