Defining a Rigid Designator

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Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, (Kripke 1980, 48) It is to say that the referent of rigid designator, speaking of a possible world or a counterfactual situation, is as same as its referent in the actual world. For example the term “President of the United States” is not a rigid term designating Omaba, because there is possible world in which the president of the United States is not Obama and hence the term doesn’t designate him (doesn’t refer to Omaba) in that world. But “Obama” designate Obama in every possible world, thus is a rigid designator. Notice, saying that in the world W the referent of “Obama” is Omaba, doesn’t mean that the residents of W use the term “Obama” to designate Obama. It just means that in describing W when we use “Obama”, we are referring to Obama. Krikpe also argues that proper names are rigid designators. For example, consider these two sentences: 1) Aristotle joined the Academy. 2) The teacher of Alexander the great joined the Academy. Intuitively, “Aristotle” in the first sentence refers to Aristotle but “the teacher of Alexander the great” doesn’t necessarily refer to Aristotle (for example in a world in which Plato is the teacher of Alexander the great). Also his arguments for rigidity of proper names, rests upon our linguistic intuition i.e. language users use proper names in modal contexts as if they are rigid: One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators. (Kripke 1980, 48) Or elsewhere: In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators, (Kripke 1980, 49) Now let us talk a little about different theories about semantics of proper names. Th... ... middle of paper ... ...by (1)! Second, DQ also along with the very intuitive principle called principle of translation, results another paradox . Third, the following scenario shows that DQ, at least in the form presented earlier, can’t be true: consider a possible world in which Venus and many other celestial bodies are called “Phosphorus”. Also in this world I truly believe that Phosphorus (=Venus) is visible in the morning and I don’t know that it is also visible in the evening. Now suppose a man, pointing to Venus in the evening, wants me to agree or disagree with the sentence “Phosphorus is visible in the morning”. Since I don’t know that the term “Phosphorus” used in this sentence refers to Venus, I can’t agree with that and according to DQ I don’t believe that Phosphorus is visible in the morning. Therefore I both do and do not believe that Phosphorus is visible in the morning!

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