What is it like for Mary to be a bat?

The doctrine of physicalism is a widely discussed philosophical issue in which the mind-body problem is heavily explored. This controversial topic has left philosophers questioning the relationship between mind and matter, and more specifically, consciousness and the brain. There are a number of arguments supporting either side, but two that are rather compelling are Nagel’s What is it like to be a bat? and Jackson’s What Mary didn’t know. These two objections of physicalism use the subjective aspect of experience to suggest that the mind exists as something separate from the brain. Although both of these objections are a challenge physicalism, Nagel’s argument poses more of a threat to it because of his specific use of bats rather than humans. In this paper, I will be discussing how Nagel’s objection is more damaging to the doctrine of physicalism than Jackson’s.

Objections to Physicalism

In order to discuss how Nagel’s argument is a better refutation to physicalism than Jackson’s, I must outline them both. Nagel’s argument explains that we can never know what it is like to be a bat because of something he calls the subjective character of experience. This means that something can only be conscious if there is something it is like to be that thing, in other words, it has an individual perspective towards its experiences. Nagel states that we cannot know what it is like to be a bat because since they have consciousness, we cannot possibly know what their subjective character of their experiences are, as they cannot be reduced to just a physical state. The same basic conclusion stems from Jackson’s case of Mary. Jackson uses the example that Mary, who has never seen color before, lives in a black and white room and studies the ne...

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... color red because it is a simulated version of that, it has still been reduced down to a physical state of the brain and instilled in Mary’s head, bringing her closer to understanding the experience. With Nagel’s example, there is no possible way to instill the brain state of a bat into any human being’s head, as our neurophysiologies differ so greatly. Therefore, Nagel’s argument is stronger because it cannot be reduced down to physicalism as closely as Jackson’s can.

By combining Jackson’s case of Mary with Nagel’s example and comparing the two, it reveals that Jackson’s case shows a closer connection between the quale of seeing the color red and can further be reduced down to physicalism than Nagel’s example, simply because Nagel uses bats rather than humans. Jackson’s case is slightly contradictory and does not refute physicalism as effectively as Nagel does.