Introduction Operation Acid Gambit was a successful joint personnel recovery mission executed on the 20th of December in 1989. The operation, largely considered a victory, was effective for several reasons. Joint recovery forces showcased excellent timing, obtained actionable intelligence, performed intense rehearsals, and integrated joint assets in extraordinary fashion. The operation was so successful that, Colonel James A. Ruffer, a major contributor to this effort, wrote, “Since WWII there had been not one rescue of an enemy held American prisoner, by U.S. forces, until Operation Just Cause.”1 In order to comprehend the full impact of this historic mission, and the monumental strides that the United States gained, the background of previous personnel recovery missions must first be understood. One specific instance entirely captures the precedent that existed prior to the accomplishments achieved in late 1989. In April of 1980, U.S. military forces comprised of elements from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines attempted, a now infamous operation, to rescue fifty-three hostages in Tehran, Iran – Operation Eagle Claw.2 Unlike Operation Acid Gambit, Eagle Claws failures in intelligence, rehearsals, integration, and Command and Control proved catastrophic. The failures in intelligence caused an increase in the required personnel and aircraft. Although branch specific rehearsals were conducted well above standard, there was little to no joint training that occurred. Moreover, there was no clear chain of command. A participant who remains unnamed, but was involved in this operation is credited with the following remarks, “Even when the best opinions are put together, the page is littered with dotted lines of coordinati... ... middle of paper ... ...ve of the Delta operators, and their aviation counter parts are what ensured mission success. Jim Nelson wrote: “You can plan and rehearse down to the smallest detail, but at the end of the day, every plan assumes a certain reaction on the part of the bad guys, and if that reaction doesn’t materialize, then everything flowing downstream from it will be entirely different than any scenario they’d thought of.”22 In closing, Operation Acid Gambit is, and was, as close to perfection as one could expect for a mission of this stature. The greatest failure of this mission wasn’t capitulated until February of 2011. When it was discovered that Mr. Muse had never been properly reintegrated, as he’d never had a psychologist conduct a debrief. It is because of this failure that instructions now mandate all personnel held in captivity must be debriefed before release.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Battle of Kamdesh and provide an alternate outcome based on the utilization of intelligence and intelligence assets. Many battles could have had a different outcome if they would trust intelligence reports without needing to validate the intelligence with another source or simply have other intelligence assets available. The Battle of Kamdesh was certainly one of those battles. The battle started just before 0600 on October 3, 2009 on Combat Outpost (COP) Keating and nearby Observation Post (OP) Fritsche in the Kamdesh district of Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. About 70 Soldiers of Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, along with 30 Afghan National Army Soldiers (ANA), fought an enemy force of about 300 Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) fighters. (Nordland, 2010) The battle took place in the Consolidation II portion of the Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign in Afghanistan. The AAF likely
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States was incredibly eager to strike back at the nations thought to be responsible for this horrific tragedy. These attacks were quickly attributed to the terrorist group al-Qa’ida, led by Osama bin Laden, and to the Taliban-run government of Afghanistan, which had provided sanctuary to al-Qa’ida. In response, Washington approved a covert plan led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to directly attack those responsible in their Middle East safe haven. Initiated on 26 September 2001 with the approval of the warlords of the Afghan Northern Alliance, with whom the CIA had formed an intelligence liaison relationship, Operation Jawbreaker resulted in the fall of the Taliban regime, the killing and capture of a significant amount of al-Qa’ida leadership, and elimination of a terrorist safe haven by early December 2001. Moreover, the Taliban’s collapse denied al-Qa’ida a pseudo-nation-state partner, serving to reduce the organization’s sanctuary to areas residing along the Pakistani border. Operation Jawbreaker, one of the first post-9/11 covert operations carried out by the United States in support of its national security interests, had proved successful. Word of the operation’s swift success astounded those back in Washington; dubbed the CIA’s “finest hour,” it signified the first of many victories by deposing the Taliban’s control of Northern Afghanistan.
army out of harms way. The author briefly discusses the troubles at Kip’s Bay and Fort Washington.
Brigade General Scales, Robert H. JR. Certain Victory. The U.S. Army in the Gulf War.
The battle is over. The NVA forces had suffered hundreds of casualties and were no longer capable of a fight. U.S. forces had suffered 79 killed and 121 injured and had been reinforced that would guarantee their safety the safety of all the companies as they medivacd all the wounded and dead, and resupplied. The actions taken by Moore and his command group, from Company Commanders to NCO’s, saved the lives of numerous American soldiers. This battle shows the leadership and unit discipline needed to survive and be combat effective in adverse situations.
Introduction Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations including Afghanistan.2 With so many different nations fighting along with our own branches of military, it would test our ability to conduct joint operations on multiple levels. History On September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden decided to “wake the sleeping giant.”
In this paper, I will provide a Battle Analysis and outline the events leading up to and surrounding the Battle of 73 Eastings (refers to a north-south grid line). In addition, I will describe how the United States Army’s (USA) 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) defeated forces from the Iraqi Republican Guard (IRG) using speed, technology and superior combat power. Although some consider the Battle of 73 Eastings extremely successful, some consider it a failure due to the large amount of Iraqi forces that retreated towards Bagdad. Lastly, I will analyze how each side used their intelligence assets and what they could have used to change the outcome.
The United States launched an operation known as Operation Desert Shield, also known as the Persian Gulf War, in August of 1990 in response to Saddam Hussein’s order to the Iraqi forces to take over Kuwait. President George Herbert Walker Bush made the decision to send American troops to Saudi Arabia to form an international coalition that would eventually turn into an operation known as Operation Desert Storm. The United States Army had not witnessed an event of such international and Homefront importation since the Cold War.
The Battle of Kamdesh was fought in Afghanistan during the Afghan War. It is an occurrence in the ongoing NATO campaign of the Operation Enduring Freedom since the year 2001. It was one of the bloodiest battles the USA forces engaged in during this campaign against the Taliban insurgents. The Taliban insurgents, assisted by local Nuristan militias, attacked Kamdesh, which is an American combat outpost, located deep in the Nuristan tribal Areas. They carried out a well-coordinated attack on the outpost, leading to a breach and an overrun of the post. This paper, seeks to analyze why, when, how, and what were the resulting impact of the battle.
“AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.” This is the message sent out by radioman Kyle Boyer at 7:58 a.m. Sunday December 7, 1941; a date which will live in infamy. The empire of Japan had attacked the United States’ Pacific Fleet based in Pearl Harbor. For months the US Intelligence community, as well as others around the world, had been intercepting and decoding transmissions from mainland Japan to their diplomats and spies in the US. We had cracked their Purple Code, and knew exactly what military intelligence was being transmitted back and forth. The Dutch also cracked Purple and informed our government of the Japanese plan and were shocked to hear reports that we were taken by surprised. Even more disturbing, months before the attack a British double agent, Dusko Popov, codenamed Tricycle, turned over to the F.B.I. detailed plans of the Japanese air raid, which he had obtained from the Germans. The government had the information, and did nothing with it.
In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, with Allied command and control exercise by Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, failed to employ the three essential attributes of mission command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital joint functions like Fires, Maneuver, and Protection. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control and the other vital Joint Functions and expound on General Eisenhower
Amid the snow-covered hills in the tiny village of Chipyong-Ni, Korea, a battle ridden 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division made a decisive stand from February 13-15, 1951 that would lead to the first operational win against a much stronger and larger force. In what some considered being the Gettysburg of the Korean War, the Battle of Chipyong-Ni was a bitterly contested engagement between the X Corp, 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, under the command of COL. Paul Freeman the North Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Communist Forces’ (CCF). This analysis will demonstrate that COL Paul Freemans’ ability to properly use mission command ultimately led to the first operational defeat of the enemy since the Korean War had started.
The commander’s intent is a critical part of mission command. The commander, through the commander’s intent, must blend the art of command and the science of control that integrates all joint warfighting functions. ADM Wesley McDonald, Commander US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), failed to convey the commander’s intent to the joint force for Operation Urgent Fury. This failure promoted misunderstanding and mutual trust issues among the joint force that affected the integration of joint functions such as intelligence and sustainment.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.