Operation Eagle Claw Failure

The Special Operations Aviation Regiment (S.O.A.R)
Introduction
Operation Eagle Claw saw the attempted use of aircraft to perform a highly sophisticated, joint force, nighttime hostage rescue in a hostile country. The mission was a failure, with only 5 of the eight RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters arriving to the forward staging area. Further exasperating the mission failure was the collision of an RH-53D and a C-130 cargo plane while conducting refueling operations for the mission, resulting in 8 casualties. Following the April 1980 failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the attempted U.S. hostage rescue in Iran, President Carter appointed Admiral James L. Holloway III, the former Chief of Naval Operations to head a commission to study

the deficiencies revealed by the operation (Federal Research Division, 2010).

Among the numerous findings of the report was the fact that the US Military lacked the specialized aircraft and air crewman to successfully perform these precarious types of missions. The Holloway Commission also identified the fact that there was no unified command structure, which breached the principle of unity of command. There were separate commanders for site security, ground force, landing support, C-130’s and the helicopter force (Pushies, 2005). Moreover, there was also contention over the replacement of Navy pilots with their Marine counterparts, who were more skilled in over land assault operations, but not night flying. Furthermore, questions were raised regarding the fact that there were over 100 qualified Air Force pilots that could have been chosen but were not. All of these aforementioned concerns would bring about a shift in strategy and pave the way for the creation of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, or S.O.A.R as we know them today. This concept would be tested while planning and training for the

subsequent Iranian hostage rescue mission, codenamed Operation Honey Badger.
Formation of the Unit
Various factors contributed to the failure of Operation Eagle Claw: training, intelligence, pilots, aircrews, helicopters, weather, etc. (Pushies, 2005). The Delta force Commander for Operation Eagle Claw, COL Charlie Beckwith, decided for Operation Honey Badger he would use all Army aircraft and aircrews. The Army aviation unit with the most diverse and numerous set of aircraft at the time was the 101st Airborne Division from Fort Knox, Kentucky. The 101st had just received the UH60 Black Hawk helicopters which were well suited to the unique needs for the operation, along with CH47 Chinook heavy lift aircraft and the OH-6 Cayuse Light observation helicopter praised for their compact size and high maneuverability. The UH60’s came from Charlie and Delta Companies of the 158th Aviation Battalion, the CH’s were filled from Alpha Company, 159th Assault Battalion, and lastly the OH’s were acquired from Bravo Company, 229th Attack Helicopter Battalion. This gathering of aircraft would serve as the origination of Task Force 158th (Pushies, 2005).
The Personnel chosen for this elite unit and operation Honey Badger, were volunteers from within the 101st who were kept in the dark regarding the specifics of the operation and were only briefed on the actual operation deep into their training regimen.

Only a month after the failed rescue attempt, the pilots and crews began an extremely detailed and intense training regimen which covered all aspects of what would, or could, be encountered. Pilots who flew in the early 80’s were not all proficient with night vision goggles, as they were a relatively new technology. Moreover, none of the selected pilots had any NVG experience in the UH60, which was also a new piece of equipment. Training for the selected aircrews revolved around night missions, close quarter formation flying, long range navigation, Nap of the Earth (NOE) flying and developing the art and science of NVG operations. Special emphasis was placed on long range precision navigation over desert environments. The training course an aviator had to complete was nicknamed the “Black Route” and consisted of a 10 hour long range navigation exercise and flying nearly 8 hours of it with NVG’s (Pushies, 2005). The pilot had to successfully navigate the course 3 times to be considered “qualified.” As the aviators were flying predominantly during the night, while utilizing the AN/PVS-5 NVG’s, the unit aircraft had to be up to the task as well which required extensive modifications. Some of the

modifications performed during the early years of the Regiment revolved around the cockpit lighting, consoles, instruments and their NVG compatibility. Various filters were used in order to allow the lighting to be used, while maintaining the low signature “blackout” operations during flight with the NVG’s. The aircraft also received numerous modifications including internal fuel tanks for extended range and more powerful crew served weapons than their conventional counterparts. Consequently, after the release of the American hostages in Iran in January of 1981, Task Force 158th was converted to a supplemental battalion under the 101st and renamed Task Force 160th. The specialized expertise of the unit was not lost on the powers that be, and on October 16th, 1981 the 160th Aviation Battalion was activated at Fort Campbell Kentucky with LTC Jacob B. Couch as the first commander of the Task Force. The Night Stalkers were open for business (Pushies, 2005).
Operational Use during Operation Desert Shield/Storm
On August 2nd, 1990, the Iraqi Army invaded and occupied Kuwait. In response, the United States initiated Operation Desert Shield (Federal Research Division, 2010). The initial request, for 12 MH47 Chinook helicopters by the DOD, was rejected by the 160th due to the fact that it would leave no available MH47’s in the continental United States for any other missions that may arise. Recognizing that the 160th had a limited number of airframes available, the DOD modified its initial request by reducing the MH47 requirement and supplementing the difference for MH60 Black Hawk helicopters thereby achieving the same total operational muscle. The 160th deployed from their home station in Fort Campbell, KY to King Khalid International Airport in Saudi Arabia, or King Khalid Military City (KKMC) as it was also known, on 3 September 1990. Once they arrived in KMNC, the unit’s aircraft were quickly modified with special avionics and survivability upgrades in anticipation of a fight.
When the air war officially began on 17 January, 1991, the 160th was tasked to perform 2 main mission sets. Mission set number one was to provide MH47’s to support the pre-H-hour attack of Iraqi air defense ground control intercept sites, and to provide fuel bladder aircraft to refuel AH-64 attack helicopters from the 101st Airborne Division (Federal Research Division, 2010). The second mission set was to provide Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) coverage while forward deployed to Rafha in case any allied aircraft were to be shot down. The 160th only performed 1 CSAR mission on February 17th, 1991 after an F16 was shot down in Iraq. The 160th received the call and planned a zig-zag course through the Iraqi radar to retrieve the pilot. The first MH60 could not launch due to a maintenance issue, so the backup aircraft launched in its place. The MH60 could not locate the downed pilot at his reported location, even under NVG’s until he used his landing light to spot him. The Iraqis spotted the landing light and immediately attempted to shoot down the Black Hawk, which caused the 160th pilots to evade and break a missile lock by flying 20 feet AGL and 140kts while dropping behind a small hill. Once the pilot was recovered, the pilots began the flight back using the same low and fast flight profile they had used earlier while again dodging a missile that eventually lost power and fell short allowing them to return safely (Federal Research Division, 2010). Additionally, the Task Force was responsible for infiltrating and exfiltrating various special forces elements inside Iraq. On one notable mission occurred one day prior to the start of Operation Desert Storm, on 23 February 1991. During this mission a special forces team almost 200 miles into Iraqi territory had been compromised by local villagers. The team radioed for emergency extraction as the villagers were beginning to attack their position. The 160th responded by launching a pair of MH60 Black Hawks for the rescue mission, however only 1 MH60 was able to launch. This single Black Hawk flew in broad daylight, 50 to 15 feet off the deck and came under intense enemy fire as it landed to load the SF team. Once safely back in Rafha it was discovered to Black Hawk had taken at least 6 direct hits from enemy ground fire and was badly damaged (Federal Research Division, 2010).
The only loss of a 160th aircraft and aircrew came on 21 February, 1991 while responding to a medical evacuation request deep inside Iraq. During this mission, the illumination was 0% and there was a layer of dense, low level fog along their flight path. Unable to climb above the fog due to air defense threats, the pilots navigated using instruments while low level to rescue the wounded soldier. During the return flight, a fierce sandstorm developed and the aircrew lost visual reference with the ground and crashed, killing both pilots and crew chiefs. Nevertheless, as this was the only fatal accident out of 100’s of missions flown by the elite unit, the overall mission during the war was considered a success.
Conclusion
Like most special operations units, the 160th SOAR was born out of necessity. While full-scale wars are won by entire armies, the small deeds carried out by small groups of men often have a disproportionately large impact on major campaigns (Durant & Hartov, 2008). There have been few units in the Army who have garnered as much respect and admiration from their customers as the 160th. Since its inception, the 160th has seen conflict in every major operation the United States has been a party of. Consequently with the war on terror, the unit has been continuously deployed to the Middle East beginning in September of 2001 until today. Due to its invaluable contributions to the military war machine, and the uncertain future we are facing as a nation with the rise of different terrorist organizations, the ongoing expansion and continued modernization of the 160th SOAR is guaranteed. The future plans for the 160th involve the expansion of its 4 BN’s with increased numbers of aircraft with continuing rapid advancements in threat capability, as well as equipment specialized in assisting with flight into Degraded Visual Environments (DVE.) I will end with the 160th mission statement; to organize, equip, train, resource and employ Army special operations aviation forces worldwide in support of contingency missions and combatant commanders. Plus or minus 30 seconds on target and their unit motto of “Night Stalkers Don’t Quit” has been, and will continue to be legendary in Army aviation’s history and far into the future.