Operation Anaconda Failure

Introduction
Even though, at times it seemed that joint functions appeared in chaos, the end-state was a unified effort. There were obstacles that precluded this in the beginning and that are why the joint function of Operation Anaconda nearly failed. The shortages of staff, lack of detailed information flow, and the slow movement on Operation Anaconda D-day was the key factors that nearly led to the failure.
Shortage of Staff
United States Army prompted and selected Major General Hagenbeck to command the 10th Mountain Division to establish forward Headquarters. Major Gen. Hagenbeck had some significant hurdles to cross. The thinly stretched and highly stressed division headquarters was undermanned because their manpower was already

committed and deployed elsewhere in country. Central Command MacDill AFB, FL (CENTCOM) placed stringent manning restrictions on the 10th Mountain Division, stating that only 50 to 60 troops would be needed for deployment. Gen Hagenbeck’s staff informed him of the strength problem so Gen Hagenbeck gave his staff the commander’s intent to improve on getting more troops for the mission.
The 10th Mountain left to deploy to Uzbekistan while 101st Airborne Division held in reserve for possible operation in Iraq. The most mindboggling was 101st Airborne Division, with no deployments ongoing and able to perform conduct helicopter air assaults, CENTCOM could have been solved the operating problem by deploying the 101ST as a Forward Headquarter.

Lack of Information
The flow of information was in chaos because commanders of task forces in the field was doing their own reporting information, also not sharing information between task force elements, air components and Special Forces groups.

My opinion CENTCOM did not have adequate control of the US forces in Afghanistan. Once 10th Mountain Division commander realized the problem, therefore; staff of Gen Hagebeck starts putting a plan into effect to establish C4I command, control, communication, and Intel and computer networks. The biggest problem was getting information flowing. The terrain makes it extremely hard for US forces to communicate and perform their command and control functions. With limited communications and many forces in heavy contact, the level of high-priority radio traffic exploded with spot reports. This was a very slow process for sending spot reports back to 10th Mountain Division. More problem can forward, that 10th Mountain needed to have Tactical Control (TACON) so everyone could share information, therefore organizations would report to 10th Mountain Division commander not directly to CENTCOM Commander. By doing it this way, 10th Mountain would report all activity in country. Order to bring cohesion in the command structure, 10th Mountain commander appointed two generals as deputies, which BG Gary Harrell and BG Mike Jones, both experienced as Special Forces Officers, well known among the special operation group. This gave the 10th

Mountain commander a useful liaison with the special operation groups and black operations. By establishing a plan for information flow, the commanders in the field was able to share information.

D-day moment help the Forces
It’s were time for 10th Mountain Division to start planning for D-day for all forces to be under one command.

Staff of 10th Mountain Division took over the planning for Operation Anaconda around the middle of February. Writing plan and operation order of the Operation Anaconda “D-day was originally set for February 25, but it fell during a religious holiday, it was moved to February 28. Once CENTCOM approved the operational concept on February 25, planners from all the task forces worked quickly to finalize the details.” Operation orders said, “The operation was supposed to last roughly 72 hours total, Gen Hagenbeck received a surprise gift, the weather forecast was bad, so Gen Hagenbeck had to delay the mission until March 2. The weather was so bad, gave 10th Mountain Division time to get more manpower to engage in the fight. By CENTCOM reinforce 10th Mountain Division is made the fight little easy, but it was difficult in Afghanistan because of the terrain and weather. The reinforce manpower came from Fort Campbell, Kentucky and aircraft carrier, John F. Kennedy arrived ready to fight in theater. Operation Anaconda was successfully because all U.S. and coalition troop work as a unity forces to defeat the adversary. On March 16 10th Mountain Division Commander declared the end of Operation

Anaconda.