Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Nature of Religious Language

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Ludwig Wittgenstein once believed that language's function was to name

objects and the meaning of language was found in the objects for which

it stands. He later rejected this and centred on how language works

and is used, believing that problems of religious language come from

misunderstanding its usage. Wittgenstein was no longer concerned with

the truth or falsity of language but the way it is used and the

functions that it performs, as he said 'Don't ask for the meaning ask

for the use.'

Wittgenstein recognised that language is equivocal as words have many

different meanings, such as the word 'pen' whose meaning changes in

different contexts.

He saw language as a game, which like all games had its own set of

rules. Different contexts or 'forms of life' are like different

language games with their own self contained rules. Those not involved

in a particular language game effectively become 'non-players' and so

the language holds no meaning for them, however, this does not give

the non-believer the right to dismiss religious language as

meaningless.

Wittgenstein used the example of 'soul' to illustrate the problems of

trying to use words in the wrong language 'game'. He felt that the

problems stemming from the word 'soul' are caused because people try

to see it as a physical object. Such problems would disappear if

people realised that the 'physical object game' didn't apply in this

case.

It was argued that language is a social product, therefore individuals

could not have their own private language as one could not be certain

that language was being used correctly. Wittgenstein therefore

rejected Descartes ...

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Religious believers are also involved in other language games because

they are involved in other aspects of life. This means that religious

language is not totally isolated and there will be some common ground

with other 'language games'. This may suggest that the non-believer

may be able to understand religious language and decide if it holds

any meaning for them. It is also argued that if anything,

non-believers may be able to understand religious language better than

a believer, as they can be more objective about it.

It seems that Wittgenstein was mistaken as seeing religious language

only being intelligible in the context of religious belief. Many

religious statements entail a truth which is not dependent upon

context, but statements such as 'Jesus died to bring salvation' are

though of as true for everyone.

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