Training Management Failures for Operation Anaconda Thesis: Even though Operation Anaconda was reported as a successful mission, Joint Operations Commanders failed to recognize the challenges they would face by not properly training their units for joint operations between military branches. What went right? Supporting Idea 1: Conus joint operations training between units Initially, the U.S combat operations took off slowly because they needed time to deploy forces to Afghanistan, secure support from Uzbekistan and Pakistan governments, and establish strategic bases and logistic support. By October 19, Special Operation Forces teams and the Central Intelligence Agency were well placed with the Northern Alliance Forces. Similarly, CENTOM commanded …show more content…
a posture of approximately 400 aircraft and 32 ships. In two months, the U.S airstrikes destroyed of Taliban bases, air defenses, headquarters, and logistic support. Conversely, the northern alliance forces on the ground were outnumbered. However, the Northern Alliance Force eventually subdued Al Qaeda and Taliban resistance with assistance of U.S. airstrikes (Kugler, 2007: p.1). Since Operation Anaconda was initially a ground operation, army offices gained an advantage with the inclusion of air forces since they were successful in countering the major CAS strikes that they had not envisioned when developing battle plans. Supporting Idea 2: Training schedules In spite of constrained operations as a result of capped ceilings for war equipment and a limited workforce, the TF MOUNTAIN employed Task force RAKKASANS as a U.S.
Army tactical element to perform some functions at the expense of mechanical warfare elements. Operation anaconda entailed a combination of air assault battalions, three light infantry and support from special operation forces units. Initially, the mortars and attack helicopters were effective. However, they were soon damaged and driven off as the war intensified. The operations involved improvised tactical air support that provided firepower required to accomplish the mission and minimize casualties in time (Kugler, 2007: p.28). As the war intensified, army reinforcements were diverted from other duties to ensure success for the United …show more content…
States. Supporting Idea 3: Transfer of authority from CFACC and CAOC to Task Force Mountains The transfer of authority to allocate sorties to TF Mountain was a turning point for the United States in the war with Taliban and al Qaeda forces. This is because the Task Force Mountains was better trained and placed to recognize, substantiate and prioritize targets in a manner best suited to the requirements of the ground forces. The transfer of authority resulted in steady improvement of the ground and air personnel to work seamlessly. By March 9, collaborative efforts between combat pilots, ground controllers and army infantry troops resulted in successful airstrikes that destroyed many targets and influenced the survivors to flee from the battlefield. Heavy mortars were airlifted to the deployed ground forces thus enabling them to increase fire against distant targets (Kugler, 2007: p. 20). Fewer enemies on the ground meant that events on the battlefield were taking a promising course. What went wrong with the operation? Supporting Idea 1: confusion between different services At the beginning, command relationships posed a severe threat to the success of Operation Anaconda.
In spite of Task Force Mountain and its ground troops being the primary consumers of the CAS campaign, CFACC and CAOC reserved command authority for strike incursions. Subsequently, strike sorties requests from ground units had to go through CFACC or CAOC, or to flying command and control aircrafts before permission was granted. All requests for emergency airstrikes were allowed almost immediately or a few minutes upon CFACC/CAOC receiving the request. However, getting authorization for non-emergency strikes was frustrating for army commanders since it took between 25 and 45 minutes (Kugler, Baranick & Binnendijk, 2009: p. 19). In some cases, air commanders overrode requests for non-emergency CAS based on their opinion that the ground forces did meet the criteria for authorization or grasp flexibility allowed to them under the prevailing
ROEs. How could have operation better trained? Supporting Idea 1: Training This falls under the institutional domain, the units taking part in the operation should have been specifically trained on how to uphold correspondence throughout the operation. The integration of various professional capabilities should have been prioritized in a manner to ensure each of the units were assigned specific duties and measures laid down on when to hand-over to duties other units, how to do it and the possible challenges identified. This helps avoid situations where units are faced with operational challenges and they lack certain directives on how to go about it (Kugler, Baranick & Binnendijk, 2009: p. 35) Supporting Idea 2: Commanders overall responsibility Commanders responsibilities correlate to the operational domain; the unity of command with strong interoperable and networking assets, are necessary. Also, forward deployed joint staff with fitting delegated authorities, are required. Command structures should be clearly defined and elaborate to the extent that commanders are well versed about their limits during joint operations. This enables a specific chain of command whereby a commander knows when to relegate command to the commander of the other joint unit depending on the challenge at hand (Kugler, Baranick & Binnendijk, 2009: p. 11). While in theory naval and air forces are commanded and controlled from long distances, ground force operations often require tactical maneuvers and close air-ground coordination. Supporting Idea 3: Leader development model and unit training Education and operational experience precipitate good leader development; special forces that have specified training working jointly with other units have different levels of training and expertise, this dictates that those with more operational experience should take the leadership positions such as command within a unit so as to ensure the commanders undertake joint planning (Kugler, 2007: p.23). In a time constrained environment such as Afghanistan, proper joint planning that is, the equal involvement of all components in planning for a military campaign is paramount. The joint planning process was inadequate to the mission, and therefore, there is a need for reforms such as bringing on board all component staffs starting from the initial phase of planning through information technology and liaison mechanisms. Secondly, the components and JFT should construct a universal problem statement, analyze the mission at hand, and use joint intelligence to prepare the battle space (Lyle, 2009: p.37). Also, the JTF should provide input on their capacities, force dispositions, and risks in the JTF course of action.
The war in Afghanistan sparked numerous operations conducted by the U.S. military and its coalition forces. One of the most influential operation until today was Operation Anaconda. Fought in the Shahi-Kot Valley during early march 2002, it was the largest American battle since the Gulf War, and their first high altitude battle ever encounter. The goal of the Operation Anaconda was to eradicate the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda foothold within the eastern region of Afghanistan. Although, originally intended to last three days, Operation Anaconda lasted seventeen days instead, with seven days of intense battle. The U.S. operation Commander, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, schemed the “hammer and anvil” plan in order to achieve his objective. However, this plan
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States was incredibly eager to strike back at the nations thought to be responsible for this horrific tragedy. These attacks were quickly attributed to the terrorist group al-Qa’ida, led by Osama bin Laden, and to the Taliban-run government of Afghanistan, which had provided sanctuary to al-Qa’ida. In response, Washington approved a covert plan led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to directly attack those responsible in their Middle East safe haven. Initiated on 26 September 2001 with the approval of the warlords of the Afghan Northern Alliance, with whom the CIA had formed an intelligence liaison relationship, Operation Jawbreaker resulted in the fall of the Taliban regime, the killing and capture of a significant amount of al-Qa’ida leadership, and elimination of a terrorist safe haven by early December 2001. Moreover, the Taliban’s collapse denied al-Qa’ida a pseudo-nation-state partner, serving to reduce the organization’s sanctuary to areas residing along the Pakistani border. Operation Jawbreaker, one of the first post-9/11 covert operations carried out by the United States in support of its national security interests, had proved successful. Word of the operation’s swift success astounded those back in Washington; dubbed the CIA’s “finest hour,” it signified the first of many victories by deposing the Taliban’s control of Northern Afghanistan.
As Marines, we have a well-known motto “One Team, One Fight” that creates an image of strong unity that everyone regardless of rank or size plays an important role. Everyone is necessary to complete the mission. In this book, one particular Marine, (then) Captain Bill Barber, has a story that since has become a crucial tool used as teaching material today for multi-level Marines everywhere. This book serves as a testimony to Captain Barber’s will in the midst of extreme opposition and sets the example of the for mentioned mindset
As the incoming brigade commander, LTC (P) Owens, I see the critical leadership problem facing the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is the inability or unwillingness of Colonel Cutler to lead and manage change effectively. In initial talks with Col Cutler and in reviewing the brigade’s historical unit status reports, the 4th ABCT performed as well as can be expected in Afghanistan, but as the onion was peeled back there are numerous organizational issues that were brought to the surface while I walked around and listened to the soldiers of the 4th ABCT, in addition to reviewing the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report. One of the most formidable tasks of a leader is to improve the organization while simultaneously accomplishing
In 1968, the United States Army activated the 123rd Aviation Battalion, creating a remarkable unit that was comprised of several Army assets. The design of the battalion revolutionized how assets could be combined to complete many missions by mixing infantry, signal, aviation, and support units. The 123rd’s mission ranged from was to collect intelligence, deliver supplies, insert and extract infantrymen, and provide air support. In addition to their primary mission they also participated in medical evacuation, an invaluable asset on the battlefields of Vietnam.
Operation Anaconda was an offensive operation conducted by Coalition Forces during the first invasion of Afghanistan. It was the last major operation to take place during the campaign (). While the operation was successful, there were many arduous battles that had to be fought in order to secure victory. One of these battles in particular stands out due to the sheer number of difficulties and setbacks that occurred during the engagement. This battle has become known as the Battle of Roberts Ridge. For the purpose of this Battle Analysis the Battle of Roberts Ridge will be analyzed with regards to the characteristics of an offense, in particular Surprise, Tempo, and Audacity.
(Rostker) Air Defense Artillery played an immensely significant role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm with units from 11th Brigade Air Defense Artillery and the 32d Air Defense Command rapidly deploying into theater. There was no doubt of the effectiveness of the air defense units in Desert Storm and Desert Shield. The air defense units displayed sound defensive tactics and preparation for the campaigns. They demonstrated excellent capabilities providing coalition and ground forces the much-needed assistance to succeed during the war. No matter how much people have criticized Air Defense Artillery following Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the units played a critical role in the Army’s strategy to win the Gulf War.
The US immediately sent SOF units and CIA officers to recon the area and meet with the Northern Alliance. The primary battle leading up to this operation was Tora Bora, which was absent of conventional forces. Up until this point, the war on terror was predominantly a Special Operations fight along with Air Force for overhead support.3 SOF and the Northern Alliance had already displaced Taliban forces out of many towns and villages in northern Afghanistan to gain control of key terrain. Key towns in northern Afghanistan, including Taloqan, Konduz, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif, took only three weeks to clear.4 The SOF units were making huge impacts across the country calling in air strikes.
Operation Desert Shield was launched by President H.W. Bush to increase the amount of forces and troops in areas surrounding Kuwait and mainly in Saudi Arabia in response to the 120,000 troops and 2,000 tanks invading Kuwait. The United Nations called for the Iraqi army’s extraction from their presence in Kuwait, however Hussein went ag...
In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, with Allied command and control exercise by Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, failed to employ the three essential attributes of mission command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital joint functions like Fires, Maneuver, and Protection. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control and the other vital Joint Functions and expound on General Eisenhower
U.S. forces experienced terrible attacks on their positions that consisted of things such as mortar fire and rocket propelled grenade fire. The source of the attacks came from areas all around them. Insurgents attacked from moving vehicles, civilian houses and mosques. The U.S. forces were attacked intensely with small arms, direct fire as well as grenades. The fighting got so intense that an AC-130 had to be called upon in order to subdue the insurgents.... ...
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
The most effective commanders through their leadership build cohesive teams. Mutual trust, shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk serve as just a few principles for mission command. Mutual trust is the foundation of any successful professional relationship that a commander shares with his staff and subordinates. The shared understanding of an operational environment functions, as the basis for the commander to effectively accomplish the mission. While my advice for the commander on what prudent risks to take may create more opportunities rather than accepting defeat. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate.