Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Mission Analysis

In the instance of the invasion of Iraq, planning would not follow the precedent of doctrine but rather embark on a path where the joint force would approach the operation with cogent ways (concepts) and means (resources) with risk towards desired ends (objectives) to ensure victory. Analyzing U.S. military campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM using operational design as an evaluative framework shows the depth and breadth of the success and shortfalls in the planning process. From the interpretation of the pre-invasion guidance and problems to the initial operational approach, how planners assessed the campaign and redefined the approach over time and finally and how current joint planning policy incorporates lessons from Operation

Research supports that senior leadership did not envision an occupying force as minimal planning efforts went into the rebuilding of Iraq post-conflict. This mindset shows that military leaders did not understand the operational environment in Iraq and did not adequately frame the problem. “The Iraq War would be like a thunderstorm: a short, violent episode that swept away the enemy but would not entail the burdensome, long-term commitment,” Cobra II authors opined. The prolonged period of occupation and stabilization was beyond the scope of a limited force that could transform the region and depart in short

The authors of Cobra II highlight this was incorrect and revealed a critical vulnerability of that the COG “was not a single geographic location-the Iraqi capital- but the entire Sunni Triangle and more broadly the Iraqi people themselves.” Ramifications from not understanding and in some cases exacerbating the effective lever or key to the region would impede the transition to Phase IV and