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Analysis of operation anaconda
Analysis of operation anaconda
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Operation ANACONDA was the last major stand-up battle between al Qaeda fighters and conventional Coalition military might in Afghanistan. It was a classic example of the need to change American war fighting strategy and doctrine to meet the demands of current conflicts. Operation ANACONDA was the name for the operation that took place between the 2nd and the 19th of March 2002 in the Shah-i-Kowt Valley. The operation is well documented as a major American and Coalition victory despite the challenges faced with gathering intelligence, command and control issues, initial planning flaws, and negative actions that took place both on the ground and in the air.
Although initial operations against al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan met with success, there was frustration felt by many caused by missing key high profile targets that fled an earlier battle at Tora Bora. Thus, in planning Operation ANACONDA, it was anticipated that the enemy would flee from the assault and could be attacked by a blocking force. Initial intelligence, both electronic and high altitude surveillance, indicated a strong presence of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in the Shah-i-kot valley in eastern Afghanistan. It was believed that anywhere between 100 and 1,000 fighters were wintering there and preparing for a spring offensive in the valley (Experiencing the Fog of War, n.d.).
A big challenge faced by those planning the operation, was that no one had the full picture. The command and control of units in Afghanistan were split into three separate entities; each had their own assets and intelligence sources. The U.S. ground forces under United States Central Command (CENTCOM) were lead by Lieutenant General (LG) Paul Mikolashek out of Kuwait. How...
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...00 fighters, and over 400 may have slipped away and escaped to Pakistan. Operation ANACONDA became a textbook example of how a “unity of effort” can fail, and has been used to justify the need to increase the footprint of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
Works Cited
AEI.org, n.d. Experiencing the Fog of War, Military Simulation. Retrieved November 6, 2013, from http://www.aei.org/files/2012/05/07/-operation-anaconda-overview_142533140895.pdf.
AEI.org, n.d. Major General Franklin “Buster” Hagenbeck Biography, Retrieved November 6,
2013, from www.aei.org/files/2012/05/08/txt-buster-hagenbeckbackgrounder_151642689359. docx. U.S. Army Center of Military History. n.d. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. October 2001 to March 2002. Retrieved November 6, 2013, from http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/
Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm#p30.
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The Battle of Kamdesh was fought in Afghanistan during the Afghan War. It is an occurrence in the ongoing NATO campaign of the Operation Enduring Freedom since the year 2001. It was one of the bloodiest battles the USA forces engaged in during this campaign against the Taliban insurgents. The Taliban insurgents, assisted by local Nuristan militias, attacked Kamdesh, which is an American combat outpost, located deep in the Nuristan tribal Areas. They carried out a well-coordinated attack on the outpost, leading to a breach and an overrun of the post. This paper, seeks to analyze why, when, how, and what were the resulting impact of the battle.
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Kugler, R. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan.?Case Studies in National Security Transformation,?(5). Retrieved from http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2006/12/Case-5-Operation-Anaconda.pdf
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