General George Pickett's Charge During The Civil War

In 1863, some of the fiercest and bloodiest fighting of the Civil War took place. In late June of 1863, the Union and the Confederate armies collided at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The Battle of Gettysburg was arguably the turning point in the Civil War and within the Battle of Gettysburg, Pickett’s Charge is considered the high water mark of the Confederacy. Although the battle on 3 July is known as Pickett’s Charge, General George Pickett commanded less than half of the assaulting force and was not the one who planned the assault. To Pickett’s left and comprising over a third of the force, General J. Johnston Pettigrew commanded a division of four brigades with men from five southern states. Pettigrew had only assumed command the day prior when the original commander, General Harry Heth, had been wounded. It was a trial by

fire for Pettigrew. Not only was he in command for a decisive battle, but this was his first time leading a division. Regardless of the surrounding circumstances, Pettigrew failed as a division commander by not creating a shared understanding with adjacent units and his higher headquarters, by not building cohesive teams across his division, by accepting unnecessary risk, and in spite of providing clear commander’s intent.
As a division commander, albeit newly appointed, Pettigrew failed in creating a shared understanding by not informing his superiors of the deteriorated condition of his division and not coordinating movements with his adjacent units. Estimates put the division’s losses from the battle on 1 July at 40% and the division had just one day to recover and prepare for another attack. General Robert E. Lee, Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, and General James Longstreet, Commander of the First Corps, chose Pettigrew’s division primarily because it was already in place for the attack. Had they known of the significant losses, a different unit could have been used. Lee did not truly know the status of the division until late in the morning on 3 July as he rode the lines and saw wounded men preparing to fight. Pettigrew had a responsibility to ensure that Longstreet understood the risk of using his battered division. He needed to effectively communicate to his superiors to inform their situational awareness and aid in planning. There is no indication that Pettigrew tried to collaborate with Longstreet or do anything more than simply receive orders from Longstreet and move off to execute. Although new to division command, Pettigrew failed to transition into his new role and establish shared understanding at the division and corps level.
Just as he failed to clearly communicate with his superiors, Pettigrew did not coordinate well with Generals Pickett or Trimble, creating weaknesses in the Confederate flanks and causing confusion once the attack began. Pickett placed his division about 400 meters ahead of Pettigrew’s and then started the assault without notice, leaving Pettigrew’s division to try to catch up. Trimble’s two brigades were placed behind Pettigrew’s right, but Pettigrew thought they should go behind his left flank to support Brockenbrough. Trimble’s division remained behind Pettigrew even as Pettigrew’s left flank crumbled. Pettigrew had time to question and perhaps affect these issues, but apparently said nothing to Pickett, Trimble, or Longstreet.
Pettigrew was more focused downward, on his soldiers, on 2 July and did not do, or did not understand, his duty to ensure that his division’s weakness was known and that tactical issues were worked out in advance. This resulted in starting the attack with a weakened force with a vulnerable flank in an assault that required great strength to conduct a frontal attack across open land. His failure to create a shared understanding with his higher and adjacent units contributed to their defeat.
On 2 July, after taking command of the division from an injured General Heth, Pettigrew went about conducting typical military tasks such as burying the dead, writing reports, filling ranks, and generally seeing to the welfare and morale of his troops.

However as the division commander, he failed to establish trust with his brigade commanders and build cohesive teams amongst his four brigades who took heavy losses in men and officers the day prior. Pettigrew had two men new to brigade command; Colonel Marshall took over Pettigrew’s own brigade and Colonel Birkett Fry took over for the wounded General Archer. General Davis and Colonel Brockenbrough were still in charge of their brigades, but were known to be inexperienced and poor leaders respectively. Pettigrew was aware of the shortcomings of Davis and Brockenbrough but did little to affect their deficiencies. For Davis, Pettigrew took “great pains before the assault to see that the division moved out properly.” This pestering did not make Davis more confident in his role and did not serve to strengthen the relationship or build trust between Pettigrew and his new brigade

commander.
On his far left flank, Pettigrew had even more issues creating cohesiveness with Brockenbrough’s brigade. Most critically, Brockenbrough was a poor leader and his men knew it. Brockenbrough originally took brigade command when the last commander was injured, but then Heth replaced him. Brockenbrough retook command by default when Heth moved up to division command. By then, his Virginians had little faith in his leadership and were tired and demoralized. Pettigrew was aware of the situation and yet did nothing to change this. He left Brockenbrough in command and on the flank of the Confederate charge. It was unlikely that Pettigrew could have had Brockenbrough relieved, but he could have strengthened the flank by moving the brigade or he could have asked for reinforcements to ensure buoy the confidence of the men. There is no indication that Pettigrew spent any effort to improve the morale of the men nor did he take any extra time with Brockenbrough like he did with Davis. By not building trust, Pettigrew dismissed the entire brigade, over 600 men, weakening the assault before it even started.
Instead, Pettigrew continued to focus on his North Carolinians. At the beginning of the assault, he rode to their lines to see them off. “Now Colonel, for the honor of the good Old North State. Forward.” His confidence in them was admirable, but his new role as division commander required him to focus outside of his old brigade and act for the good of the entire unit. The brigades of the division comprised men from Virginia, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. Most telling, as his men lay dead, wounded or retreating, Pettigrew told Lee that he was not responsible for the performance his division but only for the actions of his own brigade. Pettigrew did not even feign to have cohesion and trust within his unit.
Despite the issues building shared understanding and cohesive teams, Pettigrew gave clear commander’s intent that his brigades understood and executed. Colonel Fry exercised initiative to ensure that his brigade linked up with and then aligned with Garnett on Pickett’s left. Part way through the assault, Fry was wounded but simply told his men to keep going, confident that they understood the intent. Marshall’s brigade made it as far forward as any and were stopped just short of Union lines. Davis, whom Pettigrew had pestered considerably about the plan, seemed to understand the intent even if he could not effectively control his brigade and keep his men in line and moving forward. Even Brockenbrough moved his brigades forward into the assault. Although the attack failed, it was not for lack of understanding of the plan by the men who fought. Pettigrew clearly conveyed the attack’s purpose and his desired end state.
During preparations and execution, Pettigrew failed to exercise prudent risk in regards to Brockenbrough’s brigade. Brockenbrough was known to be a poor leader by all around him. He originally took brigade command temporarily, was replaced by Heth, and then took it temporarily again after Heth was moved to division. That Lee did not put Brockenbrough permanently in command or promote him to general, is telling of Brockenbrough’s leadership abilities. Pettigrew knew of Brockenbrough’s deficiencies, but did not take any action to mitigate them as he did by spending extra time with Davis. Before the assault, Brockenbrough inexplicably split command of his brigade with Colonel Mayo, who himself was nowhere to be found when the charge began. Two subordinate commanders had to take the initiative to put Mayo’s brigade into action (again displaying Pettigrew’s clear commander’s intent). Not only did Pettigrew leave Brockenbrough in charge, but he left those Virginians to cover the flank one of the most important positions in any frontal attack. Pettigrew’s inaction with Brockenbrough risked the entire flank of the Confederate assault.
Further, at the beginning of the attack, Brockenbrough failed to move with the rest of the division. When a member of the staff asked Pettigrew if he should go get them, Pettigrew told him not to bother and that the brigade “might follow, and if it failed to do so it would not matter.” With this statement, Pettigrew essentially discounted an entire brigade and one that was entirely responsible for his flank. Brockenbrough’s brigade eventually emerged. Had it not, Davis would have been left to figure out that his brigade was now the flank and Trimble’s division to the rear would certainly have been confused. By leaving Brockenbrough in command and on the flank, Pettigrew put the entire assault at risk for a flank attack. Pettigrew’s willingness to leave Brockenbrough behind at the last minute demonstrated that Pettigrew did fully grasp the importance of having his flank secure and the confusion a missing brigade would cause on the battlefield.
Overall, Pettigrew failed in executing mission command. He demonstrated his battlefield leadership by staying in the fight with his North Carolinians, directing and realigning his formations as needed, and working to rally the men to cross the Emmitsburg Road. His acts were courageous, but his men needed a division commander. He failed to create shared understanding with Longstreet and provide a detailed information on the condition of his troops after the battle on 1 July. He failed to communicate with Pickett and Trimble to ensure their movements and plans were coordinated. Pettigrew did give a clear commander’s intent, but he also took unnecessary risks with the other brigades.
It is difficult to put so much responsibility on someone so new to division command, but the same principles of mission command apply to every level of leadership. Pettigrew’s success as a brigade commander did not transfer to his performance as a division commander. As a wounded Pettigrew withdrew from the failed assault, he ran into General Lee. Pettigrew told Lee that he was “responsible for his own Brigade, but not for the Division.” Lee consoled Pettigrew and took responsibility for the entire assault. This exchange with Lee aptly captures Pettigrew’s failures in mission command.