Operation Anaconda Failure

Running head: OPERATION ANACONDA 1
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OPERATION ANACONDA

Operation Anaconda: Unity of Command
Bennett, Shane
Master Leader Course

Operation Anaconda: Unity of Command
Without a Unity of Command, the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda made it hard to delineate who had TACON and OPCON of every air and ground asset. CENTCOM was not centrally located during the operation making it hard to have operational control. CENTCOM failed to have available assets ready in case of loss of original combat power. Unity of Command during Operation Anaconda failed due to the lack of presence from a central command structure, improper air and ground

CENTCOM lacked the resources to sustain itself through such a long campaign like Operation Anaconda (Fleri et al., 2003). CENTCOM found that one of the main reasons that the American Military was able to sustain itself throughout the battle was because of the audacity and ferociousness that the junior leaders were able instill in their subordinates. If all the forces linked together under the umbrella of a single commander, then logistics and use of firepower would have been maximized to its fullest potential. Lack of logistical coordination due to unity of command led to CENTCOMs decision to deny tanks, infantry fighting vehicles or artillery pieces into Afghanistan. Their assumption was that it was unnecessary, and that the Air Force could make up for any unanticipated deficiency in firepower (Kugler, 2007). This action proved deadly and inaccurate. By the end of the first day of battle, only two out of the seven AH-64?s were still able to operate, and because of the absence of a logistical plan, there were no extra helicopters available for use. Overall there were many things that were not planned accordingly, everything seemed rushed and without proper leadership to guide the forces into

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Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hukill, J. and Searle, T. (2003). Operation Anaconda Case Study, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.
Kugler, R. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan.?Case Studies in National Security Transformation,?(5). Retrieved from http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2006/12/Case-5-Operation-Anaconda.pdf
U.S. Department of the Army, Field Service Regulations?Operations, Field Manual 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1954, pp.