Agreeing With Russell's Analyses of Sentences and Refuting Strawson's Objection

Introduction
In this paper I will argue that Russell's analyses of sentences is successful and that the objection brought by Strawson can be refuted. Russell’s theory of definite descriptions contains a significant insight in that Russell’s view that what appears to be referential propositions are in fact quantificational is correct.

Russell's theory of definite descriptions
Russell propounds two theses, one about names and the other about definite descriptions. This paper deals with Russell's analysis of definite descriptions, 'the F', and his theory of their proper logical analysis. Definite descriptions are complex quantifier phrases to be analysed as follows: The F is G, which has the logical form ∃x(Fx & ∀y(Fy → x=y) & Gx).

Russell's philosophic goal was to show up superficial similarities in sentences and reveal the underlying logical structure of natural language sentences, thus doing away with ambiguity or vagueness found in language. The heart of Russell’s theory of descriptions, is that definite descriptions, ‘The so and so’, are not singular terms (which take their semantic value from the object), thus they do not refer to a singular object. Russell argues that this shows that surface form does not reveal logical structure and he takes a non-referential interpretation. Russell argues that definite descriptions are general terms, thus the phrases refer to objects that satisfy a general condition. The distinctions that Russell draws between different logical forms allowed him to explain three important puzzles concerning names and definite descriptions: empty names, substitution into belief contexts, and informativeness of identity statements. This paper will only show how Russell’s analysis solves the problems of e...

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...analyzed retains its significance. However, there are a number of objections to Russell not covered in this paper and it seems overall truth-value judgments are a subject that still open for debate.

References
Donnellan, Keith S. (July 1966). "Reference and Definite Descriptions". The Philosophical Review (The Philosophical Review, Vol. 75, No. 3) 75 (3): 281–304. doi:10.2307/2183143. JSTOR 2183143

Ludlow, Peter, "Descriptions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .
Russell , Bertrand. ‘On Denoting’ Mind, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 56. (Oct., 1905), pp. 479-493.
Russell, Bertrand, ‘Descriptions’ A.W. Moore, ed., Meaning and Reference, OUP 1993)
Strawson, P. F. ‘On Referring’, Mind, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 235. (Jul., 1950), pp. 320-344