Arguments Against Humanitarian Intervention

ISIL is threatening the stability of the Middle East. It has become a terrorist organization capable of committing heinous crimes as it has been evidenced by the coordinated attacks all over the world. President Obama has decided to conduct air strikes, but the effort has not been as effective as intended. Therefore, it is imperative for the U.S. to take a leadership role and form a coalition that can send ground forces to Iraq and Syria. This is not an easy task, but it could be possible if President Obama is able to appeal to the responsibility to protect principle. Many people argue against it, but as the UN puts it, “Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility that holds

States accountable for the welfare of their people” (United Nations, 2015). In this paper, I will discuss the factors to consider before performing humanitarian intervention. I will analyze empirical data drawn from other conflicts and I will compare them to the war on ISIL. This analysis will allow us to gain a better understanding of the conceptual and practical aspects of the R2P principle.
Evans notes that the international commission appointed to address R2P policies, identified five criteria of legitimacy for military intervention. If President Obama wants to appeal to the responsibility to protect principle, he must consider them carefully. The first is to “consider the seriousness of the harm being threatened” (Evans, 2008). ISIS has caused large-scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing through torture, mass executions, and bombardment of civilian populations. Additionally, indoctrinated radicals have committed massacres all over the world. Next is the “motivation or primary purpose of the proposed military action” (Evans, 2008). The primary purpose of military action is to minimize or eliminate the threat against vulnerable citizens. Journalist Kate Brannen notes that a year ago, President Obama talked about degrading and destroying ISIL. In November 2015, he said that his goal was to contain this terrorist organization (Brannen, 2015). However, as a result of the terrorist attacks that took place in California, he went back to his former strategy and vowed to destroy ISIL (Collinson, 2015). The third factor is to “consider whether there are reasonably available peaceful alternatives” (Evans, 2008). President Obama has advocated for a peaceful solution to the civil wars in Iraq and Syria. This solution would have a direct impact on the war against ISIL. For instance, Pollack and Walter state, “resolve the civil war, however, and the source of ISIS’s strength and appeal disappears” (Pollack & Walter, 2015). ISIL must be coerced through military action because a peaceful solution simply does not exist. Furthermore, President Obama must “consider the proportionality of the response” (Evans, 2008). Judging the effectiveness of the air strikes against ISIL is a challenging task. The general consensus is that air strikes alone can help to degrade ISIL’s capabilities, but they will not be defeated if these air strikes are not accompanied by ground support. During the ethnic expulsion in Kosovo of 1999, air strikes combined with ground troops were effective in the long run because it “forced the authorities in Belgrade to withdraw their troops, allowed an international stabilization force to enter the province, and allowed for an unprecedented rapid return of refugees” (Seybolt, 2007). US Presidential candidates Marco Rubio and Hillary Clinton have identified this deficiency and vowed to send a few thousand troops to fight against ISIL. The last factor that must be taken into account is to “balance of consequences” (Evans, 2008). Would military action cause more good than harm? Possibly, but that does not mean that military action will not have consequences. Sending ground troops would certainly result in more deaths within our armed forces. It is likely that ISIL would retaliate with further terrorist attacks around the world, but these potential risks are a small price to pay to preserve in order to protect American interests. Above all, more lives will be saved in the long run than those lost in the process of defeating ISIL.
Even though the R2P principle aims to be a selfless measure, it generates a great deal of controversy. The argument is that the coalition can use this policy as a license to intervene in conflicted nations in order to pursue its political, strategic, or economic interests. Another issue is that those nations, who possess veto powers in the UN, are the same ones who are capable of carrying out these operations. For the moment, the US leads Operation Inherent Resolve, a coalition of nations conducting air strikes against ISIL. The problem is that these air strikes can be indiscriminate. Newsweek Journalist, Jack Moore, notes that “according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 250 civilians in Syria were killed by the U.S.-led coalition between September 2014 and November 23, 2015. SOHR also estimates that Russian air strikes have killed 403 civilians, including 166 women and children, since their campaign began in September” (Moore, 2015). This collateral damage can be used by ISIL to radicalize more citizens in order to recruit them. One way to protect civilians is to create a no-fly zone, which is being contemplated at this moment. Ultimately, the question to be answered is whether the greater good of society more important. After seeing the atrocities committed by ISIL, many of us would agree.
To better assess the strategy against ISIL, it is necessary to look at the lessons learned from past conflicts. During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, three quarters of US troops were dedicated to logistics in order to get emergency aid to those who needed it. This shows that humanitarian assistance does not only entail combat, but also logistics, construction, health services, among others. Secondly, NGOs in Somalia lost the ability to negotiate with local leaders and became over dependent on foreign military. It is imperative for NGOs to maintain neutrality during these conflicts because politicization of these organizations could represent their exile. Lastly, this conflict showed the UN that military action is not always an easy and quick solution, as it was believed after Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq.
In Serbia, Operation Deliberate Force demonstrated that air strikes could be effective after NATO was able to drive the Vojska Republika Srpska (VRS), away from Sarajevo within a short period. On the other hand, there was a painful lesson to be learned; we cannot conduct a peacekeeping operation when there is no peace to keep (Seybolt, 2007). Evidently, coercion through military action is an effective way of dealing with belligerent forces.
During the 1994 civil war in Rwanda, the Hutu led a group of about 800,000 refugees in Goma. The problem is that humanitarian organizations found themselves unprepared to handle the influx. As a result, “overcrowding, lack of sanitation, lack of clean water and an insufficient supply of food soon led to epidemics of cholera and dysentery. “The result was 19.5 deaths per 10,000 people per day” (Seybolt, 2007). Operation Support Hope, allowed US troops to alleviate this situation by setting up water purification units and by bringing in antibiotics from the US and Germany. According to Seybolt, “when the US military pulled out, the crude mortality rate was below one per 10,000 per day” (Seybolt, 2007).
The conflict that took place in Somalia between 1991 and 1995 has a similarity to the situation in Iraq. The government seemed incapable of taking charge of the civil war that ensued. Additionally, militias were collecting taxes and stealing humanitarian aid (Seybolt, 2007). We see that ISIL is governing, taxing, and selling oil from those areas under their control. Some of the challenges in this case were to protect the population from famine. Since the militias were stealing most of the goods that arrived from international aid, it did not benefit the population. However, “military airlift called Operation Provide Relief, authorized by the UN to facilitate the emergency delivery of humanitarian assistance by UN agencies and NGOs” (Seybolt, 2007). All of these supplies reached the population because they were not subject to looting from militias. Seybolt states that “according to a study by the Refugee Policy Group and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the number of lives saved during this period was between 20,000 and 60,000, depending on the scenario portrayed, with the median of 40,000 providing a reasonable estimate” (Seybolt, 2007). Unfortunately, something similar is occurring in Syria where trucks containing food and medicine for Syrians displaced from their hometowns are being hijacked by ISIL (Dettmer, 2014). Unfortunately, airlift support is not an option in those areas controlled by ISIL.
Another similarity to the war against ISIL is the level of destruction created by land combat and air strikes. Evans states that there are three basic responsibilities under R2P: “the responsibility to protect, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild” (Evans, 2008). UN forces would have the responsibility to comply with the latter one. For instance, during Operation Restore Hope, security forces worked to improve the port of Mogadishu, the airport, and several roads and bridges. This is very important because vital infrastructure is needed in order to run basic services in a city and is a significant factor in maintaining political stability. Unfortunately, President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of US troops after two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and the death of 18 US soldiers. “U.S. troops left the country in March 1994. The United Nations withdrew from Somalia in March 1995. Fighting continued in the country” (U.S. Department of State, 2013). Even though the United Nations was unable to solve the crisis, the US continued to provide humanitarian aid to the Somali people.
Evans makes an important observation in his book.

He states that we do not have the right to intervene, but the responsibility to protect” (Evans, 2008). Humanitarian intervention can be effective at times, but not always. Seybolt notes that one of the most dangerous aspects of humanitarian intervention is when international governments manipulate the numbers of deaths and refugees to suit their agenda. It is important to report the real amount of people saved because overestimating can be used as an excuse to show effectiveness through radical actions. Additionally, empirical evidence shows in past conflicts, lack of resources and slow response prevented saving more lives. To prevent the same failures from reoccurring, it is necessary to consider three factors “the needs of the population and aid organizations on the ground, the objectives of the intervention, and the strategy employed by the intervener” (Seybolt, 2007). All of these lessons learned helped to shape the current R2P policy. For example, humanitarian intervention terminology was removed because it was linked only to military intervention. As it was shown during Operation Restore Hope, intervention goes well beyond that. Unfortunately, the civil wars of Iraq and Syria are keeping ISIL strong and a negotiated agreement seems to be the only way to end them. The inefficacy to deal with the atrocities committed in Syria and Iraq clearly undermine the principles of the R2P policy because the international community has failed to protect the population from “genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing” (United Nations,

2015).