Having defined the airpower theory of this paper lets turn to the categorization. This translates to the “effects for national security objectives”. How can airpower be categorized to achieve desired effects? In Clausewitz´ On War he refers to two strategies of (land-) warfare: annihilation and exhaustion of an enemy. Clausewitz subordinated those strategies to his famous notion thatt “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.” The decisive battle is inherent to annihilation and exhaustion consists of smaller scale battles and maneuvers which ultimately leads to attrition of an adversary’s warfighting resources. Both strategies were successfully applied through airpower. In 1991, the aerial attack by coalition aircraft on Iraqi forces in operation Desert Storm provides a useful example of the application of air power towards annihilation. …show more content…
Parallel attacks on political and military leadership, C2 and Infrastructure is the core of Wardens Five-Ring-Theory. In this sense, airpower has been linked to Effects Based Operation (EBO). This approach focusses on airpower actions and their linkage to a desired behavior by the enemy. This is in opposition to earlier approaches of targeting for damage and destruction in the realm of annihilation or attrition. But EBO has to involve more than the mere military instrument of power: A systematic approach of analyzing the political, economic, social, infrastructural, informational and military composition of any adversary. This leads strategic military leadership to the right decision, what actions to take against what target to achieve the desired effect. The Air Force Doctrine Document 3-0 states that “Commanders employ lethal and nonlethal means, through kinetic and non-kinetic actions to create desired
(U) Background: Over the course of United States history the Army has made changes to how it engages its foreign enemies. These tactics techniques and procedures are the result of lessons learned during conflict, mistakes made under fire, and the results of a nation at war. As a result the IPB process has changed to accommodate a dynamic and often fluid battlefield. However this has not changed the core concept behind IPB, the four steps still remain an integral part of the Commanders Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), and are essential in war gaming. IPB assist in providing valuable Intelligence to the War Fighter throughout all phases of operations. This paper will cover each step of the IPB Process as well as discuss products associated with each of those steps and how these products can be an asset to the Commander and the War Fighter.
The United States of America is a powerful and well known force throughout the world. It has become a superpower of nations in just about three hundred years, being one of the newest nations in existence today. Its military reaches out into several countries in the globe and holds a presence as a peacekeeper and wielder of democracy. Of the US military’s five branches, the Air Force is the ruler of the skies, keeping control of the earth’s aerospace. Without the Air Force Special Operations, the military could not complete operations as effectively or efficiently as it potentially could. The United States Air Force is a key part of America’s mission to spread and assist democracy throughout the world.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
During the first and the second phases, the coalition adopted a strategy used in the Second World War. It attacked Iraq’s infrastructure through use of superior air force power. The focus was the military communications systems and government electricity
The just war theory is described by Thomas Massaro in his book Living Justice as the “principle that warfare might be justified under certain conditions” (108). The complexities involved with international relations makes determining a just war very difficult. Even though historically pacifism hasn’t gained much traction within Catholic circles, it currently is gaining popularity with many mainstream Catholics. With so many differing views on military action, one might ask, “What determines a just war? How can we balance the need for peace with self-defense?” An examination of criteria for a just war and critiques written on this topic might shed light on these two questions.
Recent technological advancements on show in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have indicated, to some, that there is a new American way of war. Scholars, however, do not seem to have reached consensus on what a new way of war for the United States would embody. Depending on the scholar, their beliefs are underwritten by the American ability to wage war with highly interconnected, agile, precise, and extremely damaging methods or because the United States is capable of waging war with a small, Special Forces centered footprint. Other scholars argue that there is not a new American way of war because traditional methods are still necessary in many kinds of conflict. Scholars who address this question focus on conflicts that they believe to be important indicators of how the United States will act in the future, but miss the forest for the trees. The choice of a particular method of combat in any given war is not the result of some national tendency, but rather the result of the political object desired. The political object is the ultimate arbiter of the choice of strategy in war, and that is certainly not new to how the United States wages war.
It is interesting and even surprising that the two major strategies regarding war were developed by European contemporaries of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) approached his philosophy of war in a structured, scientific manner. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) took a more fluid, open-ended approach to his philosophy of war. The fact that they lived during the same time period in Europe is also fascinating in that they likely knew of each others’ writings as well as potentially influenced and were influenced by the philosophy of the other. Jomini’s scientific approach is more applicable to the tactical and operational levels of war while Clausewitz approaches war as more of an art or interaction between people that is more appropriate to the strategic and political levels of war. Although their two war strategies are presented as opposing strategies, by comparing concepts from each of the theorists to the other theorist’s work shows that they are actually more complementary than competing in that they are addressing different levels of war. The concepts to be evaluated are Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as a continuation of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” as well as Jomini’s definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”.
Walzer understands that his ideas are theoretical and probably idealistic in some ways but he also understands that to allow wars to be anything but just is to legalize and encourage aggressive and self serving wars of conquest. Walzer is interested in the development of the idea of what it is for a war to be just. He writes, “Some political theories die and go to heaven; some, I hope, die and go to hell. But some have a long life in this world, a history most often of service to the powers-that-be, but also, sometimes, an oppositionist history. The theory of just war began in the service of the powers” (Walzer 3). The rise of a modern state and the idea of state sovereignty have clouded and wrongly employed the idea of “just war” in using
Maxwell, Hilary. “Warfare Plans of Countries.” Monta Vista High School, Cupertino. 26 Jan. 2014. Lecture.
Current military leadership should comprehend the nature of war in which they are engaged within a given political frame in order to develop plans that are coherent with the desired political end state. According to Clausewitz, war is an act of politics that forces an enemy to comply with certain conditions or to destroy him through the use of violence. A nation determines its vital interests, which drives national strategy to obtain or protect those interests. A country achieves those goals though the execution of one of the four elements of power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economical means. The use of military force...
Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region, the Argentineans attacked military objectives, while missing British centers of gravity. Because they failed to analyze the critical factors and capabilities of both the enemy and themselves, they were doomed to failure from the outset of the mission.
By the end of the Cold War the literature focusing on strategic studies has highlighted transformational changes within international system that affected and altered the very nature of war. As a result many security studies scholars have renounced traditional theories of strategic thought. Clausewitzian theory, in particular, has taken a lot of criticism, regarding its relevance to modern warfare. (Gray, How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?, 2005)
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "The State of War" elegantly raises a model for confederative peace among the states of Europe, and then succinctly explains its impossibility. Rousseau very systematically lays out the benefits of such a "perpetual peace" through arguments based only in a realism of pure self-interest, and then very elegantly and powerfully turns the inertia of the self-interest machinery against the same to explain why it can never come to be. However, this final step may be a bit too far; in his academic zeal for the simple, I will argue that he has overlooked the real, or at least ignored the possible. His conclusion may be appealingly reasoned, but it is still insupportable.
In the Novel by Robert M. Epstein, his military background was identified and how he planned his attacks were broken down so that the average person could understand them. He was the individual who introduced the ideas of modern warfare to the global affairs. The de...
War is a universal phenomenon, it is a violent tool people use to accomplish their interests. It is not autonomous, rather policy always determines its character. Normally it starts when diplomacy fails to reach a peaceful end. War is not an end rather than a mean to reach the end, however, it does not end, and it only rests in preparation for better conditions. It is a simple and dynamic act with difficult and unstable factors which make it unpredictable and complex. It is a resistant environment where the simplest act is difficult to perform. In this paper, I will argue why war is a universal phenomenon and what are the implications of my argument to strategists.