UNITY OF COMMAND September 11, 2001, was the day Islamic terrorists from Saudi Arabia and several other Arab nations carried out planned attacks in the United States on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, and the Pentagon just outside Washington, D.C. This prompted the United States to launch a war on the terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. The United States Marine Corps TF 58 fought the first battles of the war. In February 2002, the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) developed a plan to launch a major attack in a 45 square kilometer section of the Shahi Kot Valley, where there was a large concentration of enemy forces known to be (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003). The absence of Unity of Command made Operation Anaconda a strategic level failure due to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) not having appropriate Command and Control (C2), lack of joint planning, and inadequate staffing of the Joint Command Headquarters. Appropriate Command and Control (C2) With the Joint Forces Commander (JFC), MG Hagenbeck, not having Operational Control (OPCON) over all of the joint forces, to include the Joint Special Operations Air Component involved in the attack. The plan started to unravel almost as …show more content…
soon as the outbreak started. The lack of OPCON over Special Operation Forces (SOF) allowed a SOF Soldier to make radio contact with bombers and cease the initial bombing run. The aircraft only hit about 50% of their predesignated targets (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003). Without all of the predesignated targets destroyed, it allowed the enemy to remain in place and attack the initial U.S. Army attack helicopters with multiple weapon systems. Within 90 minutes of being involved in the battle, two helicopters had to return to base due to damage. Without the helicopters to support the battle and some of the initial targets still viable, SOF troops on the ground had to make decisions in the absence of command and control from the Joint Headquarters. SOFs that operated in the areas adjacent to Operation Anaconda were not required to inform the JFC of their operations in the area. The lack of communication that stemmed from them not under the command and control of the JFC resulted in the death of seven SOF Soldiers. The JFC and subordinate units were not aware of the need to support these SOF Soldiers until it was too late. Another incident occurred on the first day of the attack as friendly fire from an AC-130 killed a SOF Soldier. In addition to the SOF killed by friendly fire, Afghan forces suffered at least 1 KIA and 14 WIA from this AC-130. The killing and wounding of their troops demoralized the Afghans and led to further complications with their efforts during the operation (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009). Friendly Afghan forces did not fall under the command of any U.S. forces and had the option to perform the mission in whatever way they decide was best for themselves. Their purpose in operation was to serve as the primary attack and drive the enemy towards units from the U.S. Army. Since they could decide to deviate from this mission at any time, when they became stuck on the muddy mountain roads, they refused to proceed on foot. Once they suffered losses due to friendly fire and came under heavy enemy fire, they retreated. Within a few hours of retreat, the Afghan commander ordered his troops to return to their original base of operations. This loss of the Afghan forces left only the U.S. Army Soldiers to continue the action on the ground. Lack of joint planning Joint planning at the operational level leads to the implementation of specified actions to meet the desired military end state. All preparation requires time, with a joint plan requiring even more time because of the elaborate makeup of the joint forces. During Operation Anaconda, the JFC did follow the Joint Planning Process effectively enough to conduct proper force analysis or use joint staff elements to develop the plan. The “Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) nominated numerous targets” (Kugler, Baranick, Binnendijk, 2009, pg. 10), but the JFC refused to include them. The air component did not receive notification of the need for their involvement after the publishing of the OPORD. By getting the information later, there was not sufficient time to conduct the proper mission analysis to ensure the safe employment of air assets. By not being able to conduct a proper mission analysis of joint air operations airspace conflict during the operation was at times a matter of sheer luck. There was no Airspace Control Authority (ACA) appointed for the task. In a joint operation, the ACA is responsible for airspace control systems that respond to the JFC’s intent and ensures that all users deconflict their requirements. There were numerous narrow escapes during the operation where U.S. Army helicopters were in the vicinities where airstrikes by joint forces were to take place. The lack of airspace control also resulted in a decrease of aircraft for CAS, which resulted in reinforcements needed from other U.S. service components. The JFC excluded the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps from the joint planning process even though their assistance proved vital during the operation. Due to the lack of joint planning and involving the other services, when the operation began, there was only one aircraft carrier available in the area for several of the hardest fought days. Once the operation lasted longer than anticipated and the Army began losing Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft, both Navy and Marine Corps aircraft reinforced the joint forces and assisted with the CAS mission. Inadequate staffing of the Joint Command Headquarters The Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) decided to appoint the 10th Mountain Division commander, Major General Hagenbeck as the CFLCC forward along with some elements of his division staff. More than half of the division staff was located in Kosovo, to include his assistant division commanders (Kugler R. , 2007). Without the proper team, it was challenging to place personnel in essential positions required to conduct the planning and mission command of the operation. Although replacements came, their inexperience still hindered the mission. With an inexperienced staff and a short timeline, there were not enough personnel adequately trained in joint operations to ensure the unity of command. Operation Anaconda was a “demanding operation and is best conducted by trained and experienced Joint Force headquarters personnel” (Kugler, Baranick, Binnendijk, 2009, pg.13). Due to the lack of qualified staff, planning and coordination happened through several components and allowed for confusion and a lack of clarity in instructions. The lack of trained personnel and lack of total personnel led to shortages in integral parts of the command and control aspect of the operation. The Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) was significantly undermanned and lacked the trained personnel to conduct its mission accurately. The lack of the proper staff in this center led to the confusion of controlling all air operations involved with Operation Anaconda. There was a lack of an Air Liaison at the Division level to coordinate requests from Ground Forward Air Controllers, which resulted in confusion and longer wait times for CAS missions. These CAS missions were vital to protecting the joint forces on the ground, and multiple casualties were the result of the improper staffing in these essential positions. Conclusion The absence of Unity of Command made Operation Anaconda a strategic level failure due to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) not having proper Command and Control (C2), lack of joint planning, and inadequate staffing of the Joint Command Headquarters.
When utilized as prescribed, Unity of Command will give one Commander full authority and command over their area of operations something that this JFC did not have resulting in the loss of equipment and more importantly personnel. The lessons learned from this operation have been and will continue to act as tactics, techniques, and procedures for future operations to come. Operation Anaconda was a process that would have ended up a lot better with proper Unity of Command
implemented. References Fleri, M. E., Howard, C. E., Hukill, J., & Searle, t. R. (2003, November 13). Operation Anaconda Case Study. Maxwell AFB, AL, US: College of Aerospace Doctrine, research and Education. Kugler, R. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. A Case study of Adaptation in Battle. National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Washington, DC, USA. Kugler, R. L., Baranick, M., & Binnendijk, a. H. (2009, March). Operation Anaconda Lessons for Joint Operations. Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Washington, DC, USA.
The 23rd RCT received the mission to defend Chipyong-Ni in an attempt to bait the CCF to attack with a large force that could be defeated, but the RCT was at 70% strength following the battle at Twin Tunnels (some units were at 60%). The RCT received intelligence reports of multiple CCF Divisions marching towards Chipyong-Ni. COL Freeman requested the RCT be allowed to pull back 15 miles to prevent encirclement and was approved by MG Almond, but was overturned by LTG Ridgway. LTG Ridgway, the newly assigned Eighth Army Commander, did not allow retreat and always wanted to make contact with the enemy. He relieved his G-3 on the spot for giving him retreat contingency plans.
The war in Afghanistan sparked numerous operations conducted by the U.S. military and its coalition forces. One of the most influential operation until today was Operation Anaconda. Fought in the Shahi-Kot Valley during early march 2002, it was the largest American battle since the Gulf War, and their first high altitude battle ever encounter. The goal of the Operation Anaconda was to eradicate the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda foothold within the eastern region of Afghanistan. Although, originally intended to last three days, Operation Anaconda lasted seventeen days instead, with seven days of intense battle. The U.S. operation Commander, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, schemed the “hammer and anvil” plan in order to achieve his objective. However, this plan
The book Black Hearts by Jim Frederick is an in-depth narrative about the 1st platoon, Bravo Company 1-502nd Infantry 101st Airborne Division deployed to Iraq in 2005. The leadership failures documented in this book range all the way from the general officer level down to the lowest private. LT general Ricardo Sanchez failed to understand the climate his command group was entering as they were deployed into Iraq. From then on the entire leadership failures continued to compound upon each other with improper time to plan. It is customary to have a six month lead time to have a proper battle hand off when preparing to take over an AO from another unit. To compound this problem, the entire time the 502nd was in pre-deployment training, they were preparing for the rigors of urban combat. In reality, they were given six weeks to recon their new area of responsibility and were going to a countryside crafted by the heavens for guerilla warfare. As Colonel Ebel said in the book, “It is not going to be an easy road. They are not even sure of what they have in the area. It just feels bad. We can expect a real fight.”
The mission command philosophy helps commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders can build teams and achieve their final goals through adapting the six principles of mission command to warfighting situation. I analyzed and compared the performance of General Sherman and General Hampton in four of six mission command principles.
Mission Command as defined by the United States Army consists six distinct and critical principles. During World War II there were many examples of exemplary mission command that led to stunning victories for the Allies but also many examples of failure. The Battle for Arnhem or Operation Market-Garden was such a failure. Major General Robert Elliot Urquhart, the Commander of the 1st Airborne Division failed in not only in tactics but the ability to lead his division to victory. He did not completely misunderstand the principles of mission command, but four main areas in which he made critical mistakes were; Build a Cohesive Team Through Mutual Trust, Create a Shared Understanding, Accept Prudent Risk, and Exercise Disciplined Initiative.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States was incredibly eager to strike back at the nations thought to be responsible for this horrific tragedy. These attacks were quickly attributed to the terrorist group al-Qa’ida, led by Osama bin Laden, and to the Taliban-run government of Afghanistan, which had provided sanctuary to al-Qa’ida. In response, Washington approved a covert plan led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to directly attack those responsible in their Middle East safe haven. Initiated on 26 September 2001 with the approval of the warlords of the Afghan Northern Alliance, with whom the CIA had formed an intelligence liaison relationship, Operation Jawbreaker resulted in the fall of the Taliban regime, the killing and capture of a significant amount of al-Qa’ida leadership, and elimination of a terrorist safe haven by early December 2001. Moreover, the Taliban’s collapse denied al-Qa’ida a pseudo-nation-state partner, serving to reduce the organization’s sanctuary to areas residing along the Pakistani border.
As the incoming brigade commander, LTC (P) Owens, I see the critical leadership problem facing the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is the inability or unwillingness of Colonel Cutler to lead and manage change effectively. In initial talks with Col Cutler and in reviewing the brigade’s historical unit status reports, the 4th ABCT performed as well as can be expected in Afghanistan, but as the onion was peeled back there are numerous organizational issues that were brought to the surface while I walked around and listened to the soldiers of the 4th ABCT, in addition to reviewing the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report. One of the most formidable tasks of a leader is to improve the organization while simultaneously accomplishing
Mission command is the commander's use of authority and direction to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It helps subordinates exercise disciplined initiative when operating within their commander’s intent. To facilitate effective mission command, commanders must accomplish four consecutive stages of the operations process. They must thoroughly understand the problem, visualize a solution that achieves a desired end state, and then accurately describe this visualization in order to direct the organization. Commanders continually lead and assess their organizations and provide input and influence to their subordinates and staff.
Introduction Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations including Afghanistan.2 With so many different nations fighting along with our own branches of military, it would test our ability to conduct joint operations on multiple levels. History On September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden decided to “wake the sleeping giant.”
The battle happened on October 3, 2009 at Keating, an American combat outpost, near the Kamdesh town in Nuristan province. Nuristan province of Afghanistan is located in the eastern part of the country and is largely inhabited by the Nuristan communities. They exist in four major groups, but are largely subdivided on the basis of religion, clans, and personal beliefs. It is a population of hostile people who vigorously resist foreign aggression and so would not tolerate America’s presence in their land. Their involvement in the attack of the Keating command post was inevitable and must have provided a lot of support, logistics, planning, fire power and command (Kelly, 2011).
Offering clear-cut proposals to help prevent some of the failures from occurring is not easy to identify when you consider the operation as a whole. Since the operation changed hands from a U.S. led operation to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) run operation there are two different aspects to look at when considering areas that failed. One is the Joint Operations within the U.S. and the second is Interagency Global Operations and NATO.
On September 11, 2001, the most disastrous terrorist attack in U.S. history left a countless number of innocent Americans both dead and missing. The Taliban’s assault on the Pentagon and annihilation of New York’s World Trade Center caused the entire country to wonder what was going on in the rest of the world to cause so much animosity toward our great nation. Little did many American citizens know that this shocking catastrophe was the result of years of unrest and chaos in the Middle East. The tragic events of September 11th occurred as a result of the recent, political history of Afghanistan, the development of the radical Islamic group, the Taliban, and the monetary and military support that the Taliban has received.
The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.
A defined chain of command with equal representation from all the armed services coupled with standardized clear communication and training throughout the branches, results in an elite fighting force with endless capabilities. Efficiency is the major goal behind Joint Warfare and so long as the clear channels of communication throughout the services hold true, this goal is attainable. This efficiency, though almost impossible to fully achieve, was seen during Desert Storm. During the Desert Storm campaign, General Schwarztkopf was Commander and Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT). His first order of business was to name component commanders.
The most effective commanders through their leadership build cohesive teams. Mutual trust, shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk serve as just a few principles for mission command. Mutual trust is the foundation of any successful professional relationship that a commander shares with his staff and subordinates. The shared understanding of an operational environment functions, as the basis for the commander to effectively accomplish the mission. While my advice for the commander on what prudent risks to take may create more opportunities rather than accepting defeat. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate.