Summary: The Forgotten Elements Of Military Strategy

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Unfortunately for contemporary U.S. strategic military planners the most powerful side in war does not always win. Defeat is a real possibility; even in a unipolar world. While the combination of a variety of strategic factors can lead to the defeat of a superior force, four stand out as the most likely explanations for why less powerful actors can, and do, win wars. These four are; the fundamentally unpredictable nature of war, a fatally flawed military strategy adopted by the more powerful adversary, an unforeseen and therefore decisive technological advantage by the less powerful side, and a sheer lack of military effectiveness of the greater power. This paper will analyze these four strategic characteristics in an effort to persuade …show more content…

Chief among these is a fatally flawed strategy adopted by the more powerful adversary that negates material superiority and battlefield success. This is sometimes referred to as “winning the battle but losing the war.” There are several reasons why military strategy can go awry and lead to defeat of even the most powerful militaries. Michael Howard discusses potential strategic pitfalls in his well-written journal article entitled “The Forgotten Elements of Strategy” published in 1979. Howard argues, quite convincingly, that to be successful, modern-day strategy must address four dimensions (logistical, operational, societal, technological) all of which can dominate depending on the circumstances of the strategic setting. Perhaps most important to us today is his assertion that the societal dimension has become the most important in warfare since 1945, particularly in the decolonization or counterinsurgency context, despite an obsession with technology and nuclear strategy. Howard’s post-Vietnam War article undoubtedly resonates with the current generation of American military leaders who despite their numerous tactical and operational victories, have been so far unable to nominally succeed (let alone declare victory) in either Iraq or Afghanistan, in large part because our strategies failed to account for essential sociopolitical factors, just as our predecessors had during the fiasco in

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