Russell's Theory of Descriptions in On Denoting

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Russell's Theory of Descriptions in On Denoting

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this essay is to give an exposition of the theory of descriptions as it is first set forth by Russell in his article 'On Denoting' found in Mind 1905.

Each section of this article will be explained in my own words, with the exception of some of the symbolic logic. Russell's own words are indicated by speech marks.

I have tried not to simply re-write what Russell has said, but rather endeavoured to explain, in an original way, each part of Russell's theses, and in the order that they are found in the article.

Firstly, I will outline the article 'On Denoting' giving my own understanding of the theory of descriptions as Russell introduces it. It should be noted that the phrase 'theory of descriptions' is not used in this article, but is coined later in Russell's philosophy.

AN OUTLINE OF 'ON DENOTING'

The theory of descriptions is Russell's solution to the problem's caused by the interpretation of denoting phrases.

This solution can be found in his article 'On Denoting' (Mind, 1905). What follows is an outline of the theory as it is proposed in that article.

A denoting phrase is a phrase such as the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present king of England, the present king of France.

These denoting phrases can be classed into either one of two groups; those containing definite descriptions and those containing indefinite descriptions.

A denoting phrase is a denoting phrase purely because of its form, not its 'content'. By this is meant, for example, that a denoting phrase need not actually denote anything in order to be a denoting phrase, it simply needs to have the form of a phrase that is...

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...t the object is an actual constituent of that proposition. The proposition contains merely the constituents of those words contained in the denoting phrase.

Therefore, with every proposition we could possibly apprehend (whether true or not) each of their constituents are real entities with which we do have immediate acquaintance, so long as we can apprehend them.

The minds of others are not known to us by acquaintance but by denoting phrases. We can then know the properties of other minds while not knowing the actual minds themselves, because we can know the constituents of the denoting phrases used to introduce them to us.

Hence, of those propositions that have the actual mind as a constituent we cannot know them.

Lastly, Russell begs the reader not to go against his theory unless at least the reader can himself reveal his own theory on denotation.

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