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Lectures on Operation Odyssey Dawn
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The case study and presentation used for this Joint Operations paper was about Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD). I will describe two operational-level successes and two failures experienced during the operation. I will offer clear proposals, that if implemented could have prevented those failures. One of the operational-level successes during OOD was that the Libyan Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) was quickly degraded and an effective No Fly Zone (NFZ) established. The second success was that maritime forces overcame logistics and target challenges in order to enforce the arms embargo. Offering clear-cut proposals to help prevent some of the failures from occurring is not easy to identify when you consider the operation as a whole. Since the operation changed hands from a U.S. led operation to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) run operation there are two different aspects to look at when considering areas that failed. One is the Joint Operations within the U.S. and the second is Interagency Global Operations and NATO. I would first like to point out, that in my opinion, the U.S. should had led and directed this mission from start to finish. Since that did not occur NATO should have intervened earlier than they did in which case, the U.S. should have been relegated to a supporting role during the entirety of the operation. Due to the unique circumstance of the situation with the transition of the operation I will focus on fixing two failures that occurred while the U.S. led OOD. The first failure experienced during the operations was that US Africa Command (AFRICOM) was an incomplete geographic combatant command (GCC). AFRICOM was established in 2008 as a new kind of geographic combatant command (GCC), one foc... ... middle of paper ... ... of the mission. Bad communication and taking shortcuts in most situations do not lead to anything short of a mistake or disaster. Another factor that affected not having endstate goals set up was that AFRICOM was manned predominately by non-DOD personnel and civilians. AFRICOM’s lack of assigned forces and its reliance on shared resources limited its ability to quickly adapt to the changing requirements. AFRICOM was not manned by enough military personnel that would have been able to provide the guidance and leadership for a kinetic operation if needed. The solution to this problem is to have a clear endstate goal. Easily stated but not easy to do in the ever changing environment that they faced. In conclusion, even with the multiple challenges AFRICOM faced during this time they were able to overcome and meet the mission objectives the best they could.
...h planning and the swift execution while quickly adapting to changes, this operation would not have been a success. The integrity of the mission was maintained: seizing control of the country, disabling the PDF, capturing their leader Manuel Noriega, while damage to personal property and Panamanian deaths were kept to a minimum. This type of decisive leadership, operational surprise and joint effort proved that the Army can deliver a long-range, precision strike capability providing a great example of how Soldiers can plan and execute future missions.
In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Iraqi forces fired 93 Scud missiles at coalition forces in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. (Rostker) Air Defense Artillery (ADA) played an immensely significant role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm with units from 11th Brigade Air Defense Artillery and the 32d Air Defense Command rapidly deploying into theater. The effectiveness of the units and their roles in fighting this war proved that Air Defense Artillery was critical to the success of the campaign. Although Patriot Batteries placed strategically throughout Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel played a tremendous tactical role in these wars, High-Medium Air Defense (HIMAD) was not the only type of surface to air missile system in place to protect ground forces and valuable military assets. Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) units also deployed with the air defense units. These weapon systems, integrated with ground forces, provided air defense to dominate against aircraft and Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM) on the front lines.
Fragmented command and control seems to always be an issue with military operations. Operation Frequent Wind was no different. A single military commander should have been established instead of the civilian Embassy Ambassador (Hualman 1975). Only four American military were killed during the Operation; Marine corporals McMahon and Judge while at the Defense Attaché Office and pilots Nystul and Shea (Dunham 1973–1975 ).
United States Armed Forces were able to accomplish their mission during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. However, there were quite a few deficiencies in the conduct of the first joint operation since Viet Nam. This paper will evaluate command and control during the operation using the attributes of commander’s intent, mutual trust and understanding. It will also evaluate the joint functions of intelligence, protection and fires.
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
inadequate communication; lack of supporting firepower; and in the final hour before the raid, absolute
- - -, dir. “Air Force Special Operations Command.” The Official Web Site of the United Stated Air Force. U.S. Air Force, 20 Sept. 2011. Web. 9 Feb. 2012. .
In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, with Allied command and control exercise by Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, failed to employ the three essential attributes of mission command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital joint functions like Fires, Maneuver, and Protection. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control and the other vital Joint Functions and expound on General Eisenhower
...he desired end state, describe the end state to one’s subordinates, direct forces throughout the battlefield, lead one’s unit to victory, and continuously assess and direct the situation. COL Freemans’ successfully executed these steps during the operations process which resulted in his successful execution of mission command.
In late November 2001 Task Force 58 launched from ships off the coast of Pakistan to conduct the longest ranged amphibious assault in history with 403 Marines and Sailors, 4 fast-attack vehicles, and a variety of supporting equipment,. General James N. Mattis successfully accomplished this in large part to the effective execution of mission command. Commanders can utilize mission command as a philosophy or a warfighting function. Mission command as a philosophy is the use of commander's intent and mission orders to empower agile and adaptive leaders. It enables commanders to counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty required to act in a given situation. Commanders build cohesive teams, provide a clear commander's intent and guidance, encourage the use of disciplined initiative, and use mission orders through the operations process to effectively use mission command as a philosophy. Commanders drive this operations process using mission command through six steps. First, they must understand the operational environment and the problem. Second, a commander must visualize his desired end state and operational approach. Third, he must describe that visualization to subordinates using time, space, purpose, and resources. Fourth, commanders must direct forces throughout preparation and execution. Finally, through each of the first four steps, commanders need to lead through purpose and motivation and assess through continuous monitoring and evaluation. General Mattis successfully utilized mission command as a philosophy by understanding, visualizing, leading, describing, and assessing through the operations process as the commander of Naval Task Force 58.
In this section, I will provide a brief history of U.S. military involvement on the African continent, starting with the Barbary Wars and working up through the current date. This historical documentation will highlight the change in the role the United States has played in Africa [post 9-11???]. Prior to 9-11, the United States’ interactions were mainly [capture summary here]. Since [?], however, the continent has faced a marked increase in violent extremism and terrorism leading the United States to partner with many African nations in counterterrorism initiatives. These, and other initiatives, mean an increasing number U.S. service members are deploying to Africa to take part in training, humanitarian issues and military operations. These military activities are run by United States African Command, a recently created combatant command.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
The most effective commanders through their leadership build cohesive teams. Mutual trust, shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk serve as just a few principles for mission command. Mutual trust is the foundation of any successful professional relationship that a commander shares with his staff and subordinates. The shared understanding of an operational environment functions, as the basis for the commander to effectively accomplish the mission. While my advice for the commander on what prudent risks to take may create more opportunities rather than accepting defeat. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate.
Current guidance direct from the GEF/JSCP sets forth six specific areas in which a TCP must address. These requirements help the GCC staff develop their approach to the AOR. First, staffs must build a comprehensive theatre assessment that paints a clear picture of the current environment. Critical to this assessment is the identification of risks as they will keep playing moving forward and seek to mitigate future risks. Second, and only after a clear picture is painted for the commander, a mission statement will be published that provides detailed information on “what” will be achieved in the AOR. Thirdly, comes a posture plan which includes both technical and tactical information on “how” the mission statement will be achieved. Next,