Operation Anaconda: A Pivotal Battle in Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan sparked numerous operations conducted by the U.S. military and its coalition forces. One of the most influential operation until today was Operation Anaconda. Fought in the Shahi-Kot Valley during early march 2002, it was the largest American battle since the Gulf War, and their first high altitude battle ever encounter. The goal of the Operation Anaconda was to eradicate the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda foothold within the eastern region of Afghanistan. Although, originally intended to last three days, Operation Anaconda lasted seventeen days instead, with seven days of intense battle. The U.S. operation Commander, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, schemed the “hammer and anvil” plan in order to achieve his objective. However, this plan

unravels within the first day of battle when the enemy forces showed to be more defensive than originally anticipated. In a case study of Operation Anaconda, Dr. Kugler (2007) expressed that U.S. achieved success when they switched tactical gears by calling air strikes, more than originally anticipated, in order to suppress and destroy the enemy. This adaptation during the battle, not only, was crucial to the success of the mission, but also painted the importance of never underestimate the enemy.
Dr.

Kugler (2007) claimed that, “Operation Anaconda was an outgrowth of earlier events during the war in Afghanistan.” One of the main event he exposed in his case study, which according to him set the stage for Operation Anaconda, was the battle at Tora Bora. Located in in the mountainous area of eastern Afghanistan, Tora Bora was a caved complex, where U.S. authorities believed to be Osama Bin Laden safe haven. The plan were to use minimum U.S. troops and relied mostly local Afghan troops in order to secure the area and capture all High Value Targets (HVT). Dr. Kugler (2007) briefly explained that, the operation turned out to be a failure from the point of view of U.S. and coalition forces, since most HTVs including Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda leaders successfully escaped during the operation. The successful escape of these key leaders was in part due to the lack of necessary amount of troops needed to block all escape routes, and to the lack of experience from the local Afghan troops, the Pashtun militia. Chairman Kerry (2009) stated in his report to congress that, “the decision not to deploy American forces to go after bin Laden or block his escape was made by Secretary of

Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and his top commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, the architects of the unconventional Afghan battle plan known as Operation Enduring Freedom.” Furthermore, Kerry (2009) claimed that, Rumsfeld believed that having too many U.S. troops in Afghanistan would create “an anti-American backlash and fuel a widespread insurgency.”
General Hagenbeck schemed his battle plan, “hammer and anvil plan,” for Operation Anaconda, from the reeks of the battle of Tora Bora. With an intelligence source reporting a minimal number of resistance fighter in the Shahi-Kot Valley, and with the belief that, these fighters would show similar resistance, as he occurred during the Tora Bora battle by attempting to flee or surrender, U.S. leaders and coalition forces predicted the operation to occur smoothly and quickly. General Hagenbeck predicted the operation to last only three days. Since, the concept of showing minimal U.S. presence in Afghanistan, was still effective during Operation Anaconda, General Hagenbeck had only a limited number of U.S. infantry troops at his disposal. With an estimate number of 1500 hundred troops, his forces comprised of a light infantry battalion of the 10th Mountain Division, commanded by LTC Paul LaCamera, the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division, commanded by COL Frank Weircinski, several U.S. and allied countries SOF troops and friendly Afghan forces. Dr. Kugler (2007) stated that “in order to keep a low profile, the infantry battalions of the 101st and 10th Mountain Divisions were sent to Afghanistan without any tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, or artillery.” As a result, U.S. troops conducted Operation Anaconda, with light armaments. General Hagenbeck also had eight Apache helicopters, thirteen Chinook helicopters, and eight Blackhawk helicopters to support his operation. U.S. troops on the ground also had access to airstrike request, and Close Air Support (CAS) during the operation since it was a joint operation with the U.S. air force and the Navy. Unware of the exact amount of enemy force within the Shahi-Kot Valley, and with a bold assumption that it would be an easy take over, U.S. key leaders and coalition forces once again relied on the efficiency of the friendly local Afghan troops. With the aids of U.S. SOF, the friendly Afghan militias were to be the hammer of the operation, lead to the front, and charge through the Shahi-Kot Valley, while U.S. troops would act as the anvil by blocking all escape routes. The faulty Intelligence provided and the meager assumption proved detrimental during the first day of battle, when initial contact with the enemy showed them to be more fiercely than originally predicted.
Similar to Tora Bora, Shahi-Kot was a rigorous valley located at a high altitude and surrounded by high ridgelines. With limited access routes and filled with caves and crevasses, it was a great defensive point for the enemy forces. Dr. Kugler (2007) stated that, “twice during the 1980’s, the Soviets mounted assaults against the Shahi-Kot Valley with attack helicopters, artillery, and infantry, and on both occasions, they withdrew in retreat, driven back by fierce resistance.” The assumption that the enemy would flee and pose no resistance became irrelevant within the first day of battle. U.S. and allied troops found the enemy more reluctant to the idea of surrendering. They were well prepared, fully armed with heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenade, and prepositioned mortars. According to Dr. Kugler (2007), the Taliban and al Qaeda intention were to make a final stand against all Americans, allies, and friendly local forces with the hope to bloody as many as they could. In lieu of this realization, and with the lack of artillery or mortars, U.S. troops had to adopt a different approach, and make more use of the air supports, which originally did not played an important role during the scheming of the operation. By the end of March 18, 2002, U.S. forces suffered a total of eight killed and fifty wounded, on which Dr. Kugler (2007) claimed, would have been more, if the air force had not intervened.
In summary, the initial outcome during early Operation Anaconda was due in part of an improper analysis of the enemy at hand, improper Intel depicting the actual amount enemy, and the faulty idea to minimize the presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. U.S. troops demonstrated their abilities to adapt to any situation despite the difficulty while striving to accomplish the mission. It is this quality that, the fierce al Qaeda forces neglected to compute, when they decided to hold their ground. Two of the lessons that derived from Operation Anaconda are never to underestimate the enemy and assuming the worse in war is sometimes beneficial.