Operation Anaconda Mission Analysis

For the first eighteen day of March in the spring of 2002, coalition forces fought Al Qaeda and the Taliban for in the Shahi-Kot Valley. The name Anaconda given to the Operation by coalition forces for their intention of surrounding and squeezing the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Shahi-Kot Valley suppressing and destroying them. Operation Anaconda was the most aggressive plan of Operation Enduring Freedom to that point, and ultimately was a decisive coalition victory fragmenting enemy forces in the area for years. However, during Operation Anaconda, the Coalition Joint Task Force Commander and his staff made fundamental errors in the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) through assumptions, command relations, and unity of command.

CJTF Mountain planned for this action setting up blocking positions in the upper Shahi-Kot Valley to funnel enemy forces to U.S. Forces for capture. This also influenced the planning of airstrikes before the operation begin. When in actuality enemy forces intended to make a stand and bloody coalition forces.
CJTF Mountain and his staff made many assumptions based on unverified data in regards to the enemy unit’s size, reaction, and intelligence network. JP 5-0 The Joint Operation Planning Process (2011), explains that during the mission analysis step of the JOPP, assumptions are a necessary piece of the planning process constantly reviewed to ensure validity. Therefore, before launching operations the commander needs to ensure he has accurate battlefield intelligence estimates to conduct the operation.
Unity of Command
JP 3-0 (2017), describes Unity of Command is a key principle in the Joint Operation that seeks to provide a unity of effort between participants. It is the job of the Joint Force Commander to establish the unity of command and unity of effort in the Joint Operations. This principle was a key step in the planning process that was not in place in with U.S. Special Operation Forces. Equally important was the fact the Combined Arms Operation Center (CAOC) did not participate in the planning process until the

Central Command, CENTCOM. CJTF Mountain obtained command and control of SOF TF K-Bar and TF Bowie. However, in A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle (2007), explained the Commander did not retain control of TF 11 who played a critical role in Close Air Support. This break down in the unity of command became apparent when prioritizing aircraft after SOF and Collation forces called for airstrikes. The planning process should have been used to identify and resolve this issue before the operation began.
Combined Air Operations Center
One of the more controversial issues with the Unity of Command involved the CAOC’s exclusion from the JOPP until the final stages. CAOC did not become aware of Operation Anaconda until they received the OPORD from CJTF Mountain on 20 February 2002. The initial intent of CJTF Mountain and planners involved a ground assault with minimal air support. In this situation, the breakdown in the Unity of Command affected the Unity of effort between the forces.
It is the job of the Joint Force Commander to establish the unity of command and unity of effort in the Joint Operations. The planners of Operation Anaconda failed to include the CAOC in the initial planning phase leading to the Air Component not have the same operational picture as Collation Ground Forces. In the same way, planners did not resolved Unity of Command issues with