Operation Hucky Operational Level Leadership Failure

The evasion of Sicily in World War II code named Operation HUSKY provides an excellent case study to evaluate joint functions. Operation HUSKY demonstrates the complexity of joint operations between air, land, and sea, while providing relevant lessons for today’s leaders. Operation HUSKY was successful in achieving its objective to capture and control Sicily as a base of future military operations. However, this essay will evaluate operational level leadership failures with regard to the joint functions of command and control (C2), movement and maneuver (M2), and protection.
This essay will begin with evaluating C2. The evaluation criteria used for C2 will include the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent,

mutual trust, and understanding. Next, this essay will evaluate the integration of the joint functions, M2 and protection. The evaluation criteria used for integration come from joint doctrine: “the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole”.
C2 is the exercise of direction and authority by a commander over assigned or attached units to accomplish a mission. Mission command forms the foundation of C2 through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders. While successful, Operation HUSKY demonstrates C2 failures concerning commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding.
From the outset, General Alexander failed to provide clear intent for General Montgomery’s and Lieutenant General Patton’s forces beyond the initial landing. Alexander failed to draw up detailed plans beyond the initial landing, preferring to wait until the troops had landed and operations had begun. Furthermore, Alexander’s lack of trust in American forces resulted in poor utilization of American troops. Alexander assigned the primary mission to Montgomery’s forces secondary to the British skepticism regarding American capabilities. Finally, Alexander’s failure to understand and have the foresight to disrupt the Axis evacuation plan resulted in Axis forces escaping. The German evacuation plan was a remarkable success, evacuating 104,000 Axis personnel. With better C2, operational success would have occurred sooner and Axis forces would not have escaped.
Commander’s intent represents a unifying idea that provides a clear purpose and end state, which allows for centralized planning and decentralized execution. Consequently, allowing staff and subordinate commanders to take disciplined initiative to achieve desired results in the absence of orders. Furthermore, it prevents paralysis or delayed action by commanders due to unanticipated actions by the enemy. Unfortunately, during Operation HUSKY a poorly defined commander’s intent hampered Allied operations.
Alexander’s failure to provide his intent beyond the initial landing caused several problems during the operation. By failing to assign Patton’s troops a mission beyond the Blue Line, it left room for disagreement and confusion once the operation began. Consequently, Patton attacked Agrigento despite Alexander’s intent not risk his involvement in a major action. Even in the final phase of the operation, Alexander still had not provided clear intent on how the operation would proceed. This forced Montgomery and Patton to meet in Syracuse to develop a plan without Alexander’s intent. With clear intent, the Allies would have been able to conduct decentralized operations, while using their initiative to take full advantage of Axis weaknesses.
Mutual trust is vital to mission command because it provides subordinate commanders the confidence to exercise initiative, which is critical to decentralized execution. Trust between commanders enhances their flexibility, agility, and freedom to take disciplined action when an opportunity presents itself. As General Dempsey stated, “Building trust with subordinates and partners may be the most important action of a commander”. Sadly, this point was lost to Alexander.
Alexander’s lack of trust in American troops caused several problems during the operation. Alexander consistently assigned the primary weight of the operation to Montgomery’s troops with Patton’s troops in a supporting role, even when operations would dictate otherwise. Consequently, when Montgomery’s advance to Gerbini met heavy resistance, Alexander shifted the boundary line west. This decision allowed Montgomery to bypass German resistance; unfortunately, it cut off Patton’s main avenue of approach to Messina. This change in the front was the most controversial decision of the operation and clearly reflected the lack of trust in American forces. The lack of mutual trust resulted in decreased operational flexibility, agility, and freedom to take disciplined action when opportunities presented themselves and delayed operational success.
Understanding is important because it allows for a shared and broad context of the situation and flows from the top down and bottom up. The better the shared understanding, the better a commander can see and understand an event, which enables them to make independent, timely, and accurate decision. It is critical that commanders make decentralized decisions that derive from a shared context to accomplish the mission. This point was also lost on the Allies.
The Allies lack of understanding resulted in a lost opportunity to take action and prevent the Axis evacuation from Sicily.

The Germans were fighting a delaying action to allow for an ordered withdraw of personnel and equipment, while simultaneously preparing forces in Italy. Yet, the Allies did not have the foresight to understand the second order effect if they did not cut off the Axis escape with air and maritime forces. Alexander had no plan; Admiral Cunningham did not think it was a prudent risk, and Chief Marshall Tedder did not feel it was of strategic importance. This lack of understanding resulted in inappropriate decentralized decisions allowing Axis personnel and a Panzer Corps to

escape.
Not only was C2 an issue; the poor integration of the joint functions M2 and protection during D-Day, Gela and Palermo hampered operational success.

Integration is critical because when utilized in a synergistic fashion the combination of the joint functions become greater than any individual function to mission accomplishment. Regrettably, the Allies often failed to arrange and utilize their forces in a manner that would allow them to operate as one. Planners had difficulty from the beginning because they had no experience in this type of planning. Allied integration failures resulted in a prolonged operation and Axis personnel and equipment escaping Sicily.
A decisive component of M2 is the disposition of forces to conduct operations by obtaining positional advantage before and during operations. This includes using various means and methods to advantageously deploy and maneuver troops to the right place at the right time under favorable environmental conditions. It also includes the coordination of direct and indirect fires to achieve a position of advantage over an enemy. Sadly, the Allies failed to integrate M2 during D-Day and at

Gela.
Operation HUSKY’s D-Day invasion provides a strong example of poorly conducted M2. The Allies chose to utilize an airborne assault despite knowing of the very unfavorable environmental conditions, along with inexperienced pilots. Despite high winds, a severe storm, and inexperienced pilots, the plan called for low-level flying over water at night against antiaircraft without fire support. This ill-advised action resulted in 65 gliders crashing into the sea with only 12 of 124 reaching their objective. It is critical that commanders take into consideration both the enemy and environmental conditions when planning M2.
Gela exemplifies how the Allies failed to integrate M2 with fires. Patton had ordered over 2,000 airborne reinforcements from his reserves in North Africa to support his weakened center at Piano Lupo, Gela. Nevertheless, even with prior naval and ground coordination, during the airborne drop naval and ground antiaircraft gunners opened fire. This action resulted in 23 destroyed, and 37 damaged transport planes out of 144, along with 10 percent casualties and a disrupted movement. Upon examination, investigators found that not all units were aware of the operation. It is important not only for commanders to coordinate fires to support their actions, but also to prevent fratricide as a protection measure.
The concept behind the joint function protection is to conserve a unit’s fighting strength through both active and passive measures. One of the key active defensive measures includes protecting the joint force from an enemy’s attack. Unfortunately, Allied air repeatedly failed to integrate with and protect land forces during Day-D and their movement from Palermo to Messina.
Operation HUSKY’s D-Day invasion provides an example of inadequately conducted protection by Allied air forces. Despite the fact that Allied air forces had gained air superiority over the southern beaches of Sicily, Air Marshal Coningham failed to provide protection. Not only had Coningham established a burdensome and unresponsive system to integrate air support, he was openly hostile to requests from ground units. His actions resulted in allowing small, ill-supplied Axis air forces to molest ground units, prevent spotter aircraft from flying, and jeopardized the Allied assault. It is critical that joint forces integrate with one another to maximize protection and conserve a unit’s fighting strength.
Patton’s movements along the northern roads from Palermo to Messina offer an example of Tedder’s unwillingness to integrate and provide active defensive measures. Despite having air superiority, the Allied Air Force did not deny the air space to Axis forces, which often attacked the coast, and Patton’s forces unopposed. To make matters worse air forces refused to take guidance from naval units who could direct them towards Axis planes using radar. These actions resulted in damage to several ships in Palermo, and the destruction of a train carrying 900 tons of critical ammunition. This intentional lack of integration, demonstrates the consequences if units fail to work together and protect one another.
While Operation HUSKY was successful, the operation failed to achieve a decisive blow to Axis forces. Furthermore, failures with regard to the joint functions of C2, M2, and protection prevented overwhelming Allied success. Had the Allied leadership utilized the joint functions properly and brought their overwhelming force to bear 104,000 Axis personnel and equipment would not have escaped to fight another day. It is paramount leaders utilize joint functions across all services and in coordination with allies in a synergistic manner to achieve optimal results.