The commander’s intent is a critical part of mission command. The commander, through the commander’s intent, must blend the art of command and the science of control that integrates all joint warfighting functions. ADM Wesley McDonald, Commander US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), failed to convey the commander’s intent to the joint force for Operation Urgent Fury. This failure promoted misunderstanding and mutual trust issues among the joint force that affected the integration of joint functions such as intelligence and sustainment. ADM McDonald failed to clearly and concisely convey his commander’s intent express to the joint force. The commander must clearly and concisely express what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish to accomplish the mission. ADM Mcdonald received guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for Operation Urgent Fury. ADM McDonald issued the guidance to the LANTCOM staff that began the planning process for the operation. Based his guidance, the staff developed a phased operation that establishing the endstate and the conditions to meet that end. However, LANTCOM excluded staff planners from other services during the early stages of planning. The exclusion resulted in a joint force unsure of the commander’s intent and the part each service would play during the operation. For example, the LANTCOM held a pre-deployment conference a few days before the invasion. The 82nd Airborne Division planners departed the conference unsure of the division’s role for the operation. LANTCOM plan for Operation Urgent Fury resulted in a navy plan for joint operations instead of a joint plan for joint operation. The failure to convey the commander’s intent ensured a joint force conducting indep... ... middle of paper ... ... of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011),III-10 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint Publication 2-01 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 January 2012).pg II-6 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2007), pg III-35 . Richard W. Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008),pg12 Richard W. Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008),pg28 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mission Command White Paper (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 April 2012),pg 3
Desert Vets. 06 March 2011 <www.desertvets.org/main-pages/desert-storm.htm>. Finlan, Alastair. The Gulf War 1991. Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2003.
The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) now provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to include the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. Its mission is to provide a global response for escorting, packaging, detection, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling, analytics, and remediation missions. This does not only include chemical weapons for which it was originally created, but now incorporates biological weapons, state sponsored laboratories, small independent laboratories and small non-weaponized radioactive materials. Most recently, they have been task organized to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as a force multiplier; the objective of this is to give the Battle Field Commander instant on the ground intelligence regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards within their Area of Operations (AO). With this new mission with the BCT, the TEU is becoming an expeditionary force.
The performance of Major General Ambrose E. Burnside at the helm of the Army of the Potomac can be characterized as less than stellar. His failures to understand, describe, lead, and assess during the Battle of Fredericksburg ultimately led to his army’s defeat and the death of tens of thousands of Federal soldiers. The fate of the mission and our soldiers rely on our ability to conduct mission command activities. It is essential we learn from the grave mistakes of the commanders of the past and become prepared to carry out these activities when we are called to do
United States (2006). The Multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures for technical intelligence, Army field manual 2-22.401, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.
O'Shea, Brandon J. "ARMY.MIL, The Official Homepage of the United States Army." "OPERATION POWER PACK. N.p., 20 Apr. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2014.
According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, mission command philosophy is, “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable discipline initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Commanders execute mission command throughout all phases of the operations process. ADP 5-0 states that, “Commanders drive the operations process.” The six steps that allow Commanders to drive the operations process are: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. I will discuss four of these steps used by COL Freeman’s analyze his ability to properly execute mission command in this Battle.
Not forging a greater consensus on the direction to go (Mediterranean or cross-channel invasion) added to complexities of the alliance and common cause. Therefore, a complete understanding of the Eisenhower’s intent was never achieved. Alexander provide little to no guidance to his ground commanders throughout the entire operation. A “clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state” was never provided to enable a good foundation for mission command. Leaders weren’t in concert with one another and in many cases, acted alone or for their own benefit. The insight and foresight required for effective decision-making, management of associated risks and the capability to consider second and subsequent order effects didn’t exist. Leadership could not achieve this understanding when operational planning was not done in a collaborative manner nor in a combined
13 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2010 (Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council, March 31, 2011), 6, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm (accessed February 10, 2012).
In April of 1980, U.S. military forces comprised of elements from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines attempted, a now infamous operation, to rescue fifty-three hostages in Tehran, Iran – Operation Eagle Claw.2 Unlike Operation Acid Gambit, Eagle Claws failures in intelligence, rehearsals, integration, and Command and Control proved catastrophic. The failures in intelligence caused an increase in the required personnel and aircraft. Although branch specific rehearsals were conducted well above standard, there was little to no joint training that occurred. Moreover, there was no clear chain of command. A participant who remains unnamed, but was involved in this operation is credited with the following remarks, “Even when the best opinions are put together, the page is littered with dotted lines of coordinati...
Throughout my twenty-five year career I have been witness to many mistakes that I have seen time and time again. It can be hard for some individuals to learn from these mistakes and then keep making them. One experience we cannot allow to happen again is the failure in leadership that allowed Task Force Smith to go into combat and not be able to complete its mission. In this paper, we will examine what lead to the escalation of force in Korea, the poor readiness, leadership, training, and equipping of the Soldiers of Task Force Smith. Task force Smith was not a failure because of its men, it was a failure at many levels due to the lack of funding and foresight into our future enemies, and where our Soldier would fight our nation’s battles.
Phythian, M 2009, ‘Intelligence analysis today and tomorrow’, Security Challenges, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 67-83.
The command structure in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom evolved, rapidly changed, and contributed to the lessons learned that shaped the command structure model for both post Operation Anaconda Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. This evolution however, did not come without a price. More specifically frustrations with inefficiencies and confusion created by the multiple dislocated command structures during Operation Anaconda. Furthermore, due to a lack of authority over assets and key role players, competing commands hindered efficiency and effectiveness during Operation Anaconda.
Rotfeld, Adam D. 1998. “Prescriptions for Improving OSCE Effectiveness in Responding to the Risks and Challenges of the 21st Century” Presented to the 3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/3isf/Online_Publications/WS5/WS_5B/Rotfeld.htm
I planned, coordinated and supervised the construction of a 35 Kilometer perimeter berm at FLB DOGWOOD, Iraq. This was the earliest complete fortifications around the perimeter of a base that housed more than eight thousand Soldiers. My engineering expertise was critical as units pursued the improvement of security of the Iraqi infrastructure in the Multi-National Division (South East) Area of Responsibility (AOR). I effectively mentored and worked with Base Defense Liaison Team of the 317th Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC). I provided guidance, oversight and design on perimeter Entry Control Points (ECPs) and conducted weekly checks and improvements to improve Force Protection (FP). I inspected mounted guard posts, initiated requests for