Walzer's Theory Of Just War

Walzer understands that his ideas are theoretical and probably idealistic in some ways but he also understands that to allow wars to be anything but just is to legalize and encourage aggressive and self serving wars of conquest. Walzer is interested in the development of the idea of what it is for a war to be just. He writes, “Some political theories die and go to heaven; some, I hope, die and go to hell. But some have a long life in this world, a history most often of service to the powers-that-be, but also, sometimes, an oppositionist history. The theory of just war began in the service of the powers” (Walzer 3). The rise of a modern state and the idea of state sovereignty have clouded and wrongly employed the idea of “just war” in using

the theory to further their power and reach. Walzer continues, proposing, “Writers like Grotius and Pufendorf incorporated just war theory into international law, but the rise of the modern state and the legal (and philosophical) acceptance of state sovereignty pushed the theory into the background” (Walzer 3). It might be better to think of the theory, not as being pushed into the background at all times. The idea was instead hidden when it would be detrimental and cause conflict but triumphed when it aligned with the state’s prospering. Because of the change in politics and the new kind of state, the leaders, the input is different. Walzer notes, “Now the political foreground was occupied by people we can think of as Machiavellian princes, hard men (and sometimes women), driven by ‘‘reason of state,’’ who did what (they said) they had to do” (Walzer 5). This new reason, not of individual but of “nation”, of “state”, changed how people thought about everything. Walzer agrees, continuing, “Worldly prudence triumphed over worldly justice; realism over what was increasingly disparaged as naive idealism” (Walzer 5). This naive idealism was that justice even had a place anymore. The “might makes right” mentality took its place and with this swapping of virtue to vice came more and more conflict. “The princes of the world continued to defend their wars, using the language of international law, which was also, at least in part, the language of just war” (Walzer 5). Justice was redefined in reference to the state and it’s rights. It was just to fight their wars because it would be unjust to lose their state, their sovereignty.

With this misunderstanding of justice and its application to the macro rather than the mircro, states had a so called just cause to fight for, their existence and flourishing as a power, as a nation. “States claimed a right to fight whenever their rulers deemed it necessary, and the rulers took sovereignty to mean that no one could judge their decisions. They not only fought when they wanted; they fought how they wanted, returning to the old Roman maxim that held war to be a lawless activity: inter arma silent leges— which, again, was taken to mean that there was no law above or beyond the decrees of the state; conventional restraints on the conduct of war could always be overridden for the sake of victory” (Walzer 5). Under such conditionsit is not surprising that justice and the idea of “just war” was seen as an impediment rather than a virtue. Walzer explains that justice was not considered in times of war because these arguments “were treated as a kind of moralizing, inappropriate to the anarchic conditions of international society. For this world, just war was not worldly enough” (Walzer 5). Just war was, as Walzer calls it, not worldly enough in so far as it rocked the boat too much. Just war was an idealist and not real concept which was not hard and strong enough for the brutal modern world.

Walzer suggests two issues which were “raised by our most recent wars, that require the critical edge of justice.” These two issues are risk free war making and … With regards to the first, risk free war making is what he describes as “ a necessary feature of humanitarian interventions.” Risk free war making is critical because while it allows the attacker, the power which is to restore peace, the ability to wage war with little direct consequences to lives lost, it also leaves the enemy with a bad taste in their mouths, so to speak.

Walzer explains risk free war making and its implications. He writes, “Wars can be fought from a great distance with bombs and missiles aimed very precisely (compared with the radical imprecision of such weapons only a few decades ago) at the forces carrying out the killings”, making them as Walzer calls them, risk free. But to understand what it is, or rather what it should be like to be in war, Walzer quotes Albert Camus. Camus argues that one cannot kill unless one is prepared to die. In certain so called risk free wars, wars in which we choose to drone strike and effectuate change with force from afar, “We impose risks on others and refuse to accept them for ourselves, even when that acceptance is necessary to help the others.” Because of this, we are blameworthy for escalations in conflict and retaliatory attacks. Risk free war making and the second issue concerning war’s endings are what Walzer focus’ on. Regarding the ending of a war

Walzer suggests, “On the standard view, a just war (precisely because it is not a crusade) should end with the restoration of the status quo ante. The paradigm case is a war of aggression, which ends justly when the aggressor has been defeated, his attack repulsed, the old boundaries restored.” This would seem to be a just ending to a war, but Walzer goes further. He is inclined to believe that maybe this is not enough in order for the conclusion to be considered just. An example he offers is this: “the victim state might deserve reparations from the aggressor state, so that the damage the aggressor’s forces inflicted can be repaired.” This going further show that Walzer is not satisfied with the minimal conceding conclusion of war, but sees a just conclusion as one which makes reparations for wrongdoing.

Luban, in “Just War and Human Rights” Argument Against Walzer,discusses how the legalist paradigm and rights of states to common life is not limited to democracies.

Likewise, the “consent” of individuals and its merits are not limited to democratic states. It is defined as “aggression” to attack a non-democratic state too. The question of “Common life” comes up. If common life is not primarily shared morality or ideas, then what is it? Is it Language? Shared history? Religion? Ethnicity? Shared morality? These cannot be primary criterion for common life. Walzer’s and the U.N.’s definition of aggression is an “armed intervention in a state’s affairs. The U.N. defines aggressive war as illegal war. Therefore, the only just war is a war of self-defense against aggression. The moral basis of this claim is that state sovereignty must be

protected.

Luban claims that State Sovereignty is not primary. Furthermore, there must be distinguishing between that which is a legitimate and an illegitimate state. This is important to do because only legitimate states possess right of sovereignty and non-interference. UN definition and concept of sovereignty ignore individual human rights when granting legitimacy and therefore sovereignty. The “Primacy of Human Rights” is crucial to understand. On this point, Walzer agrees with Luban. The primacy of human rights means that all rights of states come from individual human rights. Social contract: formation of nation comes first, but this formation is not vertical, hierarchical, but horizontal, amongst the peoples. The nation (people) may then, through consent, establish the vertical contract with state. Therefore, the state itself only has rights if it is legitimate, respecting of the contract of the ones which comprise it.

Aggression is not always a crime Luban claims. A state without consent of people has no right against aggression. But the difficult part is knowing from outside whether state is legitimate or not. Luban would say sometimes it’s obvious that it’s not, and in those cases, it is “imperative to act against the injustice on the behalf of those who cannot. Luban proposes a new definition of just war based on human rights. This definition distinguishes between human rights and “socially basic human rights” which are security and subsistence, rights needed to enjoy any other rights. If no socially basic rights are involved, then any war threatening human rights is unjust. On the other hand, a war defending socially basic human rights is just even if it violates other human rights. The example which is given is “State A is an oppressive state violating socially basic human rights. State B invades A to liberate people.” By UN definition, this is unjust aggressive war. But for Luban, state A is illegitimate and State B is defending socially basic human rights.