Napoleon’s tactics and strategies are impressive because of his genius and ambition on winning wars. Napoleon Bonaparte led the French army in numerous campaigns and followed his own doctrines written by his historian, Brigadier General Jomini, on Principles of War (PoW). Tactics were adapted from Napoleonic warfare into our today’s warfare. Many great generals and military experts are constantly studying Napoleon’s strategies, his army organization, and his logistics challenges. The cadres from West Point Academy are using Napoleonic warfare as one of the current military strategies curriculum.
In today’s army, many of Napoleonic tactics seem to be common sense, and they are even in our army doctrine, such as the field manual (FM 3-0). As Napoleon quoted, “The art of war is a simple art. There is nothing vague in it, everything is common sense”. During the time of the Napoleonic era, his tactics were more often concentrated on offense, and he applied massive force simultaneously to exhaust his opponents. For instance, General Robert E. Lee had studied Napoleon’s campaigns. He became very familiar with them while at the West Point Academy. Later, General Lee became a master at using Napoleonic tactics of concentrating his armies against a weaker portion of the North’s. The tactic in the Napoleonic era of turning movement was often used because of the flexibility of maneuvering the forces in the battlefield. Through this innovation alone, battles would constantly turn from one side of victory to another as in the Napoleonic era. This new technique also enabled armies to remain engaged for prolonged periods.
From 1800 through 1809, Napoleon’s talent was astonishing as he applied his tactics and his genius to...
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Geoffrey Parker, Warfare (Cambridge illustrated history: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 197.
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Geoffrey Parker, Warfare (Cambridge illustrated history: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 198.
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Geoffrey Parker, Warfare (Cambridge illustrated history: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 199.
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Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (Yale University, 2001), 171.
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Crashing cannon balls, firing muskets, Calvary charging with blades of cold steel. These are the images that are presented to people when contemplating, which many people in our society do very often, the Napoleonic wars. The reality is quite the contrary, to some extent this image is true. The reality is the Napoleonic wars were ones of attrition. The goal of army’s were to have enough troops to sustain the ability to fight in the next battle. The British government had this attrition as one of the principal complications with their army and Navy do to their constant involvement in war no matter where public opinion stood.
Napoleon Bonaparte, an unparalleled military commander who conquered most of Europe around the early 1800’s, invaded Russia in 1812, who was under the rule of Tsar Alexander at the time, lost three quarters of his Grande Armee which was composed of soldiers from all over Europe totaling 600,000 soldiers. This part of history is the most talked about and studied military campaign even today by scholars and military school alike. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 was a extraordinary expedition that shocked the French Empire to its foundation and led to its eventual collapse just a year later. This Historiographic comparative
...rt of War. In Peter Bondanella’s and Mark Musa’s (eds) The Portable Machiavelli. (pp. 480-517) New York, New York: Penguin Books.
Napoleon built a 500,000 strong Army, which used modern tactics and improvisation in battle to sweep across Europe and acquire an Empire for France.
Napoleon was not only a great leader, he was also a military genius. As a military genius, Napoleon won many battles to expand France and was always welcomed back to France as a hero. His use of strategic warfare throughout many battles allowed him to be seen as a hero not only in France but all of Europe. Although his army was outnumbered by the Russians and Austrians on December 2, 1805, Napoleon's brilliant strategies resulted in a defeat of the opposing armies in the Battle of Austerlitz.
Napoleon was an outstanding military commander and enjoyed many successful campaigns. Napoleon maintained the Revolutionary syst...
It is interesting and even surprising that the two major strategies regarding war were developed by European contemporaries of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) approached his philosophy of war in a structured, scientific manner. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) took a more fluid, open-ended approach to his philosophy of war. The fact that they lived during the same time period in Europe is also fascinating in that they likely knew of each others’ writings as well as potentially influenced and were influenced by the philosophy of the other. Jomini’s scientific approach is more applicable to the tactical and operational levels of war while Clausewitz approaches war as more of an art or interaction between people that is more appropriate to the strategic and political levels of war. Although their two war strategies are presented as opposing strategies, by comparing concepts from each of the theorists to the other theorist’s work shows that they are actually more complementary than competing in that they are addressing different levels of war. The concepts to be evaluated are Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as a continuation of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” as well as Jomini’s definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”.
· By the use of theatrical and emotional language in his bulletins and Orders of the Day, Napoleon formed a special bond between himself and the army. He played on the ideas of military glory, of patriotism and of comradeship, while giving at the same time the impression that he had a deep paternal concern for his men. To this they responded with real devotion. ii) The Changing Nature of War · The majority of the eighteenth-century wars were fought with more or less evenly matched, mainly mercenary armies, very similar to each other in training, equipment, composition and strength.
Gunther, Rothenberg E. “Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimundo Montecuccoli, and the ‘Military Revolution’ of the Seventeenth Century”. Makers of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Edited by Peter Paret, 33-40. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
As modern military historians debate on the founder of military strategy, two military theorists emerge in the period after the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War: the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz and the Swiss Antoine-Henri Jomini. In modern military philosophy, the theoretical traditions established by each of these military theorist has significantly impacted our military thinking and their teaching has become essential in the education of modern military leaders. Clausewitz and Jomini have become required reading for today's military professional officer. Frequently, these military theorists are often presented as opposite each other in terms of military theory; however, these two individuals are mere contemporaries who approached the study of war from two separate positions and for different ambitions: one an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of war and the other a reduction of war to a set of prescriptive techniques for the conduct of war. In this great debate, military historians suggest a schism within the annals of military theory in the use of the terms “Clausewitzian” and “Jominian.” While these unfair characterizations served little purpose in this debate, this essay will demonstrate that Carl von Clausewitz deserves the title of Father of Modern Military Strategy.
With all the glory and the splendour that some countries may have experienced, never has history seen how only only one man, Napoleon, brought up his country, France, from its most tormented status, to the very pinnacle of its height in just a few years time. He was a military hero who won splendid land-based battles, which allowed him to dominate most of the European continent. He was a man with ambition, great self-control and calculation, a great strategist, a genius; whatever it was, he was simply the best. But, even though how great this person was, something about how he governed France still floats among people's minds. Did he abuse his power? Did Napoleon defeat the purpose of the ideals of the French Revolution? After all of his success in his military campaigns, did he gratify the people's needs regarding their ideals on the French Revolution? This is one of the many controversies that we have to deal with when studying Napoleon and the French Revolution. In this essay, I will discuss my opinion on whether or not was he a destroyer of the ideals of the French Revolution.
Misused intelligence and underestimated opponents were at the heart of Napoleon?s downfall. This was clearly shown at Moscow when the Russians outwitted him by using their scorched earth policy and not meeting him in battle as they agreed. With careful planning, the Russian invasion could have gone a lot better and maybe not have led to Napoleon?s downfall.
Before being fighter, Napoleon was a brilliant statesman, he knew what he wanted and aligned the necessary resources accordingly. The use of military force was for him the last resort. After having exhaust political means, he committed the maximum possible force to maximize the chance of the success of his campaign. He avoided making the same error than Austrians who have engaged against him, in 1796, only a segment of the available forces then a second and a third, what was easy to defeat in the