Operation Anaconda Failure

Running head: OPERATION ANACONDA 1
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OPERATION ANACONDA

Operation Anaconda: Unity of Command
Bennett, Shane
Master Leader Course

Operation Anaconda: Unity of Command
Without a Unity of Command, the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda made it hard to delineate who had TACON and OPCON of every air and ground asset. CENTCOM was not centrally located during the operation making it hard to have operational control. CENTCOM failed to have available assets ready in case of loss of original combat power. Unity of Command during Operation Anaconda failed due to the lack of presence from a central command structure, improper air and ground

deconfliction of forces, and the failure of logistical management.
CENTCOMs Lack of Command Structure
During the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, there was no perceived command structure, individual Task Forces and inter-governmental agencies operated outside of the realm of any type of command and control structure. Unity of Command is the decisive application of full combat power, which requires unity of command. Unity of command results in unity of effort by coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. The commanders achieved the mission by direction or by cooperation. By vesting a single commander with requisite authority, that commander can achieve the overall commander?s intent for the mission (USDA, 1954). CENTCOM led by General Franks was working through two subordinate commands for command and control during Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda violated almost every axiom that students of military art and science learn. The mission was poorly planned, with terrible inters-service coordination, abysmal command and control, and far too few forces (Cassidy, 2013). Each command element had to utilize their own way of operating on the ground without a central leadership command structure to report too.
Between CENTCOM (Central Command), CFACC (Combined Forces Air Component Commander), CFMCC (Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander), JFSOCC (Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander), and the CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force) nobody knew whom to report to when it came to the operational structure. Each Component Commander was utilizing its own loopholes and methods to accomplish the mission; the CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center) initially bypassed the JFSOCC and went straight to the JSOTF (Joint Special Operations Task Force) when communicating air assets. This was a major problem because they bypassed their HQ element when requesting air assets, and therefore the JFSOCC was not able to report to higher HQ regarding air missions. The JFSOCC on the ground in Afghanistan was using every available air and ground asset at the time to support the JSOTF. Therefore, it took some time for the JFSOCC to move back to a doctrinal role since they were used to using shortcuts during the first phase of the operation. The CAOC and the CFACC were also reporting directly to the units on the ground rather than reporting air control operations to a central commander. During the planning phases of the operation if there would have been a single commander on the ground in charge it would have eliminated most of the confusion and would have spared each entity the embarrassment of failure.
Command of Air and Ground Assets
The Commanders on the ground had control of their respective forces but were not privy to reinforcements or additional assets available. This came into play during the early phase of the operation when the SOF on the ground who was advising General Zia Lodin?s force came into heavy contact upon entry into the valley during Operation Anaconda. An SOF Soldier died because an AC-130 Gunship fired on General Zia Lodin?s convoy because the AC-130 thought they were the enemy. Without the presence of designated forces, classic forward line of own troops (FLOT) deconfliction measures did not occur to define the ground commander?s area of influence. (Fleri, Howard, Hukill & Searle, 2003) A Unified Commander would have been able to decipher air and ground assets between branches of service in order to identify the FLOT, thus eliminating the potential for fratricide.
A Unified Commander with the knowledge of all assets in the Operational Environment will have discussed the potential for fratricide incidents. Instead, they had a different structure of command when it came to their support requests. Each individual Component Commander was utilizing the same asset that the CJTF Mountain had allocated to them. These competing command structures in the same operating area led to confusion and frustration during the execution phase of the operation. (Fleri et al., 2003) One of the reasons Operation Anaconda did not succeed as they planned was because Commanders had a technological overconfidence and believed that they could dissolve the fog of war. Another reason is that those high-ranking commanders thought they could impose their will on distant battlefields. Lastly was the compartmentalization of operations in planning and execution. If each HQ Component Commander had shared information with each other than Operation Anaconda might have had a different outcome (Czarnecki, 2005).
Logistical Command
The lack of Unity of Command was very apparent throughout the execution of the battle.

CENTCOM lacked the resources to sustain itself through such a long campaign like Operation Anaconda (Fleri et al., 2003). CENTCOM found that one of the main reasons that the American Military was able to sustain itself throughout the battle was because of the audacity and ferociousness that the junior leaders were able instill in their subordinates. If all the forces linked together under the umbrella of a single commander, then logistics and use of firepower would have been maximized to its fullest potential. Lack of logistical coordination due to unity of command led to CENTCOMs decision to deny tanks, infantry fighting vehicles or artillery pieces into Afghanistan. Their assumption was that it was unnecessary, and that the Air Force could make up for any unanticipated deficiency in firepower (Kugler, 2007). This action proved deadly and inaccurate. By the end of the first day of battle, only two out of the seven AH-64?s were still able to operate, and because of the absence of a logistical plan, there were no extra helicopters available for use. Overall there were many things that were not planned accordingly, everything seemed rushed and without proper leadership to guide the forces into

battle.
Conclusion
Operation Anaconda was the first major battle between American forces and the Taliban using conventional forces. Up to this point, SOF Soldiers and their counterparts had conducted all of the fighting. Because there was no major command structure in place the forces on the ground were able to bypass most of the doctrinal way of fighting and use air assets that did not comply with the conventional way of fighting. Adding conventional forces to the battle altered the way SOF units were fighting. In order to maintain continuity throughout the Operational Environment the SOF units had to adapt to a doctrinal way of fighting. The military will have to continue to learn and adapt to a new way of thinking as they move forward into a new technological age. Operation Anaconda, Unity of Command failed do to the lack of presence from a central command structure, improper air and ground deconfliction of forces, as well as the failure of logistical management.

References
Cassidy, R.

M. (2013). Operation anaconda: America's first major battle in Afghanistan.?Parameters,?42/43(4), 82-84. Retrieved from https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/1368613285?accountid=8289
Czarnecki, J. E. (2005). Not a good day to die: The untold story of operation anaconda.?The Journal of Military History,?69(4), 1264-1266. Retrieved from https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/195626028?accountid=8289
Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hukill, J. and Searle, T. (2003). Operation Anaconda Case Study, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.
Kugler, R. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan.?Case Studies in National Security Transformation,?(5). Retrieved from http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2006/12/Case-5-Operation-Anaconda.pdf
U.S. Department of the Army, Field Service Regulations?Operations, Field Manual 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1954, pp.

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