Wait a second!
More handpicked essays just for you.
More handpicked essays just for you.
Unified land operations summary
Don’t take our word for it - see why 10 million students trust us with their essay needs.
Recommended: Unified land operations summary
Unified land operations are part of the Army's war fighting doctrine. It explains how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain or maintain a position of relative advantage in land operations through offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously. This is used in order to prevent conflict. In comparison; Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. In a time of declining budgets the Army must make difficult decisions as to how to protect America’s security interest and role as not only global but regional as well. With new dangers and the unpredictability of our global environment, the question becomes how can the Army “Set conditions to expand when called on” given the current drawdown and limited environment? In response to this particular question, the Army will not need to expand after the drawdown to restructure the …show more content…
total force. Soldiers should train, and develop at the lowest operation levels and leverage technological advantages of future combat systems to empower the force as a whole. The Army plans to decentralize combat power to the lowest unit level. Therefore; creating a more adaptive force capable of achieving regional alignment through mission training would be ideal. The force comprised of empowered Soldiers and leaders will be proficient in culture, politics, and the fundamental aspects of unified land operations. Having leaders that can make sound decisions will decrease the need to rely on a large Army to fight an unconventional enemy. Critical thinking also becomes a vital role when decisive actions need to be taken where it is guided by mission command. The development of these particular thinking skills has been a success for the Unites States Army. As the military entered into a new era of war fighting, critical thinking has become essential to help Army forces function effectively and accomplish missions within a mission command structure. Commanders and Leaders at all levels have adopted different decision-making practices. This research paper will present the role of critical thinking and how it facilitates understanding and support the different decision-making approaches in a mission command structure. Creative thinking will lead to new insights, perspectives, and new ways of understanding things. In this case, commanders and leaders are able to better understand and support their decision making approach. Due to an unpredictable financial and global environment, downsizing is necessary. A large Army has become unsustainable and requires change. Smaller decentralized units with increased training and technological capabilities along with an emphasizes on Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) partnerships will allow the United States of America to preserve its strategic plans and remain a global nation. How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict.
An army without unified land operations would fail Unified land operations are part of the Army's war fighting doctrine. It explains how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain or maintain a position of relative advantage in land operations through offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously. This is used in order to prevent conflict. In comparison; Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land
operations. In a time of declining budgets the Army must make difficult decisions as to how to protect America’s security interest and role as not only global but regional as well. With new dangers and the unpredictability of our global environment, the question becomes how can the Army “Set conditions to expand when called on” given the current drawdown and limited environment? In response to this particular question, the Army will not need to expand after the drawdown once it leverages two aspects in the restructure the total force. Soldiers should train, and develop at the lowest operation levels and leverage technological advantages of future combat systems to empower the force as a whole. The Army plans to decentralize combat power to the lowest unit level. Therefore; creating a more adaptive force capable of achieving regional alignment through mission training would be ideal. The force comprised of empowered Soldiers and leaders will be proficient in culture, politics, and the fundamental aspects of unified land operations. Having leaders that can make sound decisions will decrease the need to rely on a large Army to fight an unconventional enemy. Critical thinking also becomes a vital role when decisive actions need to be taken where it is guided by mission command. The development of these particular thinking skills has been a success for the Unites States Army. As the military entered into a new era of war fighting, critical thinking has become essential to help Army forces function effectively and accomplish missions within a mission command structure. Commanders and Leaders at all levels have adopted different decision-making practices. This research paper will present the role of critical thinking and how it facilitates understanding and support the different decision-making approaches in a mission command structure. Critical thinking and creative thinking is applied when commanders and leaders need to understand the mission and are drawn to make effective decisions. “Critical thinking examines a problem in depth from multiple points of view (ADRP 6-0, 2-7).” If we utilize the same solutions, an enemy will acknowledge, adapt and overcome the solution. Creative thinking will lead to new insights, perspectives, and new ways of understanding things. In this case, commanders and leaders are able to better understand and support their decision making approach. In conclusion, unified land operations describes how the army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict. An army without unified land operations would fail due to lack of planning.
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
The mission command philosophy helps commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders can build teams and achieve their final goals through adapting the six principles of mission command to warfighting situation. I analyzed and compared the performance of General Sherman and General Hampton in four of six mission command principles.
Mission Command as defined by the United States Army consists six distinct and critical principles. During World War II there were many examples of exemplary mission command that led to stunning victories for the Allies but also many examples of failure. The Battle for Arnhem or Operation Market-Garden was such a failure. Major General Robert Elliot Urquhart, the Commander of the 1st Airborne Division failed in not only in tactics but the ability to lead his division to victory. He did not completely misunderstand the principles of mission command, but four main areas in which he made critical mistakes were; Build a Cohesive Team Through Mutual Trust, Create a Shared Understanding, Accept Prudent Risk, and Exercise Disciplined Initiative.
Mission command is the commander's use of authority and direction to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It helps subordinates exercise disciplined initiative when operating within their commander’s intent. To facilitate effective mission command, commanders must accomplish four consecutive stages of the operations process. They must thoroughly understand the problem, visualize a solution that achieves a desired end state, and then accurately describe this visualization in order to direct the organization. Commanders continually lead and assess their organizations and provide input and influence to their subordinates and staff.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
There was also confusion over unity of command. Admiral McDonald, commander of LANTCOM, made two errors in command and control. He did not assign one his subordinate commanders to act as the overall director of ground forces no matter what the service and he did not select the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps as the leader of Army forces. The lack of a single commander meant that coordination between the Marines and the Army was minimal. The lack of a designated ground force commander and the omission of XVIII airborne Corps muddied the commander’s intent. The services would have been ...
The Hammelburg Raid (also known as Task Force Baum) has been one of the most controversial operations of World War II, and it cast a shadow over General George S. Patton’s otherwise illustrious career. While in command of the 3rd Army, Gen. Patton ordered the controversial and secret operation. The operation took place on March 26-28, 1945 with the official purpose of taking a small task force 60 miles behind enemy lines to liberate the prisoner of war camp OFLAG XIII-B near Hammelburg, Germany. But unofficially, its purpose was to free Patton's son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel John Waters, who was taken prisoner at Kasserine Pass, Tunisia, in 1943. Initially, the operation was successful. They reached the camp and released the prisoners, but they were ambushed on the way back and taken prisoner. It resulted in nine dead, 32 wounded, and 16 missing in action. I will be discussing some of the principles of Mission Command and their effects on the outcome of the Task Force Baum.
Unified Land Operations defines the army operational design methodology (ADM) as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. The operational design methodology incorporated into army doctrine serves as a method to compliment the military decision making process (MDMP). Although the ADM it is often confused with replacing MDMP, its purpose is to address complex problems from a nonlinear approach. ADM helps the commander to answer questions to problems. However, only a collaborative effort of an operation planning team (OPT) will achieve the approach to answering complex problems. Doctrine alone does not provide the answer to complex problems, but rather offers a guide to solve them. To conceptualize the MDMP, planners must incorporate ADM to provide a better understanding, visualization, and description of the problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide the framework to support why ADM is required in the MDMP.
...er, fires and interdiction. The AO can be contiguous or noncontiguous, depending on the mission, size of the AO and size of the Unit. Additionally the AO helps to identify the geographic region that a commander is capable of influencing with either maneuver or fire support systems, these systems can be either kinetic or non-kinetic. This area is defined as the Area of Influence (AI), and should be larger than the AO based upon the range of the fire or maneuver system available to the Commander. Finally, while the primary accomplishment of the mission occurs within the AO, the Area of Interest (AOI) is where events, issues and areas outside of the AO can interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. These areas can extend into enemy controlled or enemy occupied areas, as well as current or planned objectives outside of the AO and AI.
...cision, each command has a different way and uses a different chain of command. Because of that, every structure has to rehearsal its process of make a decision before a mission. In addition, a country, which takes part in multinational command, is responsible for support of its national forces. Furthermore, the Multinational Command Structure is a mosaic of national interest and politics’ wish. Every country has its rules of engagement and its national goals and reason why decide to participate in the operation. Finally, each Multinational command represents the structure of an alliance or coalition. NATO is the example of the alliance and the Integrate Command Structure. This alliance is the example of the treaty for long-term goals. The coalition is more relate to the Lead Nation Command and the Parallel Command. These commands express short-term goals.
In past instances the ability to control forces outside of territorial borders has been difficult, and can still be a challenge at times. Getting information to where it is needed when it is needed was just as much of a problem in the 1990’s as well, but with the advent of technologies such as the satellite phone and the global positioning system, directing the military outside of The States had become easier than ever before. Forward power projection is the control of military forces outside of its territory, and during the Operation Desert Shield and Storm this was effectively displaye...
The commander’s intent is a critical part of mission command. The commander, through the commander’s intent, must blend the art of command and the science of control that integrates all joint warfighting functions. ADM Wesley McDonald, Commander US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), failed to convey the commander’s intent to the joint force for Operation Urgent Fury. This failure promoted misunderstanding and mutual trust issues among the joint force that affected the integration of joint functions such as intelligence and sustainment.
As we transition from subjective training to objective, it is critical to understand the emphasis on training has not changed, just the language. Commander will continue to focus on battle focus training developed by long- range, short- range and near- term planning. The Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM) is the Army’s newest system for prioritizing resources for units on a 5-year cycle based on the level of readiness they must achieve. Each year of the cycle has established Personnel (P), Sustain (S) and Readiness (R) Aim Points on the Unit Status Report (USR). The SRM seeks to stabilize units in a “band of excellence,” even following their READY year, maintaining the highest readiness level instead of automatically downgrading their readiness to a C4 level regardless of whether they deployed. Guidelines in the Prepare Year (PY) found in the SRM will assist Commanders at every level on key training events they will need to focus on for that particular
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
The most effective commanders through their leadership build cohesive teams. Mutual trust, shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk serve as just a few principles for mission command. Mutual trust is the foundation of any successful professional relationship that a commander shares with his staff and subordinates. The shared understanding of an operational environment functions, as the basis for the commander to effectively accomplish the mission. While my advice for the commander on what prudent risks to take may create more opportunities rather than accepting defeat. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate.