The Lac-Mégantic Derailment In Canada

Lac-Mégantic Derailment
Abstract:

The Lac-Mégantic derailment occurred on July 6, 2013 in the town of Lac-Mégantic, which is located in the Eastern Townships of the Canadian province of Quebec and has population of about 6,000.The disaster occurred when a 74-car freight train, through a complex series of events, ran away and derailed. The events that led to the disaster included an inadequate repair on the lead locomotive’s engine, a lack of the necessary amount handbrakes, weak safety training for Montreal, Maine & Atlantic (MM&A) staff, and a failure of federal oversight.

Background:

-The Train:
The train that derailed was designated “MMA 2” and was 4701 ft. long and weighed 10,287 tons. The train consisted of five locomotives in the

front, one remote-control car used to house the control equipment necessary for train operation. Also, there was one loaded box car that was used as a buffer car, followed by 72 unpressurized, dangerous goods tank cars loaded with a highly volatile petroleum crude oil, with each tank car filled with about 30,000 gallons of crude oil.

Events:

-First Event:
About nine months before the accident, engine repair was done on the train’s lead locomotive due to previous engine failure.

MM&A performed a low-cost “non-standard” repair on the damaged engine. Because of the time and cost for a standard repair, along with the pressure to return the locomotive to service, the engine was inadequately repaired with an epoxy-like material that lacked the proper strength and durability. The repair eventually failed, leading to a series of problems in the engine and an accumulation of oil in the turbocharger and exhaust manifold.

-Second Event:
Two days before the crash occurred, an engineer on a separate trip had reported some trouble with the locomotive’s engine. Despite the concerns with the engine, the locomotive was put at the head of the train and was bound for Nantes. The engineer, Tom Harding, noticed that the engine was surging, making it difficult to keep a steady pace. By the time that the train arrived in Nantes, it was spewing enough smoke and oil that the taxi driver noticed oil landing on the cab’s window. Mr. Harding reported and discussed the issue with a rail traffic controller who was in Bangor, Maine. Both agreed to deal with the matter the following morning. The locomotive was then left

running.

-Third Event:
An insufficient number of handbrakes were set to keep the train in place given its size and the incline the train was parked on. The train’s engineer, Mr. Harding, only set seven hand brakes. This is far less than the required number of brakes that would have been required to keep the train in place if the main air brakes failed. The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) set out a company chart that designates how many handbrakes must be set under given conditions. The chart indicated nine, which wouldn’t have been enough on their own either. Investigators concluded that between 18 and 26 handbrakes on would have been needed in order to hold the train should the air brakes fail. Some of the locomotives had systems that could automatically restart in the event of brake failure, but were also shut down. The TSB also concluded that the railway did not give its staff enough training.

-Fourth Event:
The train began to roll downhill toward Lac-Mégantic when it was left idling on the main track, instead of pulling it into the side track that ran parallel to the main track. This had been the standard practice of MM&A for several months because it kept the side track free for storing rail cars that were not in use. This practice was neither questioned nor prohibited by the government. If the train had been parked on the side rail when it began rolling forward, the train would have run into a derail device which should have prevented it from proceeding downhill to Lac-Mégantic.

-Fifth Event:
About an hour after the train’s engineer left, a fire developed on the lead locomotive.

Firefighters extinguished the fire and then shut down the locomotive. When the locomotive was shut down, no other locomotive was started. This meant that the air compressor was left off while the air brakes were slowly leaking. The train’s “reset safety control” system, which sets the entire train’s brakes should the engine fail, was not wired to go off. About an hour after firefighters shut down the train, the pressure in the air brakes had dropped low enough to allow the train to start rolling. The derailed 17 minutes later when it was 11.6 kilometers (7.21 mi)

away.

-Sixth Event:
When the train reached the curve in the track at Lac-Mégantic, it was reported to be travelling at 105 km/h (65 mph). This speed was more than triple the typical speed at this location. The locomotives made the turn, but because of the tank cars’ higher center of gravity they derailed. The official report found that the train’s speed was the major contributing factor in the derailment. The derailment and following pileup left about one-third of the tanker cars with large breaches.
-Seventh Event:
The tanker cars were carrying a highly volatile oil for which the level of hazard “had not been accurately documented” by the railway. The amount of oil, along with its low viscosity and high volatility allowed it to spill, spread, and ignite quickly. This triggered fireballs and fire in the heart of Lac-Mégantic. The TSB concluded MM&A did not do enough to identify and manage risks on the railway and cited the company’s “weak safety culture”.