Mission Command: Understand
Wade E. Campbell Jr.
Master Leader Course 01-18
In April 2003, Major General David Petraeus led the 101st Airborne Division in combat operations into the northern Iraq city of Mosul. The 101st Airborne Division advanced faster and further than expected. The initial call to end major combat fighting resulted in the strategy of the U.S. military changing tactics. The military went from combat operations, to policing, and ultimately policy enforcers. Gen. Petraeus understood Mission Command and set into motion steps to improve the post war reconstruction of Mosul. As the commander, Gen. Petraeus had to analyze the mission and variables in order to accomplish the mission. With little to no guidance Gen. Petraeus
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used information collection (reconnaissance), conceptual and detailed planning, and critical thinking and problem solving, to ensure the post reconstruction phase of Mosul was successful. Gen.
Petraeus relied heavily on his past experiences working overseas, as well as his background as an economics instructor at West Point. The time he spent working with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and forming a headquarters in Haiti, led to what would be one of the highpoints of his career. Serving abroad allowed him to analyze multiple situations and enhance collaborative skills with others that proved to be invaluable. Gen. Petraeus understood how information collecting was an important part of mission command. He had to first utilize his commanders in the initial stages for conducting an investigation; it was a top priority in building strategic intelligence. In the initial phase of post reconstruction, he had to be able to secure and hold Mosul. Colonel Anderson was ordered to conduct a recon of the city to decide what the next move would be. Col. Anderson’s arrival to Mosul was met with a briefing of the city. The initial reports were unclear, the marines claimed it was hostile, with looting and lawlessness. However, a group of Special Forces down played hostilities in the …show more content…
city. Col. Anderson was able to complete an assessment after a drive throughout the city without incident. He reported back to Gen. Petraeus, that the city was ready to be occupied; command and control was implemented. Gen.
Petraeus had to implement a conceptual and detailed plan that had a means to an end. The five functions of management (planning, organization, staffing, directing, and controlling) came into play. The initial planning phase was to rebuild the destroyed city of Mosul, but when Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) fell apart, Gen. Petraeus decided to use elements of his engineering units to assist where ORHA failed. This included the renewal of running water, electricity, fuel, and communications. Next, Gen. Petraeus held meetings with his commanders, local tribal leaders, up and coming politicians, business owners, and university teachers on a daily basis. The meetings were an effort to organize a plan to assist soldiers from 101st Airborne Division with the restoration process. Staffing consisted of Iraqi generals who were brought in to coordinate the building up of a reliable police force that was tasked to restore law and order. The Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers assisted in legal issues and negotiations between factions. A finance team was brought in to assist in the payrolls of local workers as well as to support budgeting efforts of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding. Gen. Petraeus directed soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division to set aside differences, from the people they were once at war with. “Strategic Corporal” was an initiative to get U.S. soldiers out of the “shoot first, ask questions later” mind
frame. He wanted the soldiers to win the hearts and minds of the local residents. He also directed the removal of negative media outlets that consisted of only one AM station, and one operational news network, which was still persuading the locals to resist Americans. He decided to allow the local media to follow him and his commanders around so that the media could report the truth. Gen. Petraeus and his aides also had television and radio time slots in which they gave positive outlooks for the future of Mosul. A television producer introduce new shows like Mosul talent show. As a result, Mosul was introduced to a variety of AM and FM radio stations and television shows. Lastly, Gen. Petraeus and his top officials controlled the elections. They allowed certain political leaders with former ties to Saddam to be eligible to run for a political party, but only if they denounced the Baath party. His head officials also enforced the number of spots agreed upon to sit on the council. Gen. Petraeus utilized critical thinking and problem solving to deter an increase in violence and protests. On June 12, during a major demonstration, violence finally erupted in Mosul. Iraqi police, feeling outnumbered, shot four protesters—killing one and wounding three (2003, p.29). Gen. Petraeus quickly addressed the situation with the mayor and decided that monies would be paid to former Iraqi soldiers and locals (one of the reasons for the protest). Demonstrations would have to be approved if more than 15 people were going to be present, and the police officers involved in the shooting were arrested. Each time there was an accidental killing or negative actions, Gen. Petraeus was fast to act on the situation and make statements. In conclusion, Gen. Petraeus used information collection, conceptual and detailed planning, and critical thinking and problem solving, to ensure the success of the post reconstruction of Mosul.
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
The 2nd Brigade of 101st Airborne Division found out in the summer of 2004 that they had to prepare for the war in the Middle East more particularly for Iraq. With Colonel Todd Ebel in Command of the 2nd Division with a year to prepare over 3,400 men and woman he got right to work. Colonel Ebel started by choosing his staff and who he thought was fit to take charge and lead this ever more complicated war. It was a huge religious civil war taking place in Iraq at the time with the Sunnis at war against the Shi’ite and after the capture of Saddam insurgency started uprising immediately. This uprising along with the uprising of Muqtada al-Sadr a key leader that had lots of violent followers that soon grew into a form of a militia called Mahdi Army which became another huge problem for the U.S. because the line between a legitamite populist movement and a huge theocratic organized-crime and terror ring was a thin one. The 2nd Brigade Infantry Battalions consisted of 1-502nd (First Strike) and 2-502nd (Strike Force) and 2nd brigade as a whole is known as the “Black Hearts”. Ebel’s mission was to deny insurgent’s access to Baghdad through his AO and as intelligence increased to uproot and destroy insurgent safe havens, while also training the IA so they could ensure the stability of the region later on. Ebel chose Lt. Col. Kunk as commander of “First Strike” 1-502nd and Lt. Col. Haycock as commander of “Strike Force” 2-502nd. By Ebel’s personality evaluations of Kunk and Haycock he decided that Kunk would work in the area that involved him being more engaging where populist centers were and work with local officials and Haycock more in the fighting areas. Kunk was in command of 3 rifle companies, 1 weapons company, 1 logistics company...
The book Black Hearts by Jim Frederick is an in-depth narrative about the 1st platoon, Bravo Company 1-502nd Infantry 101st Airborne Division deployed to Iraq in 2005. The leadership failures documented in this book range all the way from the general officer level down to the lowest private. LT general Ricardo Sanchez failed to understand the climate his command group was entering as they were deployed into Iraq. From then on the entire leadership failures continued to compound upon each other with improper time to plan. It is customary to have a six month lead time to have a proper battle hand off when preparing to take over an AO from another unit. To compound this problem, the entire time the 502nd was in pre-deployment training, they were preparing for the rigors of urban combat. In reality, they were given six weeks to recon their new area of responsibility and were going to a countryside crafted by the heavens for guerilla warfare. As Colonel Ebel said in the book, “It is not going to be an easy road. They are not even sure of what they have in the area. It just feels bad. We can expect a real fight.”
The mission command philosophy helps commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders can build teams and achieve their final goals through adapting the six principles of mission command to warfighting situation. I analyzed and compared the performance of General Sherman and General Hampton in four of six mission command principles.
As the incoming brigade commander, LTC (P) Owens, I see the critical leadership problem facing the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is the inability or unwillingness of Colonel Cutler to lead and manage change effectively. In initial talks with Col Cutler and in reviewing the brigade’s historical unit status reports, the 4th ABCT performed as well as can be expected in Afghanistan, but as the onion was peeled back there are numerous organizational issues that were brought to the surface while I walked around and listened to the soldiers of the 4th ABCT, in addition to reviewing the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report. One of the most formidable tasks of a leader is to improve the organization while simultaneously accomplishing
Effective planning is impossible without first understanding the problem. Commanders rely on personal observations, experiences, and input from others to develop understanding. They also prioritize information requests and incorporate additional information as those requests are answered. A complete understanding of the problem and environment builds the foundation for the operational process and ...
...at home. Based on the QDR Gen Casey writes the objectives memorandum to best support the defense of the United States and support the civil authorities at home.
The performance of Major General Ambrose E. Burnside at the helm of the Army of the Potomac can be characterized as less than stellar. His failures to understand, describe, lead, and assess during the Battle of Fredericksburg ultimately led to his army’s defeat and the death of tens of thousands of Federal soldiers. The fate of the mission and our soldiers rely on our ability to conduct mission command activities. It is essential we learn from the grave mistakes of the commanders of the past and become prepared to carry out these activities when we are called to do
Operation Desert Shield was launched by President H.W. Bush to increase the amount of forces and troops in areas surrounding Kuwait and mainly in Saudi Arabia in response to the 120,000 troops and 2,000 tanks invading Kuwait. The United Nations called for the Iraqi army’s extraction from their presence in Kuwait, however Hussein went ag...
A military officer must manage pieces of one of the largest organizations in the United States government - an organization that accounts for the third largest piece of the American budget and is comprised of 1.3 million active sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines, many of whom are tasked with being deployable to any location within 48 hours. This is only possible through concise, professional communication on the part of every service member, especially
U.S. Military Commanders promised an overwhelming response. On the morning of Sunday, the 4th of April, 2004, platoons of Marines began to position themselves around the city. The following day, the fighting began and quickly intensified. This day was the start of what is known as Operation Vigilant Resolve. It was an operation set to take back control of Fallujah from the insurgents (McCarthy, 2004).
On March 18, 2003, Coalition forces would launch the initial attacks on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. A full invasion of the country followed, and Hussein was overthrown from power. While the end of Hussein’s oppressive reign was considered a victory for many of the Iraqi people, the Sunnis of the Ba’ath Party refused to accept his demise. Although the Sunnis were in the minority, the city of Fallujah would remain home to many of the Ba’ath Party supporters. On March 31, 2004, almost a year to date from the end of Hussein’s reign, four American Blackwater contactors working in Fallujah were attacked, brutally beaten, burned and dismembered by a group of Iraqi insurgents. Two of the bodies were hung from a bridge for all of the citizens of Fallujah to see, and a mob style celebration took place in the city. The highly publicized incident would be the igniter for the First Battle of Fallujah, known as Operation Vigilant Resolve. On May 1, 2004, the battle would end with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the city and control being turned over to the newly formed Fallujah Brigade. The mission as a whole was a failure, and the shortcomings of Operation Vigilant Resolve were ultimately a demonstration of the underestimation of the power, size, efficiency, organization and control that the Insurgent Forces had in Iraq as well as the lack of a consistent strategic plan from the American forces.
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Joint Warfare Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment.
...d me with our staff and Soldiers we have been given the opportunity to lead. The time and effort spent will be well worth it. Possessing a shared understanding of the operational environment will aid in our planning process when conducting operations throughout our theater of operation. In every operation we execute we know that we will accept prudent risks, identification and mitigation of those risks will determine our ability to accomplish our mission. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate. My involvement in all aspects of mission command is critical to the success of our organization.