The Lack of Unity of Command During Operation Anaconda
Throughout military history one of the principles of war is the Unity of Command. Unity of command is the ability to lead campaigns and battles by a single Senior Officer. Although Operation Anaconda was a success it was hindered during its first days of contact due to the lack of Unity of Command. The Unity of Command initially failed due to different commands operating within Afghanistan, a long distance leadership style, the lack of control over all Special Operations Forces, exclusions of the United States Air Force (USAF), and not having a proper Joint staff.
U.S. Forces in Afghanistan
The command and control (C2) element had some flaws. The first being a failure in long distance
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leadership. Long distance leadership is being able effectively lead from afar by using modern technology. The second flaw in the C2 element was not being able to control all of the Special Operation Forces. Long Distance Leadership Unity of Command was not present in Afghanistan before Operation Anaconda started.
General Franks, who was leading Central Command (CENTCOM) in Florida, had two Component Commands working in Afghanistan. The first was Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) led by Army LTG Mikolashek located at Camp Doha, Kuwait and the second was led by Air Force LTG Mosley Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) located at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Both commanders where operating thousands of miles away from Afghanistan. With both commanders being geographically dislocated from the battle field, this led to a long distance leadership style that was not conducive to the Unity of Command during a time of war (Marzano, …show more content…
2006). Lack of Control Over Special Operations Forces (SOF) To an extent, Afghanistan did have a U.S. Ground Force Commander operating in the country. Colonel Mulholland who was the 5th Special Forces Group Commander. The 5th Special Forces Group was working with Afghanistan Troops. Outside of Mulholland’s command were other Special Operation Forces and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operatives that Colonel Mulholland had no control over. Therefore, this alleviated the Colonel from having a good Unity of Command in Afghanistan. Mistakes within the Command and Control Unity of Command must be established when a Senior Officer takes command of an operation. A joint commander must have a strong, well organized joint staff to effectively plan. A joint staff will be able to organize all the assets available and influence the planning process. Developing a Unity of Command From January through February of 2002, the U.S.
military decided to conduct an assault on the Shahikot Valley in Afghanistan using a sizable amount of U.S. ground forces. This was due to the Taliban having control over the Shahikot Valley. However, there was no Unity of Command established. Due to this sizable ground force, General Franks appointed the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Hagenbeck as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) commander. MG Hagenback was appointed only days before the operation was to take place. As with COL Mulholland, MG Hagenback did not have control over all of the SOF and CIA Operatives. This lead to the lack of planning within the command and control element of the Operation. Therefore, there was not a defined command structure for Operation Anaconda, resulting in a poor Unity of
Command. Limited Staff The 10th Mountain Division was spread pretty thin when Major General Hagenbeck arrived to Bagram Air Base north of Kabul, Afghanistan. The MG only had a partial staff, no deputy commanding officers and did not have his entire division. At this time the 10th Mountain Division only had two Brigades (BDE). The Division had one BDE in Kosovo, a Battalion (BN) in Bosnia and a BN in Sinai, Egypt. This left Major General Hagenback extremely short on staff for planning the operation as well as leaving him with only one Light Infantry Battalion (BN) in Afghanistan. Major General Hagenback only had three personnel on his limited staff that had ever worked in a joint environment. Unity of Command suffered due to his staff and deputy commanding officers being spread thin. Exclusion of the United States Air Force (USAF) The USAF was left out of the planning process until the last week of February 2002, according to a document dated in 2005 (HQ United States Airforce, 2005). Planning for such a large operation should have included the USAF during the preliminary planning stage. A direct reflection of the failure of the command and control element was not including such an important tool until the last part of the planning process. Joint Forces Joint forces are forces composed of many different military elements, whether assigned or attached to a single joint force commander. When a joint force command is established the Unity of Command within the commander’s control will be more organized and information will flow with ease. Unity in Joint Forces Unity of Command within a joint force environment is important on the battle field for the command and control element to be able to establish a solid operational command and control element. Joint Forces working together and setting aside rivalries will help unify the entire operation. Joint Command Structure A joint command structure is strengthened by establishing a true joint task force under a senior military commander (Kugler, Baranik, & Binnendijk, 2009). Having a solid joint task force structure will enable the distribution of authorities and responsibilities so that the operational and tactical decisions can be made in a more effective manner. This will enable the entire joint task force to have a better working environment and better assist the fulfillment of the mission. Joint Planning Processes The joint planning process must include every organization that will be participating in the operation. The USAF being left out of the planning process until the last week of February 2002 is a prime example of why a joint planning process must exist. Utilizing the correct military branches will alleviate any assumptions or mistakes that can be made without the correct subject matter expert. Conclusion In conclusion, having a single Senior Officer in place to establish an effective Unity of Command before a large scale operation takes place can eliminate frustrations found on the battle field or in any operational environment. Unity between joint forces is extremely important to ensure proper utilization of the tools the military has to offer.
The 23rd RCT received the mission to defend Chipyong-Ni in an attempt to bait the CCF to attack with a large force that could be defeated, but the RCT was at 70% strength following the battle at Twin Tunnels (some units were at 60%). The RCT received intelligence reports of multiple CCF Divisions marching towards Chipyong-Ni. COL Freeman requested the RCT be allowed to pull back 15 miles to prevent encirclement and was approved by MG Almond, but was overturned by LTG Ridgway. LTG Ridgway, the newly assigned Eighth Army Commander, did not allow retreat and always wanted to make contact with the enemy. He relieved his G-3 on the spot for giving him retreat contingency plans.
The war in Afghanistan sparked numerous operations conducted by the U.S. military and its coalition forces. One of the most influential operation until today was Operation Anaconda. Fought in the Shahi-Kot Valley during early march 2002, it was the largest American battle since the Gulf War, and their first high altitude battle ever encounter. The goal of the Operation Anaconda was to eradicate the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda foothold within the eastern region of Afghanistan. Although, originally intended to last three days, Operation Anaconda lasted seventeen days instead, with seven days of intense battle. The U.S. operation Commander, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, schemed the “hammer and anvil” plan in order to achieve his objective. However, this plan
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
The book Black Hearts by Jim Frederick is an in-depth narrative about the 1st platoon, Bravo Company 1-502nd Infantry 101st Airborne Division deployed to Iraq in 2005. The leadership failures documented in this book range all the way from the general officer level down to the lowest private. LT general Ricardo Sanchez failed to understand the climate his command group was entering as they were deployed into Iraq. From then on the entire leadership failures continued to compound upon each other with improper time to plan. It is customary to have a six month lead time to have a proper battle hand off when preparing to take over an AO from another unit. To compound this problem, the entire time the 502nd was in pre-deployment training, they were preparing for the rigors of urban combat. In reality, they were given six weeks to recon their new area of responsibility and were going to a countryside crafted by the heavens for guerilla warfare. As Colonel Ebel said in the book, “It is not going to be an easy road. They are not even sure of what they have in the area. It just feels bad. We can expect a real fight.”
The mission command philosophy helps commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders can build teams and achieve their final goals through adapting the six principles of mission command to warfighting situation. I analyzed and compared the performance of General Sherman and General Hampton in four of six mission command principles.
Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1). William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, executed good mission command in the Battle of Tippecanoe because of his ability to effectively utilize the doctrinal tasks of “understand, visualize, describe, direct, and lead” operations.
Mission Command as defined by the United States Army consists six distinct and critical principles. During World War II there were many examples of exemplary mission command that led to stunning victories for the Allies but also many examples of failure. The Battle for Arnhem or Operation Market-Garden was such a failure. Major General Robert Elliot Urquhart, the Commander of the 1st Airborne Division failed in not only in tactics but the ability to lead his division to victory. He did not completely misunderstand the principles of mission command, but four main areas in which he made critical mistakes were; Build a Cohesive Team Through Mutual Trust, Create a Shared Understanding, Accept Prudent Risk, and Exercise Disciplined Initiative.
The SPCC is targeted to commissioned officers in grades 0-5 (Lieutenant Colonel) or 0-6 (Colonel) who have been centrally selected to command TO&E (Troops, Organization & Equipment) Sustainment Units. This course provides training in modular force operations for newly selected command designees, enabling them to function effectively throughout their command tour. The focus is current and emerging sustainment doctrine and leadership topics for commanders. Training received during the SPCC at Fort Lee is intended to complement the Pre-Command Course (PCC) program of instruction (POI) at Fort Leavenworth, KS; making training consistent at both locations.
As the incoming brigade commander, LTC (P) Owens, I see the critical leadership problem facing the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is the inability or unwillingness of Colonel Cutler to lead and manage change effectively. In initial talks with Col Cutler and in reviewing the brigade’s historical unit status reports, the 4th ABCT performed as well as can be expected in Afghanistan, but as the onion was peeled back there are numerous organizational issues that were brought to the surface while I walked around and listened to the soldiers of the 4th ABCT, in addition to reviewing the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report. One of the most formidable tasks of a leader is to improve the organization while simultaneously accomplishing
Mission command is the commander's use of authority and direction to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It helps subordinates exercise disciplined initiative when operating within their commander’s intent. To facilitate effective mission command, commanders must accomplish four consecutive stages of the operations process. They must thoroughly understand the problem, visualize a solution that achieves a desired end state, and then accurately describe this visualization in order to direct the organization. Commanders continually lead and assess their organizations and provide input and influence to their subordinates and staff.
3 Colonel John T. Carney Jr., No Room for Error, 273. 4. Richard Kugler, Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, 3. 5. General Tommy Franks, American Soldier, 1988. 6 Todd Marzano, Criticisms Associated with Operation Anaconda, Can Long Distance Leadership Be Effective, 4. 7 Todd Marzano, Criticisms Associated with Operation Anaconda, Can Long Distance Leadership Be Effective, 6. 8 Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 121.
The performance of Major General Ambrose E. Burnside at the helm of the Army of the Potomac can be characterized as less than stellar. His failures to understand, describe, lead, and assess during the Battle of Fredericksburg ultimately led to his army’s defeat and the death of tens of thousands of Federal soldiers. The fate of the mission and our soldiers rely on our ability to conduct mission command activities. It is essential we learn from the grave mistakes of the commanders of the past and become prepared to carry out these activities when we are called to do
According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, mission command philosophy is, “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable discipline initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Commanders execute mission command throughout all phases of the operations process. ADP 5-0 states that, “Commanders drive the operations process.” The six steps that allow Commanders to drive the operations process are: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. I will discuss four of these steps used by COL Freeman’s analyze his ability to properly execute mission command in this Battle.
Since the beginning of the retreat from Kabul, General William Elphinstone never provided a clear commander’s intent to his subordinate leaders and Soldiers. His lack of confidence and indecisiveness made the situation worse. He tried to stop the retreat as thousands of troops and camp followers were already half way leaving the cantonment. Elphinestone ordered one of his officers, Collin Mackenzie, to stop the retreat and make the retreating forces go back to the cantonment in Kabul. Mackenzie, tried to convince Elphinestone that this would be fatal. Half of the troops inside the cantonment and the other half out of the cantonment left them vulnerable to an enemy attack. Mackenzie ignored Elphinestone’s order and he kept moving the troops
A defined chain of command with equal representation from all the armed services coupled with standardized clear communication and training throughout the branches, results in an elite fighting force with endless capabilities. Efficiency is the major goal behind Joint Warfare and so long as the clear channels of communication throughout the services hold true, this goal is attainable. This efficiency, though almost impossible to fully achieve, was seen during Desert Storm. During the Desert Storm campaign, General Schwarztkopf was Commander and Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT). His first order of business was to name component commanders.