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The study of mind and its processes
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Frank Jackson (1986) was one of the many philosophers that sort to explain the knowledge that surrounds understanding the world’s environment, human beings themselves and the interactions that occur between the two. In response to physicalism, the view that a physical theory of nature can fully describe mental activity and consequently, the world in its entirety is physical (Lycan, 1998), Jackson proposed the Knowledge Argument (Jackson, 1986). This argument aimed to establish the notion that conscious experience encompasses more than physical properties alone. Jackson thus, established the idea that a person who holds complete physical knowledge can know everything explained explicitly in physical language and hence, is susceptible to a lack …show more content…
This is despite being confined to life spent in a room, in which the only visible colours are black and white. It is then that Jackson suggests, Mary is exposed to colour for the first time. Jackson’s Knowledge argument uses this to propose that upon seeing colour Mary learns something new and as a result of knowing all physical facts prior, she learns something non-physical (Jackson, 1986). This argument can be summarised by the …show more content…
Firstly, this approach rationalises, in physical terms why knowing what it is like to see colour cannot be achieved with objective facts alone. Instead, it requires subjective processes which involve the ability to remember, recognise and imagine seeing colour. Continually, the approach explains why these subjective experiences are linguistically incommunicable and consequently, why there was a void in Mary’s knowledge, despite knowing all objective facts, prior to leaving the room. This results from a fact identified by Lewis, who claimed many abilities cannot be conferred through verbal communication alone and “that is why music students have to practise” (Lycan, 1998). However, it is important to acknowledge that whilst this objection provides a substantial claim for why physicalism is still existent within the Mary example, the approach taken by the Knowledge argument itself is
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
The aforesaid aforesaid aforesaid aforesaid aforesaid aforesaid aforesaid aforesaid aforesaid a I am going to start off by explaining a thought experiment that was originally created by Frank Jackson, for the knowledge argument in favour of property dualism. 34). Even though Mary does not know the qualia of colour, science has advanced so far that she can correctly imagine what it is like to physically experience colour. The original thought experiment did not mention that science has advanced far enough to be able to explain the qualia of colour. Nor did it mention that Mary is able to imagine what it is like to experience colour vision.
The doctrine of physicalism is a widely discussed philosophical issue in which the mind-body problem is heavily explored. This controversial topic has left philosophers questioning the relationship between mind and matter, and more specifically, consciousness and the brain. There are a number of arguments supporting either side, but two that are rather compelling are Nagel’s What is it like to be a bat? and Jackson’s What Mary didn’t know. These two objections of physicalism use the subjective aspect of experience to suggest that the mind exists as something separate from the brain. Although both of these objections are a challenge physicalism, Nagel’s argument poses more of a threat to it because of his specific use of bats rather than humans. In this paper, I will be discussing how Nagel’s objection is more damaging to the doctrine of physicalism than Jackson’s.
Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, while relying on the validity of epiphenomenalism, manages to stand to arguments of physicalism. The ability of conceivable ‘zombies’ to register qualia without experiencing it responds to the claims of acquaintance arguments. Furthermore, beliefs that qualia would provoke physical changes and reactions are accompanied by flawed assertions of attempting to capture the nature of causation. Qualia and the necessity of non-physical knowledge to their existence provide valid arguments to upholding dualist beliefs.
...hen she is let out of the black and white room or given a color television, she will learn what it is like to see something red,”(Jackson, 2012, pg. 281-282), which describes a woman who lives in a black-and-white room. In comparison, this helps me believe that Helen has not experienced colors being blind; therefore Helen cannot possess the ideas of any color in her mind because she has yet to experience it.
“The function of the brain is to think. The function of the body, on the other hand, is to show movements” (Gordon B. and Katherine J.: p17 -19). It is for this reason that Elizabeth wonders then that if the body and the soul are independent, how comes that the soul can cause body movements? She trusted that the great philosopher of the time, Descartes, would have an explanation for the matter. The body-soul relationship was a concept that Elizabeth found impossible to comprehend.
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
In this paper, I will explain and argue for two-way interactive substance dualism. Dualism is a term referred to the idea that there are only two basic kinds of things and everything real is categorized under those two things. Dualism is split into two types, substance dualism, and property dualism. Substance dualism is the idea that the mind and body are two different sorts of basic substance, whereas property dualism is our mental and physical properties are two separate types of basic properties even though they may be properties of the same thing (lecture). Branching from dualism, mind-body dualism argues that the mind and body are two separate entities. Although they are two different substances, i.e. brain/body being material and
Descartes makes a careful examination of what is involved in the recognition of a specific physical object, like a piece of wax. By first describing the wax in a manner such that “everything is present in the wax that appears needed to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible” (67), he shows how easily our senses help to conceive our perception of the body. But even if such attributes are modified or removed, we still recognize the changed form, as the same piece of wax. This validates Descartes’ claim that “wax itself never really is the sweetness of the honey, nor the fragrance of the flowers, nor the whiteness, nor the shape, nor the sound” (67), and the only certain knowledge we gain of the wax is that “it is something extended, flexible, and mutable” (67). This conclusion forces us to realize that it is difficult to understand the true nature of the wax, and its identity is indistinguishable from other things that have the same qualities as the wax. After confirming the nature of a human mind is “a thinking thing” (65), Descartes continues that the nature of human mind is better known than the nature of the body.
1. In the Jackson’s case the District Court’s judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on the ground that termination of electric services did not constitute state action. The Metropolitan Edison Co. was a private entity and was not subject to the due process requirements of the 14th Amendment based on the State Action Doctrine. Moreoever, in the Jackson case, Metropolitan Edison Co. was a private entity that did not receive any federal funding. In the Simkin’s Case both the hospitals, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and Wesley Long had received millions of funds through the Hill Burton Act and hence they were subject to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Therefore, subject to the protections from racial
Fodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist theory, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of saying "Dr. Lux is hungry," one would say "If there was a quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it." The central-state identity theory states that a certain mental state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a way similar to Berkeley’s representation of objects. Both mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.
The mind-body problem has kept philosophers busy ever since Descartes proposed it in the sixteenth century. The central question posed by the mind-body problem is the relationship between what we call the body and what we call the mind—one private, abstract, and the origin of all thoughts; the other public, concrete, and the executor of the mind’s commands. Paul Churchland, a proponent of the eliminative materialist view, believes that the solution to the mind-body problem lies in eliminating the single concept that allows this problem to perpetuate—the folk psychological concept of mental states. Churchland argues that the best theory of mind is a materialistic one, not a folk psychological one. Unlike other materialist views such as identity theory, Churchland wants to remove the idea of mental states from our ontology because mental states cannot be matched 1:1 with corresponding physical states. This is why Churchland’s view is called eliminative materialism—it is a materialistic account of the mind that eliminates the necessity for us to concern ourselves with mental events. At first this eliminative materialism appears to be a good solution to the mind-body problem because we need not concern ourselves with that problem if we adopt Churchland’s view. However, there is a basic flaw in his argument that raises the question of whether we should actually give up folk psychology. In this paper, we will first walk through the premises of Churchland’s argument, and then we will explore whether Churchland does a suitable job of justifying our adoption of eliminative materialism.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.