Task Force Smith Failure Essay

Throughout my twenty-five year career I have been witness to many mistakes that I have seen time and time again. It can be hard for some individuals to learn from these mistakes and then keep making them. One experience we cannot allow to happen again is the failure in leadership that allowed Task Force Smith to go into combat and not be able to complete its mission. In this paper, we will examine what lead to the escalation of force in Korea, the poor readiness, leadership, training, and equipping of the Soldiers of Task Force Smith. Task force Smith was not a failure because of its men, it was a failure at many levels due to the lack of funding and foresight into our future enemies, and where our Soldier would fight our nation’s battles.

After explaining the multiple failures I will provide why we cannot forget these mistakes for future forces. History proves time and time again why we must not forget the lessons we learned from the blood of our fore fathers.

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Task Force Smith: lessons learned through failure.
Somewhere in the world there is an enemy that is training to kill American service members. It is our job to ensure we meet these enemies on the field of combat and defeat them to complete the objectives given to us. As the wars in Iraqi and Afghanistan have drawn down so have the U.S. forces. The leadership in the U.S. has decided that budget cuts are a risk that they are willing to take moving forward. In my experience, I have seen the fallout and devastating effects of budget cuts and drawdowns on the force after large conflicts. Readiness and training are paramount in ensuring there are no more Task Force Smiths. In this paper, we will examine what lead to the escalation of force in Korea, the poor readiness, leadership, training, and equipping of the Soldiers of Task Force Smith. After explaining the multiple failures I will provide why we cannot forget these mistakes for future forces.
A Costly Mistake
At the end of World War II, with the defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army only weeks away, the Soviet Army attached the Japanese forces from the Russian border in the north and fought their way south through Korea. During this period the allied forces had to decide on a point where to divide the Republic of Korea. United States planners decided to divide the Korean peninsula into two geographical entities because neither the Soviets nor the U.S. Armies could afford time or resources to help re-establish Korea as its own nation after a long Japanese occupation of the peninsula. The planners decided that they did not want the point to be behind where the Soviets had already fought through. They looked at the 38th parallel as a point that equally split the country and the capital city of Seoul would be in the U.S. sector.
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The Allied forces provided this recommendation to the Soviets and they agreed that the 38th parallel would become the zone of control for each country. This split would lead to futures conflicts along the border and then would eventually escalate into the Korean War in June of 1950.
At the conclusion of World War II, the United States had over 100 Army divisions and over eight million men in uniform. With the defeat of Germany and Japan the U.S. didn’t need such a large force, so the draw down began. The United States had occupation forces in Europe and Japan to help re-establish these countries and ensure that future conflicts would not happen. As the nation moved on from the war we redefined our future enemies in the Soviet Union and their communist expansion across the globe. The national strategy in fighting our future conflicts would involve strategic bombing and atomic weapons. Little thought and funding was put into the development of future ground weapon systems.
Fat and lazy
The U.S. forces in Japan following the end of World War II took on duties of disarming, provide security, a work force to help rebuild Japan, and helped to create a democracy. There was not much though put in the training of the occupation forces in Japan. There were very few large areas where units could train on maneuvers and the infrastructures such as bridges and roads couldn’t support the weight of American tanks. With the lack of training areas the army did not keep medium tanks in Japan. The lack of training and tank support would prove costly when thrust against North Korean forces that were better prepared for the coming invasion into South Korea.
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When World War II ended the military devised a plan that awarded points to troops that had been in the Army the longest and had seen the most combat. With this, the most seasoned veterans left the military and headed home to restart their lives. This left a void of combat harden troops with the most experience and leadership. The North Korean troops that Task Force Smith would face were composed of Koreans that fought with the Chinese and the Russians during the war against the Japanese forces in Korea and China.
“The best defense against a tank is another tank” (Garrett, 2000) this term is the one of the best ways to describe one of the shortcomings of Task Force Smith and not having a full Regimental Combat Team. The 21st Infantry Regiment, during the Battle of Osan was no match for the North Korean forces it would face. The American would face an enemy without the support of American armor. The North Koreans had Russian T-34 tanks that were battle tested and used to stop the mighty German war machine. The Task Force was equipped with 2.36” bazookas and 75mm recoilless rifle that could not penetrate the armor of the T-34’s. The army had developed the 3.5” bazooka that could penetrate the armor but it had not been field

yet.
The winds of war were starting to blow with the communist expansion across the globe. The serious lack of thought put into the readiness, leadership, training, and equipping of the U.S. forces would result in not only losing battles but also American lives.

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The invasion
On Sunday morning of June 25 1950 the North Korean Army kicked of their invasion into South Korea with 89,000 troops, over 150 T-34 tanks, and copious amounts of artillery to support their movements.

The numerically superior North Korean Army caught the South Korean army of 38,000 and the American off guard. The North Koreans captured the South Korean capital of Seoul within a few days and were driving south. The United Nations voted to send military forces there to help out and the United States started to mobilize its forces. The 24th Infantry Division was the closest force, which happened to be in Japan. They quickly organized an undermanned and under equipped Regimental Combat Team that they would fly to Korea to help stop the North Korean hordes from making their way south while the rest of the 24th I.D. would ship the remainder to the division’s equipment and men to Pusan to help fight the North

Koreans.
The 24th Infantry Division Commander, Major General William Dean had concluded the 21st Infantry Regiment was the most combat ready unit he had under his command. Task Force Smith received its name from its commander LTC Charles Smith; it was comprised of the 1st BN 21st Infantry Regiment and its 406 men that were composed of Soldiers that were 20 years old or younger; only 1/6th had ever seen combat. Each man received 120 rounds of ammo and two days rations. The Task Force had two 75mm recoilless rifles, two 107mm mortars, four 60mm mortars, and six 2.36 bazookas. The 52nd Field Artillery Battalion joined the task force with its 108 men and six 105mm howitzers (Lawton, 1969)

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Marching orders
The 24th ID commander, MG Dean gave LTC Smith his marching orders. “When you get to Pusan, head to Taejon. We want to stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as we can. Block the main road as far north as possible.” “ That’s all I’ve got. Good luck, God bless you and your men!” (Denny, 2015) A few days after arriving in Korea, Task Force Smith started moving north and finally arriving and digging into a side of a hill north of Osan on July 4. The men dug in well-constructed defensive positions facing along the road as well as making positions for the 105mm howitzers that provided the cover and concealment from enemy troops traveling down the road. On July 5 around 07:00 am, the Task Force spotted it first enemy travel south towards its position. The North Korean advanced guard with a column of eight T-34 tanks from the 107th Tank Regiment approached their position. When the tank column reached within two kilometers of the 1-21th infantry they initiated fires from the 52nd artillery battalion which had little to no effects on the tank column. Once the column reached within one thousand meters they tried to engage the T-34’s with the recoilless rifle, they scored direct hits but caused no damage to the armor and the T-34’s kept rolling through the kill area. The T-34’s reached the 1-21th infantry final protective line where they fired 22 2.36 inch bazooka rounds from the range of less than twenty meters with still no effects. The howitzers using High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds were able to damage three T-34’s and knock them of service during the first engagement. A second column of 25 T-34’s make their way into the engagement where the Americans fired upon them with howitzer, which managed to disable another three T-34’s before the North Koreans knocked out one of the howitzers and killed over a dozen Americans.

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Sometime around 11:00am two infantry regiments and three T-34’s from the North Korean 4th Division approached the American battle position. A fierce battle ensued for the next hour between the Americans and North Korean forces. The Americans found themselves in a desperate position when the North Korean started to envelope their position. A few hours after the fight started LTC Smith ordered a withdrawal. The American were able to perform an orderly withdrawal but received its highest casualties during the withdrawal because of the exposure to the enemy fire. One of Bravo company’s platoons did not receive the order to withdrawal until it was too late to move their causalities. The causalities and a medic, which would remain to surrender to the North Koreans, were discovered later shot in their litters.
The Americans delayed the North Koreans for almost eight hours but in the process of the rout received up to 40% causalities (Toland, 1991) Hours after the American made their withdrawal Soldiers slowly make their way back to friendly lines. Once the Task Force regrouped they moved south to meet up with the remainder of the 24th Infantry Division, which over the next month fought numerous engagements in delaying the North Koreans from reaching Pusan.
Aftermath
In 1989, General Gordon Sullivan, which at that time was the Army Chief of Staff, stated the ongoing drawdown of forces after the Cold War would not lead to another Task Force Smith. (Garrett, 2000)

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As I have shown in this paper there was a serious lack of planning and concern for the readiness, leadership, training and equipping of forces after a major conflict. The U.S. planners did not use joint intelligence preparation when considering their future adversaries and tactics they would use to try and defeat American forces. In my experience, I have seen the fallout and devastating effects of budget cuts and drawdowns on the force after large conflicts. Readiness and training are paramount in ensuring there are no more Task Force Smiths. So this time after our withdrawal from Iraqi and Afghanistan we must be steadfast in vigilant when it comes to ensuring that we have the right weapons and mostly the correct amount of service members to meet our enemy’s on the field and battle and defeat them.