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Perception of war
Development of warfare
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It is interesting and even surprising that the two major strategies regarding war were developed by European contemporaries of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) approached his philosophy of war in a structured, scientific manner. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) took a more fluid, open-ended approach to his philosophy of war. The fact that they lived during the same time period in Europe is also fascinating in that they likely knew of each others’ writings as well as potentially influenced and were influenced by the philosophy of the other. Jomini’s scientific approach is more applicable to the tactical and operational levels of war while Clausewitz approaches war as more of an art or interaction between people that is more appropriate to the strategic and political levels of war. Although their two war strategies are presented as opposing strategies, by comparing concepts from each of the theorists to the other theorist’s work shows that they are actually more complementary than competing in that they are addressing different levels of war. The concepts to be evaluated are Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as a continuation of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” as well as Jomini’s definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”.
The first concept is Clausewitz’s Trinity of War which is comprised of “…three categories of forces: irrational forces…; non-rational forces…; and reason or rational calculation…” [Bassford, pg 205]. The irrational forces are hostility and violence that originate mainly with the people and are the impetus of a political solution that may result in war. The non-rational forces refer to chance and probability which are primarily...
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... from reoccurring in Afghanistan.” [Sobchak, pg 239]
The war strategies of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine Henri de Jomini are not mutually exclusive philosophies. Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as an extension of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” speak more so to the upper, strategic and political ranges of war. Jomini addresses the operational and tactical levels in the lower ranges of war with his definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”. So if one views their work collectively rather than as competitors, the two philosophies complement each other by addressing different segments of the spectrum of war.
Works Cited
Jomini, A., Lesson 3, Reading 1.
Douhet, G., Lesson 3, Reading 2.
Warden, J., Lesson 3, Reading 3.
Bassford, C., Lesson 4, Reading 1.
Beyerchen, A., Lesson 4, Reading 2.
Sobchak, F., Lesson 4, Reading 3.
Rogier van der Weyden painted his vision of the biblical Deposition before the year 1443, likely between 1435 and 1438. The painting is oil on wood panel and was an altarpiece commissioned by the crossbowmen’s guild in Louvain, Belgium. Jesus’s body is at the center of the scene, being carefully lifted down from his cross. He is surrounded by mourners, his mother, Mary, swooning in her grief as John the Evangelist reaches out to support her and Mary Magdalene wringing her hands, her head bowed in sorrow. The figures in the artwork do not fit completely within the frame of the altarpiece and the only the lower part of the cross is shown in full. In his Deposition, Rogier van der Weyden attempts to capture the extreme grief apparent at Christ’s death and reflect the emotion onto the observer, placing him/her within the narrative.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. Translated and edited by Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
The Russo-Japanese War has many lessons to offer and this essay has discussed the three most enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict for limited aims. History has and will likely continue to show us the inherent difficulties of successful and durable war termination. The leadership foresight needed to pre-plan war termination that achieves the political goal is often beyond the capabilities of countries and their leadership. The Japanese provide us with a rare scenario where their pre-war plan was nearly identical to the post war results. As a result, the Russo-Japanese War can offer current planners and leaders several valuable lessons on war strategy, planning and termination that are still relevant to today’s conflicts.
War is the means to many ends. The ends of ruthless dictators, of land disputes, and lives – each play its part in the reasoning for war. War is controllable. It can be avoided; however, once it begins, the bat...
Clausewitz emphasizes that “war is a branch of political activity, that it is in no sense autonomous” (Clausewitz, 605). This principle is especially applicable to the post-war period of World War II. The political struggle between the ideologies of democracy and communism would entail global focus for the next 50 years, and the events that brought about the defeat of Germany shaped the landscape of this political struggle.
Europeans during the 16th Century had made unique technological and intellectual advancements, they expanded their knowledge and continued to spread their dominance across the world. These advancements perpetuated the idea that their race was superior to other races and that they had the right to hold other groups of people accountable for what they saw as transgressions. Europeans felt the need to control and make sure that all groups of people were following their moral state of conducts. In History of A Voyage to the Land Of Brazil, Jean De Lery introduces the main motivation of the Europeans journey to the Americas by emphasizing that it was influenced by Christian values ( Lery 3). This shows how the concept of Christianity is important
Jus ad bellum is defined as “justice of war” and is recognized as the ethics leading up to war (Orend 31). Orend contends that an...
...nt variables. It can deal with the interests within a country and interests out of it. It can occur due to ideological differences or religious differences. It can occur due to a power grab, and in the cases of a failed brinkmanship, can be a complete accident. Each war throughout history has its own unique set of reasoning for occurring, which makes studying the causation of war so fascinating: in every war you study, you are guaranteed to find so many unique characteristics that it possesses.
Throughout history theorists tried to capture all aspects of warfare, propose new ways and means to apply the conceptions, and even conjecture how best to terminate wars. Carl Von Clausewitz in his masterpiece ‘On War’ conceptualized the nature of war on land and linked relationship between warfare and politics in concise ideals. The visionary theorist Giulio Douhet shifted the view of war in 1921 when he published The Command of the Air, where he introduced war through the concepts of airpower. This essay aims to contrast the theories of Clausewitz’s conception of land warfare with Douhet’s conception of air warfare because the characteristics and environmental end states changed with the introduction of airpower.
"We begged God to accept our lives and our blood and unite them to His life and His blood for the salvation of these tribes."1 This quote gives a small window into the heroism and abandon in which St. Isaac Jogues lived out his call to evangelize the native people of New France (Canada). Driven by a deep admiration for the Jesuit missionaries of Japan and China, he sacrificially dove deep into the culture of those who he lived with. He did this so that Jesus would not not simply come across as a European savior, but as a universal redeemer who speaks to people in their own language, through their own heritage and traditions. Even after facing brutal torture at the hands of the Mohawks, St. Isaac Jogues persisted in spreading the gospel in Canada, trusting that through his sufferng God would bring about salvation.
The just war theory is described by Thomas Massaro in his book Living Justice as the “principle that warfare might be justified under certain conditions” (108). The complexities involved with international relations makes determining a just war very difficult. Even though historically pacifism hasn’t gained much traction within Catholic circles, it currently is gaining popularity with many mainstream Catholics. With so many differing views on military action, one might ask, “What determines a just war? How can we balance the need for peace with self-defense?” An examination of criteria for a just war and critiques written on this topic might shed light on these two questions.
Hobbes, as one of the early political philosophers, believes human has the nature to acquire “power after power” and has three fundamental interests which are safety, “conjugal affections”, and riches for commodious lives. (Hobbes, p108, p191) From this basis, Hobbes deducts that in a state of nature, human tends to fight against each other (state of war) to secure more resources (Hobbes,
Amongst military theorists and practitioners who studied war, its origin and implications, Carl von Clausewitz assumes a place among the most prominent figures. With his book On War, he demonstrated his capability to provide thorough historical analysis and conclusions of the conflicts in which he was engaged, and as a philosopher he reflected about all encompassing aspects of war. Today, Western armies conduct modern warfare in a dynamic environment composed of flexible and multiple threats in which civilians form a substantial part. Studying Clausewitz provides current military and political leadership useful insights to understand twenty-first century warfare. He explains the nature of war, provides an analytical tool to understand the chaos of warfare, and he argues for well educated and adaptable leadership capable of creative thinking. Although he died before his work was complete, his writing style was ambiguous and unclear at some moments, and current technology reduced some of his tactics obsolete, his work still arouses and inspires military and political strategists and analysts.
Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region, the Argentineans attacked military objectives, while missing British centers of gravity. Because they failed to analyze the critical factors and capabilities of both the enemy and themselves, they were doomed to failure from the outset of the mission.
Clausewitz's On War, first published in 1832, until now remains one of the most influential studies in understanding character, nature and conditions of warfare. In his book Clausewitz not only traced an interaction of intension and planning with the realities of combat, but by exploring the relationship of war to policy, politics and society gave a new philosophical justification to the art of war. (Heuser, 2002)