(U) Subject: Discuss the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process, steps one through four.
(U) Background: Over the course of United States history the Army has made changes to how it engages its foreign enemies. These tactics techniques and procedures are the result of lessons learned during conflict, mistakes made under fire, and the results of a nation at war. As a result the IPB process has changed to accommodate a dynamic and often fluid battlefield. However this has not changed the core concept behind IPB, the four steps still remain an integral part of the Commanders Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), and are essential in war gaming. IPB assist in providing valuable Intelligence to the War Fighter throughout all phases of operations. This paper will cover each step of the IPB Process as well as discuss products associated with each of those steps and how these products can be an asset to the Commander and the War Fighter.
(U) IPB and MDMP: In order to fully understand the IPB process, an understanding of how MDMP and IPB are interrelated needs to be addressed. IPB is utilized to minimize unknown elements concerning an adversary, terrain, weather and civil considerations for a variety of operations including on-going and future operations. IPB provides a framework that assists in identifying information, facts and assumptions pertaining to the Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support available, Time available and any Civil Considerations (METT-TC). While this does not answer everything that may occur, it does facilitate effective staff planning. By using the IPB Process and MDMP, the Commander and Staff are able to select a Course of Action (COA) and begin the orders process...
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...er, fires and interdiction. The AO can be contiguous or noncontiguous, depending on the mission, size of the AO and size of the Unit. Additionally the AO helps to identify the geographic region that a commander is capable of influencing with either maneuver or fire support systems, these systems can be either kinetic or non-kinetic. This area is defined as the Area of Influence (AI), and should be larger than the AO based upon the range of the fire or maneuver system available to the Commander. Finally, while the primary accomplishment of the mission occurs within the AO, the Area of Interest (AOI) is where events, issues and areas outside of the AO can interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. These areas can extend into enemy controlled or enemy occupied areas, as well as current or planned objectives outside of the AO and AI.
Works Cited
FM 2-01.3
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Battle of Kamdesh and provide an alternate outcome based on the utilization of intelligence and intelligence assets. Many battles could have had a different outcome if they would trust intelligence reports without needing to validate the intelligence with another source or simply have other intelligence assets available. The Battle of Kamdesh was certainly one of those battles. The battle started just before 0600 on October 3, 2009 on Combat Outpost (COP) Keating and nearby Observation Post (OP) Fritsche in the Kamdesh district of Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. About 70 Soldiers of Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, along with 30 Afghan National Army Soldiers (ANA), fought an enemy force of about 300 Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) fighters. (Nordland, 2010) The battle took place in the Consolidation II portion of the Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign in Afghanistan. The AAF likely
c. Systems that fall under PIM, such as eMILPO and iPERMS, track soldier information. These systems specifically track duty
Effective planning is impossible without first understanding the problem. Commanders rely on personal observations, experiences, and input from others to develop understanding. They also prioritize information requests and incorporate additional information as those requests are answered. A complete understanding of the problem and environment builds the foundation for the operational process and ...
3. Neumann, Jonathan T.. The Military Decision Making Process and the Battle of the Little Bighorn. 2001. Reprint, Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2014.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
Unified Land Operations defines the army operational design methodology (ADM) as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. The operational design methodology incorporated into army doctrine serves as a method to compliment the military decision making process (MDMP). Although the ADM it is often confused with replacing MDMP, its purpose is to address complex problems from a nonlinear approach. ADM helps the commander to answer questions to problems. However, only a collaborative effort of an operation planning team (OPT) will achieve the approach to answering complex problems. Doctrine alone does not provide the answer to complex problems, but rather offers a guide to solve them. To conceptualize the MDMP, planners must incorporate ADM to provide a better understanding, visualization, and description of the problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide the framework to support why ADM is required in the MDMP.
In this paper, I will provide a Battle Analysis and outline the events leading up to and surrounding the Battle of 73 Eastings (refers to a north-south grid line). In addition, I will describe how the United States Army’s (USA) 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) defeated forces from the Iraqi Republican Guard (IRG) using speed, technology and superior combat power. Although some consider the Battle of 73 Eastings extremely successful, some consider it a failure due to the large amount of Iraqi forces that retreated towards Bagdad. Lastly, I will analyze how each side used their intelligence assets and what they could have used to change the outcome.
...portant before engaging in any warfare. The team should plan well on how to engage the enemy and adhere to the plan unless an unprecedented occurrence takes place; the team should also consider a plan B. Thirdly, apart from physical warfare, the mental warfare can be used to convey a message that affects the confidence of the enemy negatively. The First Special forces adopted a strategy of scaring away the Germans using stickers with threatening messages; the color of their faces was also scary and facilitated in camouflaging. Fourthly, military concepts should never be made public, the adoption of the force was a big secret but the success was tremendous. Lastly, coordination and a good chain of command is key in conquering in any battle. Without proper coordination an army can be destabilized by the enemy, however, proper chain of command guarantees performance.
...these intelligence failures, more emphasis is now placed on the creation of intelligence products used on the battlefield. All possible enemy courses of actions are now red teamed in an attempt to produce a much accurate analytical product.
2. Battle Management, Command, Control, and Communications (BM/C3): The BM/C3 component is divided into two main parts. First, the Command and Control (BM/C2) system controls the overall NMD system. Information from sensors is forwarded to the BM/C2, which processes the data and determines the targets for the GBI to intercept. Second, the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) is a network of ground systems that relay communications to the GBI while in flight to guide it to the incoming warhead.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
Today, the complexity of the battlefield has experienced significant increases due to the challenges of asymmetric menaces after the end of the Cold War. The concept of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) tries to embrace these new conditions based on ambitious processes like Knowledge Base Development (KBD). Furthermore, military planning and operation execution have to cope not only with a highly complex and dynamic adversary’s system conducting asymmetric operations, but also with great challenges on the Blue side, such as the coordination and interaction of multiple coalition partners and different agencies and organizations in a non-linear battlespace. Experiences from recent months and years have undoubtedly proven that EBO cannot be successfully conducted without adequate support by IT tools. Especially the various wargaming activities within EBP cannot be properly accomplished by just using traditional measures. Military planners desperately need automated tools in order to handle data masses, multi-dimensional and dynamic interrelations within the adversary’s system and own (blue) forces and instruments.
Paul and Elder’s eight elements of thought directly support the Army officers as they work through the Army Problem Solving Process by expanding their ability to think critically and creatively. The following eight elements enhance a problem’s solvers perspective on what is important; making the best possible decision the same goal as the Army Problem Solving Process. The eight elements of thought are Point of view; Purpose; Question or problem; Information; Inferences and conclusions; Concepts and theories; Assumptions; and Implications/Consequences. Point of view-Drs. Paul and Elder suggested this as a starting point in the Army officers thought process. Drs. Paul and Elder believe that within the Point of View, decision makers should look at their view through the follow-on analysis of frames of reference, Perspectives, and Orientations . While combining the totality of the Point of View, Army leaders look at a problem from a “place which they are viewing the problem.” Furthermore, the Point of View element brings to the Army Problem Solving Process the leader’s ability to “reflect of who the people are inside, what they use to make their assumptions and their decision.” Utilizing the Point of view element assists in the Problem Solving Process by providing leaders with guidance from commanders to the problem solvers to create alternatives to solve a problem. According to US Army ATTP 5-01, 2001, par. 11-25, 2-14, alternatives and possible unpopular ideas or
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
Parallel attacks on political and military leadership, C2 and Infrastructure is the core of Wardens Five-Ring-Theory. In this sense, airpower has been linked to Effects Based Operation (EBO). This approach focusses on airpower actions and their linkage to a desired behavior by the enemy. This is in opposition to earlier approaches of targeting for damage and destruction in the realm of annihilation or attrition. But EBO has to involve more than the mere military instrument of power: A systematic approach of analyzing the political, economic, social, infrastructural, informational and military composition of any adversary. This leads strategic military leadership to the right decision, what actions to take against what target to achieve the desired effect. The Air Force Doctrine Document 3-0 states that “Commanders employ lethal and nonlethal means, through kinetic and non-kinetic actions to create desired