“More than most professions, the military is forced to depend upon intelligent interpretation of the past for signposts charting the future.... The facts derived from historical analysis he [the soldier] applies to conditions of the present and the proximate future, thus developing a synthesis of appropriate method, organization, and doctrine.... These principles know no limitation of time. Consequently the Army extends its analytical interest to the dust-buried accounts of wars long past as well as to those still reeking wit the scent of battle. It is the object of the search that dictates the field for its pursuit.”1 --General Douglas MacArthur I want to first state that the syllabus for this year's course was remarkable in that it seamlessly managed to include various perspectives and issues in historiography within the short parameters of the year, and so the task of fitting one extra week's worth of reading for this assignment was quite daunting. Unfortunately, this response is not sufficient, and I am obliged to continue. I'm an avid follower of military history, and so I decided that this form of history may arguably be a feasible theme for the course syllabus and crucial to the understanding of historiography. An all encompassing definition for military history is it is a special historical discipline that “deals with military phenomena” and “covers the entire spectrum of diverse manifestations and interconnections.” It qualifies as a science as long as it retains its “historicocritcial method”, and the neglect of this method would compromise its bid to “scientific scholarly status.”2 Forming a part of the large family of historical scholarship, military history abide the same principles that govern methodology. Howev... ... middle of paper ... ...”, but it must be pass the test of reality in order to for the fact to be deemed scientifically acceptable. They should be able to answer these pertinent questions: “Is it possible, and at the same time credible that a certain fact has actually occurred, or that it really could have been such as it is rendered by the sources?” “The correctives available in this process are provided by (1) the 'laws' (condensed historical experience) of the theory of war, by 2) historically unchanged topo-geogrpahic conditions and by (3) what we know is physiologically or technically possible.” It was due to Delbruck's Sachkritik that “altered several 'established truths' about major battles or characteristics of classical and medieval warfare”, and this method of factual criticism became a “conscious part of the normal approach of historians of warfare to their objects of study.”15
- - -, ed. "The Anti-War Movement in the United States." English.Illnois.edu. Ed. Oxford Companion to American Military History. 1st ed. Vers. 1. Rev. 1. Oxford Companion to American Military History, 1999. Web. 24 Feb. 2014. .
Brigade General Scales, Robert H. JR. Certain Victory. The U.S. Army in the Gulf War.
World War I is marked by its extraordinary brutality and violence due to the technological advancement in the late 18th century and early 19th century that made killing easier, more methodical and inhumane. It was a war that saw a transition from traditional warfare to a “modern” warfare. Calvary charges were replaced with tanks; swords were replaced with machine guns; strategic and decisive battles were r...
Millett, Allan Reed., Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012. New York: Free, 2012. Print.
McGuigan, Cathleen. "Theater Of War." Newsweek 151.14 (2008): 52-53. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 28 Mar. 2010.
John Keegan, the author of “The Face of Battle” is allowing the reader to view different perspective of history, from the eyes of the soldier. Although by his own account, Keegan acknowledges, “I have never been in a battle. And I grow increasingly convinced that I have very little idea of what a battle can be like.” Keegan scorns historians for pointing the finger of failure after an evolution occurs and not examining the soldier’s point of view while the battle is transpiring.
Even though half of a century separates us from the unforgettable event, it left horrible memories especially in those who saw, felt and experienced World War II which was waged on land, on sea, and in the air all over the earth for approximately six years. Whether it’s a battle, hospital, or holocaust, there are so many stories from the survivors, who can teach us not only about the profession of arms, but also about military preparations, global strategies and combined operations in the coalition war against fascism.
Military History: The Definitive Visual Guide to the Objects of Warfare. New York: DK Publishing, Inc., 2012. Print.
It is far easier for us in the present than it was for those at Gettysburg, to look back and determine the path that the leaders should have taken. As students, studying battles such as this, we have the advantage of hindsight, knowing the outcome. Nonetheless, we can still learn valuable lessons from it. To do so, this analysis will explore some of the decisions of the leaders at Gettysburg, and how they were affected by the operational variables. This essay will scrutinize some of the leaders at Gettysburg, and the impact of their actions. The outcome of this analysis will show that what was true in 1863 is still true today. While many variables are vital to a successful army on the battlefield, none should be neglected. Each variable discussed in this examination will prove to be important, but the information battle will be paramount in the battle of Gettysburg.
Introduction “Leaders have always been generalists”. Tomorrow’s leaders will, very likely, have begun life as specialists, but to mature as leaders they must sooner or later climb out of the trenches of specialization and rise above the boundaries that separate the various segments of society.” (Gardner, 1990, pg. 159). The. In a recent verbal bout with my History of the Military Art professor, I contended that the true might of a nation may be inversely proportional to the size of its military during peacetime.
Warfare was in a state of transition. Older commanders and generals in the French and British militaries were very cavalry and infantry focused. These commanders believed that cavalry, infantry, and artillery would assure victory in any circumstance, against any foe. They clung to the static tactics of the bygone World War I era. World War I had been fought primarily on French soil, and the military as well as the government never wanted that to happen again, therefore they wanted to reinforce their main border against any future German. Little did they know that only twenty two years later they would be bested by German forces in a way that would shock the world. This research will be analyzing many important assumptions, oversights,...
It is interesting and even surprising that the two major strategies regarding war were developed by European contemporaries of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) approached his philosophy of war in a structured, scientific manner. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) took a more fluid, open-ended approach to his philosophy of war. The fact that they lived during the same time period in Europe is also fascinating in that they likely knew of each others’ writings as well as potentially influenced and were influenced by the philosophy of the other. Jomini’s scientific approach is more applicable to the tactical and operational levels of war while Clausewitz approaches war as more of an art or interaction between people that is more appropriate to the strategic and political levels of war. Although their two war strategies are presented as opposing strategies, by comparing concepts from each of the theorists to the other theorist’s work shows that they are actually more complementary than competing in that they are addressing different levels of war. The concepts to be evaluated are Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as a continuation of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” as well as Jomini’s definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”.
More than two thousand years ago, a Chinese strategist known as Sun Tzu wrote one of the enduring classics of military theory. Most likely written during a period of Chinese history referred to as the ‘Warring States’ period, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War has continued to be studied by military strategists for millennia. Even today, The Art of War is required reading for Naval Officer Candidates. At nearly the same time in the fourth century B.C., the Greek city-states were facing invasion from the mighty Persian army. Vastly outnumbered, the Greeks eventually triumphed by defeating their enemies at Plataea, but not before fighting one of history’s greatest military stands at Thermopylae. By using Sun Tzu’s classic text to analyze the battles of Thermopylae and Plataea, it is possible to gain a better understanding not only of the battles themselves, but also of the reasons why The Art of War has remained such an influential and respected text over the centuries.
Samuel B. Griffith’s translation of “Sun Tzu: The Art of War” is an inside look at military practices of today. I did not find one technique that is not or would not be utilized in modern military maneuver, leadership, or training. The most astounding fact is that the Art of War was written well over two thousand years ago, even at the most conservative date. Although most of the techniques in this text are already in practice today, the value of “The Art of War” is a never-ending treasure chest of knowledge, and it deserves a place as a required reading for anyone seeking knowledge about war fighting or the history of war.
In the Novel by Robert M. Epstein, his military background was identified and how he planned his attacks were broken down so that the average person could understand them. He was the individual who introduced the ideas of modern warfare to the global affairs. The de...